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The thesis investigates the issue of public participation in decision-making on public-
private partnership (PPP) projects in Kazakhstan. A central question explored here is how, if at 
all, the authorities of Kazakhstan ensure public participation in the decision-making on PPP 
projects. Likewise, an analysis is conducted of the different modes of participation by the 
public, namely meaningful participation, non-participation and pseudo-participation, and how 
they can affect PPP projects. The thesis also studies the broader implications of public 
participation in the decision-making on PPPs for the society in Kazakhstan more generally.          
By employing a multi-method approach, in particular, interviews, content analysis and 
case studies, I argue that there remains a deficiency in public participation in the decision-
making on PPP projects in Kazakhstan. As the findings and arguments presented in the research 
indicate, through an assessment of both domestic and international case studies, public 
participation, namely meaningful participation positively affects the course of PPPs, leading to 
an effective and more democratic realisation of PPP projects. Similarly, the analysis also shows 
how non-participation and pseudo-participation by the public in the decision-making on PPPs 
negatively impact the course of PPP projects, bringing about various risks that could lead to 
adverse political and economic outcomes resulting in the suspension of PPPs.                           
Through analysing the state of public participation in the decision-making on PPPs in 
Kazakhstan and the resulting implications, the key claim is made that public participation in the 
decision-making on PPPs can lead to the development and advancement of political pluralism,   
civil society, social capital and to the enhancement of representative democracy in Kazakhstan. 
Public participation in the decision-making on PPPs can also contribute to the promotion of 
local, participatory and e-democracy in the country. These are crucial implications arising from 
ensuring public participation in the decision-making on PPP projects for the society in 
Kazakhstan. The implications of this research go beyond the particular Kazakhstani experience 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
The present thesis is an investigation into the issue of public participation in the decision-
making on public-private partnership projects (PPP) in Kazakhstan. As a form of collaboration 
between the public and  private sectors, PPP is widely applied by countries as a tool in 
implementing infrastructure projects, yet the employment of this tool has been due to various 
reasons and priorities in different nations. While in certain countries economic challenges or 
financial constraints such as budget deficits have motivated the use of PPP, other countries have 
used PPP to ameliorate the provision of public services by involving the private sector 
(Chowdhury, et al., 2011, p. 247).  
As a public policy, it is important to note that first and foremost, PPP is concerned with 
the wellbeing of people and is therefore adopted for their interests as its main users. In other 
words, PPP is adopted by governments for citizens qua the end users of public services 
delivered under the PPP mechanism. This important orientation of public policy is tied to the 
democratic understanding of politics itself. For instance, in delineating the concept of 
‘political’, Gauba draws a parallel with the notion of ‘polity’, where political decisions are made 
for the public (Gauba, 2013, p. 1). Similarly, Wolin (1960, cited in Gauba, 2013, p. 1) distinctly 
depicts the idea of ‘political’ as follows:  
Certain functions, such as national defence, internal order, the dispensing of 
justice, and economic regulation, have been declared the primary 
responsibility of political institutions, largely on the grounds that the interests 
and ends served by these functions were beneficial to all of the members of 
the community (Gauba, 2013, p. 1).  
It could therefore be concluded that public policies in general, including PPP policy, is adopted 
for the sake of the public and should be maximally beneficial to the public. This aim is itself 
based on the democratic understanding that politicians and officials represent the interests of 
citizens, fulfilling their primary obligations on behalf of citizens and for their sake, who 
delegate their powers to these representatives.   
Generally speaking, democracy itself is construed as a broad conception, containing 
various characteristics, models and theories. These different ideas aim to account for a wide 
range of issues such as the democratic rights of an individual, the role of people or majority in 
governing polity, global democratic challenges, to name a few. As Held (1996, p. 1) has pointed 




ancient Greece to the modern era. This continuous scrutiny of the notion has played a part in 
its complexity and evolution through time. Noting this complexity, such an idea as 
‘participation’ has always played a significant democratic and political role for citizens, 
especially as a right to participate in political processes. This is why the concept of 
‘participation’, and more precisely ‘political participation’ has been under the scrutiny of 
different political thinkers, such as Verba and Nie (1972), Lucas (1976), Macpherson (1977), 
Pennock (1979), Birch (1993), Bishop and Davis (2002), Teorell (2006), to name just a few. 
Moreover, scholars such as Mill (1910) and Pateman (1970) advocate the idea of ‘participation’ 
as a more requisite and democratic method of effecting the power of people – democracy in 
practice. 
Since the early years of the post-Soviet period in Kazakhstan the issue of ensuring citizen 
participation in the decision-making on public affairs has always remained acute, especially in 
practice. Therefore, the participation of citizens in the decision-making on PPP projects needs 
to be examined within the ongoing PPP policy in Kazakhstan. The PPP policy in the country 
has been recently introduced at large, and the basic law regulating the relations in the field of 
PPP, namely ‘On Public-Private Partnership’, was adopted in 2015. This recent enactment of 
the law is in addition to the law ‘On Concessions’, which as a widespread form of PPP has been 
in place since 2006. Nonetheless, citizen participation as a democratic aspect in the framework 
of the current PPP policy requires critical exploration into how it is operating. In particular, the 
question ought to be asked as to whether in fact citizen participation in the decision-making on 
PPP projects, whose implications affect the interests and lives of people as the end users of 
PPPs, is ensured by the government.   
Apart from citizens, other non-state actors such as interest groups should also be involved 
in the decision-making on PPP projects.  The importance of involving such groups is due to the 
fact that they also have the right to express their views on public policies (programmes), 
including a PPP policy. Therefore, they are also interested in how government implements a 
PPP policy whose practical implications, that is, PPP projects and their associated outcomes  
can directly or indirectly affect the democratic interests and rights of citizens who create and 
run interest groups. For instance, in his book Social Theory Сole (1920, p. 7) depicts 
associations in society as a form of guild of individuals who pursue common goals by taking 
actions to achieve them. From this interpretation, interest groups can be understood as 
associations or institutions from diverse spheres of social life that enter and attempt to influence 
societal relations affecting their interests. Therefore, since PPP projects can be implemented in 




groups. Consequently, they also have the democratic right to speak out and voice their opinions 
and concerns regarding PPP projects and their possible impacts. As such, given that interest 
groups as well as citizens ought to be involved in the decision-making on PPPs, in the course 
of the thesis I consider the participation of both citizens and interests groups, therefore 
highlighting the involvement of different voices in the decision-making processes on PPPs.        
With this exposition in mind, the aim of this thesis is to investigate the merits of public 
participation in the decision-making on PPP projects, understood primarily as a democratic tool, 
through the case study of Kazakhstan. As a young country aiming for strengthening its 
democratic development, Kazakhstan presents a case where the strengths and shortcomings of 
public participation in the decision-making on PPPs, as they stand today, can be investigated. 
And furthermore, the present research can offer new insights into how public participation in 
the decision-making on PPP projects can be used and implemented in ways to further 
democratic values and processes.  
Speaking about the PPP policy in Kazakhstan, the government is now actively employing 
PPP as an opportunity to attract investment and other technological capabilities of private 
institutions in the joint implementation of infrastructure projects alongside government bodies. 
Since the Republic of Kazakhstan is a developing country (International Statistical Institute, 
2017), PPP is considered to be one of the tools instrumental in achieving the strategic objective, 
namely the development of the national economy. In 2011 the Programme for the Development 
of Public-Private Partnership in Kazakhstan for 2011-2015 was developed and adopted to 
realise the Address of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan – ‘The new decade, the new 
economic growth, the new opportunities of Kazakhstan’ to the people given on the 29th of 
January 2010 (Decree of the Government ‘On Approval of the Programme for the Development 
of Public-Private Partnership in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2011-2015 and Making 
Amendment to the Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 14 April 2010 
No. 302’, 2011). The programme was, furthermore, developed in order to implement the ‘State 
Programme on the Forced Industrial and Innovative Development of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan for 2010-2014’ (Decree of the Government ‘On Approval of the Programme for 
the Development of Public-Private Partnership in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2011-2015 
and Making Amendment to the Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 14 
April 2010 No. 302’, 2011).   
Currently PPP networks in Kazakhstan working to implement infrastructure projects 
include both public institutions and private organisations. It should be noted that within the 




attracting private sector actors in the implementation of socially significant projects. A private 
partner, according to article 1, subsection 2 of the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan ‘On 
Public-Private Partnership’ (2015), is understood as an individual entrepreneur, legal entity or 
consortium that enters into a PPP arrangement. Furthermore, in 2006 the Law of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan ‘On Concessions’ was adopted, stating that a concession is an ‘activity aimed at 
the creation (reconstruction) and operation of concession facilities that is carried out at the 
expense of concessionaire’s funds or on terms of co-financing by a grantor’ (Law ‘On 
Concessions’, 2006). The introduction of the concept of concessions in Kazakhstan is 
noteworthy, since it is viewed as one of the most common forms of PPP implemented around 
the world (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004; UNECE, 2008; Zapatrina, 2011; Siemiatycki, 2012).  
Given this exposition, it can be seen that for citizens of any state, including Kazakhstan, 
it is important to know how effectively a PPP policy is implemented in practice, that is, whether 
the public services under the PPP mechanism bring about the desired results for citizens as the 
end users of PPPs, meeting their interests. Furthermore, with regards to the democratic 
considerations of PPP policy in the context of Kazakhstan, it is of interest to the citizens to 
know how the state, particularly politicians and officials ensure representative democracy while 
exercising the PPP policy in practice. Since politicians and officials as representatives act and 
make decisions on behalf of citizens and with their interest in mind, it is important to examine 
how the interests of citizens are protected and promoted during the implementation of PPP 
projects. This enquiry is especially noteworthy for the case of Kazakhstan, given the nation’s 
recent history, and its current quest for democratisation.  
As noted earlier, Kazakhstan gained its independence just under 30 years ago following 
the dissolution of Soviet Union. It is clear that the authoritarian political regime of the Soviet 
Union has left its profound imprint on its former republics, including Kazakhstan. Such impacts 
indeed extend to these nations’ political systems. A description of such political drawback is 
exemplified in the work of Grugel (2002), where she depicts the maelstrom of democratisation 
in the post-Soviet nations. For example, Grugel shows how the ex-Soviet republics were in a 
complete turmoil after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and accordingly, the progress towards 
democratisation was extremely obscure and onerous (Grugel, 2002, p. 197). Besides, as Grugel 
argues further, democratisation could not be advanced both on the part of governments and 
societies (ibid., p. 198). This is due to the fact that former member states of the Soviet Union 
inherited an uncertain and unsteady political legacy from the former Soviet Union, namely the 
encumbrance of the undeveloped society in terms of democratic development (Grugel, 2002, p. 




undeveloped, and more importantly, the democratisation prospects were ambiguous (ibid.). 
Similarly, Rutland has noted that the social gap and economic recession were exacerbated in 
Russia in the early years of the post-Soviet period, thus making the development of the 
democratic society most challenging (Rutland, 1996, p. 249). It is clear that such political, 
democratic, social and economic woes following the fall of the Soviet Union, were not limited 
to Russia, but rather extended to all former republics of the Soviet Union, including Kazakhstan.  
The first few years of formation of a new independent Kazakhstan, there were various 
examples of vacuums in the society and government particularly regarding democracy and free 
markets. For instance, in 1991, the year of independence, the government adopted the Law ‘On 
Concessions in the Republic of Kazakhstan’ that was a reasonable move insofar as the country 
had to revitalise its economy, including through the development of private entrepreneurship. 
However, the law was imperfect, since at the time not only was a market environment not 
properly institutionalised, but domestic entrepreneurship was also underdeveloped. 
Furthermore, the law was democratically flawed, especially in relation to domestic private 
institutions. This is since, according to article 1 of the above law, the concession as the right to 
perform an economic activity was to be granted exclusively to a foreign legal entity or 
entrepreneur. As a result, the law was repealed in 1993 (Law ‘On Recognition Invalid the Law 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan ‘On Concessions in the Republic of Kazakhstan’, 1993).   
Furthermore, in the first years of independence the society in Kazakhstan was not 
evolving in democratic conditions. In this period citizens did not have the rights to voice their 
opinions during the decision-making processes on public matters, including the laws, public 
programmes and infrastructure projects. For example, examining the opinion poll issues in the 
ex-Soviet countries during the first years of the states’ independence, Bashkirova argued that 
the authorities disregarded the people’s voices, whereas public opinion on public policies would 
significantly advance democratisation in societies (Bashkirova, 1995, pp. 291-292).  
Given these historical and democratic contexts in Kazakhstan, it is crucial to examine 
how, after a certain period of development as an independent state, the democratic processes 
have improved in the country. In particular, given the focus of the present thesis, it is worth 
enquiring how the government is currently ensuring public participation in the decision-making 
on PPP projects. 
With the preceding exposition in mind, the present research aims to answer the following 
key research questions; 
- How, if at all, is public participation in the decision-making on PPP projects ensured by 




- How do participation, pseudo-participation, and non-participation of the public affect 
PPP projects? 
- What, if any, are the implications of public participation in the decision-making on PPPs 
for the society in Kazakhstan? 
The answers to these questions will be revealing in various ways. Firstly, the answers will give 
an insight into the current state of political rights of the public through the lens of public 
participation in the decision-making on PPP projects in the country. This insight has practical 
significance for the public since, as mentioned earlier, the implications of PPP affect the lives 
and interests of the public. Secondly, investigating these questions would be revealing of how 
democratically the authorities of Kazakhstan implement the PPP policy in practice. That is, 
whether they ensure public participation in the decision-making on PPP projects. Thirdly, and 
more importantly, through a multi-method approach adopted for this research, the extent to 
which the authorities truly take into account opinions and interests of citizens while making 
decisions on PPPs will be discerned. To be specific, the question of whether meaningful 
participation of the public is ensured in the decision-making on PPP projects will be examined, 
that is, whether the authorities enable citizens and interest groups to influence their decisions 
on PPPs. In this vein, an understanding will be gained regarding the impacts of meaningful 
participation and/or its absence in the decision-making on PPP projects, and how it impacts the 
practical implementation of PPP projects. In other words, although traditionally PPP policies 
have been motivated by economics, here the assumption that meaningful public participation, 
in addition to advancing democracy, would assist in attaining economic goals will be explored.  
Particularly, as the cases examined reveal, the economic effectiveness of PPP projects may rely 
on how democratically they are implemented. Lastly, through such an understanding, an 
account can be offered of how public participation in the decision-making on PPP projects, can 
impact the society in Kazakhstan by bringing about democratic benefits for it.     
Given the outline of the aims and context of the present research, the outline of the thesis 
is as follows. In the next chapter (Chapter two), I will present the conceptual framework and 
the methodology employed in the research. In the conceptual framework I will outline the 
concept of participation that I will be using throughout the work. Given the focus of this 
research on public participation as a democratic aspect, the concept is understood as an attempt 
on the part of the public to influence the government decisions related to PPP projects. In the 
second part of the chapter I will outline the methodology employed, detailing three methods 
used in gathering and analysing data. These are qualitative, semi-structured interviews 




Kazakhstan, case studies in the form of examples of PPP projects in Kazakhstan, and content 
analysis whereby official documents (normative legal acts) will be analysed.   
Chapter three presents a literature review whereby important scholarly contributions in 
the debate about PPP are critically examined. Among the topics included in this review are 
principles of PPP, risks, success factors and challenges involving public control, monitoring 
and participation in the decision-making on PPP projects. Through this examination I will point 
out the gap in the literature that this work aims to fill, namely that pertaining specifically to the 
democratic issue related to public participation in the decision-making on PPP projects. The 
project aims to fill this gap through a focus on the case of public participation in the decision-
making on PPP projects in Kazakhstan. This would be a revealing case, since Kazakhstan still 
has some authoritarian elements in governance, thus making the significance of public 
participation in the decision-making on PPP projects more salient and revealing. Despite the 
focus of the thesis being on Kazakhstan, the issue of concern has international importance. To 
show this broader importance and relevance, in chapter four I look at three cases of PPP projects 
in different countries (China, Taiwan, and Tanzania), where the significance of public 
participation in PPP and the adverse consequences arising from non-participation and pseudo-
participation of the public can be seen. The empirical data examined in this chapter will be 
drawn on in the later chapters where I give conceptual and practical implications, together with 
conclusions of the research.  
In chapter five I start to use the data collected as part of the fieldwork for this research to 
outline the current state of public participation in the decision-making on PPP projects in 
Kazakhstan. In particular, I will draw on the interviews conducted with the representatives of 
government bodies and quasi-state institutions in different parts of the country to argue that 
there is a problem of deficiency in public participation in the decision-making on PPP projects 
in the country. Furthermore, I will examine the existing legislation of Kazakhstan (normative 
legal acts) to argue that the deficiency in public participation in PPP project is in part due to 
provisions in the existing legislation of Kazakhstan. Following these observations, in chapter 
six I examine two cases of PPP projects in Kazakhstan, namely the construction of the Kok-
Zhailau ski-resort, and the construction and operation of the Big Almaty Ring Automobile 
Road, within which local authorities did not initially ensure public participation, as well as 
meaningful participation. Looking at these cases in detail, I will show how different risk factors 
arising in the projects, which adversely affected their course, were due to not ensuring public 
participation, along with meaningful participation of the public in the decision-making on the 




In chapter seven, reviewing recent developments in the case of the ‘Kok-Zhailau’ project, 
I will argue for the benefits of meaningful public participation both for the democratic and 
effective realisation of PPP projects, as well as for the development and advancement of 
political pluralism, civil society, social capital and for the enhancement of representative 
democracy in  Kazakhstan, which are conducive to the democratisation of the society in the 
country at large.   As I will show, meaningful participation not only minimises different risk 
factors therefore assisting in the effective implementation of PPPs, but it also empowers citizens 
and interest groups to influence the decisions on PPPs, thus bringing about a more democratic 
realisation of PPPs and democratising the society in Kazakhstan on the whole. Having noted 
these benefits, I will then suggest ways in which the existing legislation of Kazakhstan could 
be improved to reflect the importance and benefits of public participation in the decision-
making on PPPs for projects, as well as for the society. These improvements include mandating 
the government to expand and ensure meaningful participation of the public in the decision-
making on PPPs and other legal measures directed at ensuring responsiveness, accountability 
and public control, thus enhancing representative democracy. Also, such legal measures can 
contribute to the promotion of local, participatory and e-democracy in Kazakhstan, thus 
benefitting the society in the country.    
Lastly, in chapter eight, I will offer a summary of the arguments and key findings of the 
research. As I will show, the analyses presented in the thesis have valuable theoretical, 
conceptual and practical contributions. These include contribution to democratic theory and 
concept of ‘participation’, as well as to the concept and theory of participatory democracy. 
Practical contributions of this work, in addition to suggesting pathways for the democratic and 
effective implementation of PPP projects, include those related to the development and 
advancement of political pluralism, civil society, social capital, the enhancement of 
representative democracy, as well as the promotion of local, participatory and e-democracy. I 






Chapter 2 – Conceptual Framework and Methodology 
 
The aim of this chapter is to outline the conceptual framework within which the research 
is conducted. Through a brief survey of the relevant literature, in the first section I detail the 
key concepts that define the outlook of the work, thus directing the methodology and the 
analysis of the project. As I point out, of especial importance to this research is the distinction 
between meaningful participation and pseudo-participation. Identifying different instances of 
these modes of participation would allow for an enquiry into how the authorities of Kazakhstan 
approach public participation in the decision-making processes on PPPs, as well as the ways in 
which the engagement of public in PPP projects can be improved through legal measures as a 
way to improve the current state of public participation in PPPs. Having defined the conceptual 
framework, in the second section the methodology employed for collection and analysis of data 
is detailed. As was noted in the previous chapter, I employ a multi-method approach to answer 
the research questions. These include qualitative interviews, case studies, and content analysis 
of normative legal documents. In giving details of my methodological approach, I detail what 
each method entails, explaining what they offer for the analysis, as well as the ways in which 
these methods are complementary and offer more comprehensive answers to the research 
questions.   
 
2.1. Conceptual Framework 
 
Given the focus of this research and the particular research questions the thesis aims to 
answer, I make extensive use of the concept of participation. The notion of participation 
embodies a democratic idea, inasmuch as it signifies the participation of the public in the 
decision-making on PPP projects with outcomes that affect the lives and interests of people and 
interests groups. The importance of participation in developing democratic countries lies in its 
empowering quality for the public. Consequently, various political thinkers have advocated for 
participation. For example, the proponents of participatory democracy such as Rousseau 
(1968), Mill (1910), Cole (1920), Pateman (1970) emphasise the notion of participation, insofar 
as they view it as the inalienable democratic right of people by means of which people should 
and can exercise their power – democracy. In this outlook, it is owing to participation that 
people can protect and promote their democratic interests and rights. In other words, through 
education people can understand how they exercise their democratic power through 




Rousseau argues that sovereignty is the basis of the body politic which is based on the general 
will of the people, however, these wills cannot be alienated from the people, although their 
powers can be delegated (Rousseau, 1968, p. 69). From Rousseau’s point of view, therefore, 
although citizens delegate their power to their elected representatives, the citizens themselves 
are the source and basis of sovereignty. In this sense, governments and their institutions can be 
seen as tools for implementing the general will of the people. As such, citizens possess the full 
moral right to act, participate and demand from the state and their servants the proper fulfilment 
of the general will.   
Noting the historical importance of the notion of participation, and the different senses in 
which different scholars have defined and defended the notion, it is important to clarify the 
working definition of participation that will be used throughout this thesis. As a concept 
emerging from democratic theory, Teorell (2006) has proposed that the concept of participation 
should be understood within the context of three models of democracy, namely, responsive, 
participatory, and deliberative models, with each model offering an understanding of a certain 
aspect of the conception. Within the responsive model of democracy, Teorell describes 
participation as an “influencing attempt” (Teorell, 2006, pp. 788-789). In this characterisation 
Teorell follows Verba and Nie (1972) who view participation as “acts that aim at influencing 
the government, either by affecting the choice of government personnel or by affecting the 
choices made by government personnel” (Verba & Nie, 1972, p. 2). Participation as 
‘influencing attempt’ implies the opportunity of citizens to express their voices on decisions 
made by government bodies (Miller, 1992 cited in Teorell, 2006, p. 789). Understood as such, 
participation is a tool that helps government decision-makers to respond to citizens’ needs 
(Teorell, 2006, p. 789). Similarly, according to Verba, participation can be seen as “a 
mechanism for representation, a means by which governing officials are informed of the 
preferences and needs of the public and are induced to respond to those preferences and needs” 
(Verba, 1996, p. 1). In the context of participatory model of democracy, on the other hand, 
Teorell defines participation as “direct decision-making” (Teorell, 2006, pp. 789-790). This is 
in light of Gould’s notion of participation, where participation is viewed as “direct and 
immediate involvement in the process of decision making by the individuals concerned. Thus, 
in this process, the authority of individuals is not delegated to some representatives but 
exercised directly by them” (Gould, 1988, p. 259). Lastly, within the deliberative model of 
democracy participation is defined as political discussion, noting that “to participate is to 




 Within the present work, I will be focusing on the notion of participation understood in 
the first sense, namely as influencing attempt. This understanding of the concept helps to better 
problematise and examine the issue at hand, especially in the case of Kazakhstan, since the 
decisions regarding PPP projects in Kazakhstan are usually initiated and made by government 
bodies. As such, and given the previously mentioned importance of citizens’ input in the 
decision-making on PPP projects, this understanding of participation would enable a better 
examination of the extent to which citizens and interest groups are involved in influencing the 
government decisions regarding PPPs.   
Another important conceptual clarification here is the notion of ‘meaningful 
participation’. In Participation and Democratic Theory (1970), Carole Pateman defines 
participation as participation of people in decision-making and argues that this participation can 
only be regarded as meaningful if and when people are able to influence decisions in such a 
way that their outcomes satisfy the participants’ interests (Pateman, 1970, pp. 68-69). Pateman 
therefore distinguishes meaningful participation from ‘pseudo-participation’, which, as Verba 
defines it, is used as a method of persuasion to agree with an already made decision (Verba, 
1961, pp. 220-221). Pateman attaches great importance to meaningful participation, since she 
argues that it is only through participation that citizens can influence the decisions made by 
their representatives (Pateman, 1970, p. 110). Participation, in this sense, creates more 
opportunities for electors to control and direct the actions of their representatives in 
government.  
A further reason for why Pateman upholds and advocates for participation is that often 
the elected representatives often fail to protect and promote the people’s interests and therefore 
do not properly fulfil their primary duties to them. As she notes in her discussion, ‘the classical 
democratic theory’ pays little attention to such a fundamental principle as participation of 
citizens, thus diminishing its ‘democratic character’ (Pateman, 1970, pp. 103-104). Pateman is 
therefore critical of political thinkers associated with classical democracy, such as Schumpeter 
(1943), Berelson (1954), Dahl (1956) and Sartori (1962), who curb the role of people’s 
participation and believe that active participation of citizens can lead to the destruction of a 
political system. Pateman argues that while for Schumpeter citizen participation is limited to 
participation in elections, for Berelson the stable functioning of a political system is the most 
important factor, even if it means the confined participation of people who themselves do not 
show an interest in public affairs (Pateman, 1970, pp. 5-7). Similarly, Pateman maintains that 
Dahl also did not approve of political participation of individuals due to the importance he gave 




defines polyarchy as a system in which power is shared by different people and groups, as 
Pateman notes, the representatives of classical theory of democracy, including Dahl, have not 
encouraged the participation of people in political processes, giving to it ‘a minimal role’ 
(Pateman, 1970, pp.1-11). This is since, as Dahl argued, among the lower socioeconomic 
groups, there are ‘authoritarian’ personalities who, if allowed participation, could bring the 
decline of polyarchy as a political system (Dahl, 1956 cited in Pateman, 1970, p. 10). Lastly, 
Pateman points to Sartori’s lack of sympathy for individuals’ active participation in politics, 
due to his conviction that such activities would result in a totalitarian system of governance, 
which Sartori understood as a struggle between competing elites for power (Sartori, 1962 cited 
in Pateman, 1970, p. 11). Through her arguments against these thinkers on the issue of 
participation, Pateman stresses that in practice, the lack of public participation prevents people 
from protecting and promoting their democratic interests and rights (Pateman, 1970, pp. 1-11). 
It is worth noting that a positive example of people’s participation in decision-making given by 
Pateman (1970, pp.85-102), namely, the functioning of workers’ councils in the industry of the 
former Yugoslavia, demonstrates that such participation is not dependant on the fact that a state 
should be a mature democracy. As such, public participation in the decision-making on PPPs 
in Kazakhstan can be considered as one of tools in promoting democratic processes in the 
country.    
Pateman is not the only scholar to emphasise the importance of participation, since others 
have also noted the need for citizens to have their say in decisions that could potentially impact 
their lives and interests. For instance, Cole (1920) argued that people’s participation should not 
be limited to their right to vote, and expressive power should be granted to citizens more 
extensively. Noting especially the importance of social groups and associations, Cole argues 
that “we ought to aim not merely at giving people votes, but at calling forth their full 
participation in the common direction of the affairs of the community” (Cole, 1920, p. 208). 
This arises from Cole’s conviction that “self-expression involves self-government” (Cole, 
1920, p.208), thus demonstrating the importance he attaches to participation of citizens.    
Similarly, Mill (1910) emphasises the significance of public participation in public 
affairs, especially at the level of local government. As he notes, in addition to the power of 
voting, citizens can themselves get elected to local executive bodies, thus serving their local 
communities (Mill, 1910, p. 348). This point serves as an answer to one of Mill’s concerns, 
namely the presence of self-interested officials and politicians as one of the vulnerabilities in 
public governance (ibid, p. 254). As a solution to this worry, Mill points to the need for local 




have the power to hold their local representatives more accountable and responsive through 
their active participation, and therefore contribute to effective local governance (Mill, 1910, pp. 
347-348). As such, it can be seen that public participation has the potential to bring officials 
and citizens closer to each other, and even act as a deterrent to self-interested and uncontrolled 
actions and decisions by representatives.   
Various political scholars have emphasised the need for participation along with its 
democratic benefits. For instance, Arnstein has argued that “citizen participation is a categorical 
term for citizen power” (Arnstein, 1969, pp. 216-217). Similarly, Held has pointed out that one 
of advantages of participation is the “minimization (eradication, if possible) of unaccountable 
bureaucratic power in public and private life” (Held, 1996, p. 271). The democratic benefits of 
participation have been emphasised in the literature as well. For instance Verba and Nie have 
argued that more participation in decision-making equals more democracy (Verba & Nie, 
1972), while Gauba has stressed the capability of participation to enhance the accountability 
and responsiveness of office-bearers to people (Gauba, 2013, p. 572). Other scholars who have 
noted such benefits include Lucas (1976), Pennock (1979), Birch (1993), and Judge (1999), to 
name a few.  
Importantly, some of these scholars argue that participation can contribute to the effective 
realisation of government policies. For instance, Pennock claims that participation can help 
officials implement public policies more effectively, thus meeting citizens’ demands (Pennock, 
1979, p. 441). Likewise, Birch has argued that participation improves the effectiveness of 
office-bearers’ work at both central and local levels, since it can make them aware of citizens’ 
needs and problems (Birch, 1993, p. 81). Participation as consultation, therefore, can be seen 
to be an effective tool in good governance (Thomas, 1990, 1993; Shand & Arnberg, 1996) 
The conceptual exposition above highlights the important aspects of the notion of 
participation that are of interest to the present project. As a democratic tool, I take participation 
to denote an attempt to influence the government decisions on PPP projects in particular. The 
conceptual distinction between meaningful participation and pseudo-participation enables a 
richer analysis and discussion of the cases considered, especially in identifying how effective 
public participation has been. Furthermore, I argue that participation cannot and ought not to 
be limited to participation in voting and that the public ought to have a more extensive role to 
play. This can be manifested through different forms of public participation in decision-making 
on public affairs (public meetings, hearings, surveys, advisory boards/committees and so forth), 
including on PPP projects. Participation defined as such is of utmost importance for citizens in 




also to hold their representatives accountable and responsive. Moreover, participation can also 
ensure the adequate public control over officials and their decisions.  In this way, the importance 
of participation as a democratic tool is highlighted. Lastly, as the exposition above indicates, 
the success of PPP projects and accordingly PPP policies can be also ensured with meaningful 
participation of the public. PPP policies planned and enacted in this way are more responsive 
to the needs and interests of people, and with the participation of the public, the implementation 
of PPP projects can be more effective and efficient. Therefore, participation can have a positive 
effect on the implementation of public policies, including that of PPP projects.  
Given this conceptual framework, the case for investigating the public participation in the 
decision-making on PPP projects in Kazakhstan is made. In the current situation in Kazakhstan, 
the role of citizens and interest groups to express their voices on decisions regarding PPP 
projects is limited due to the lack of commitment to ensuring public participation in the 
decision-making on PPPs. This limited role of public participation, in its turn, leads to 
difficulties in managing projects, not benefitting citizens. I will briefly outline two examples to 
demonstrate how the conceptual background laid out here can be used effectively to understand 
the strengths of public participation, including meaningful participation and the shortcomings 
of non-participation, together with pseudo-participation of the public in the decision-making on 
PPPs in Kazakhstan. 
A case I consider later on in the thesis involves an ongoing PPP project on the 
construction and operation of a toll road in Almaty region. The regional authorities did not 
involve the public in the discussion of the project during its planning phase. As a result, without 
having heard the opinions of the locals, the authorities of Almaty region went ahead with 
redeeming plots of land and properties belonging to local residents for the planned construction 
of the toll road. Although such a decision clearly concerns the local residents’ interests and has 
a profound effect on their lives, it was made without their consultation. Furthermore, the 
authorities attempted to acquire the plots of land and properties of local residents at 
unreasonably low prices, leading to the suffering of many low-income families. Not 
surprisingly, this decision led to social, legal, investment, political and corruption problems 
which, as well as their problematic impact on the locals, had a considerably adverse influence 
on the project itself. It should be noted that although the authorities began to consult the public 
by holding public hearings long after making the decision, the public participation in the 
decision-making on the project was not meaningful.         
In this PPP case, the regional authorities made the decisions without considering people’s 




PPP projects are implemented for citizens’ interests and needs as the primary users. In this 
example, where the regional authorities made decisions and implemented them without 
consulting the people concerned, it is clear that Pateman’s scepticism is realised. As was noted 
earlier in this section, Pateman (1970) argued that the representatives of people do not always 
fulfil their duties to electors as needed and expected of them, which generally undermines 
representative democracy. I furthermore agree with Pateman’s conviction that public 
participation should not be limited to participation in elections, and more importantly, that 
public participation should be extended to enable citizens and interest groups to express their 
opinions on government decisions, whose outcomes affect their lives and interests. As can be 
seen from the above example, the lack of public consultation as a widespread form of 
participation in the decision-making processes can have adverse impacts both on the lives of 
the public, as well as on the successful implementation of PPP projects. What this case 
highlights, therefore, is the importance of public participation in the decision-making processes 
on PPP projects which are primarily implemented for the interests of people.    
Another case that will be considered in more detail later on, is the PPP project on the 
construction and operation of a ski resort on the Kok-Zhailau plateau (the foothills of the Ile-
Alatau mountain) not far from the former capital of Kazakhstan, Almaty. The authorities of 
Almaty did not ensure public participation in the decision-making on the PPP project while 
planning it. This, similar to the case above, resulted in the project being adversely affected, as 
well as causing social, legal, investment, political, and corruption problems. Only after some 
time later the city authorities began to involve the public in the discussion of the feasibility for 
the project. Although the city authorities held public hearings which are considered to be one 
of the instruments of consultation (Arnstein, 1969; Thomas, 1990; Bishop and Davis, 2002), 
the voices and opinions of people were not taken into account. In other words, this was not an 
instance of meaningful participation, but only of pseudo-participation. For years, the authorities 
were simply persuading people to support the decisions that had already been made, including 
the construction of the ski resort, as well as other decisions specified in the feasibility study for 
the project. In this case of pseudo-participation, the public did not see the results or changes 
they would have liked to see in the final decisions made by the authorities.  This case is an 
instance of the PPP project within which the authorities do not listen to citizens, fail to respond 
to their demands, and ultimately, the decision-making process becomes undemocratic, thus 
undermining representative democracy. Generally speaking, this PPP case demonstrates the 




It should, however, be noted that later on in the thesis I discuss some of the recent 
improvements to the above case regarding public participation. In particular, I describe the 
latest public hearing on the project, which took place in late 2018 during the course of this 
research. In this instance the authorities of Almaty brought a new feasibility study for the project 
to public discussion, taking into account the comments of the public. This shows that after 
several years of disputes between the local authorities and communities, the city authorities 
finally took public opinion into account. Furthermore, in this instance the participation was 
meaningful, insofar as the local community were able to influence the city authorities’ decisions 
and achieve the desired changes in the decisions. This was an important and positive 
development in the PPP project, since many citizens who had for years opposed it, were now 
supportive and approved of the project. The crucial observation in these latest developments 
and events, is the fact that the city authorities began to seriously consider public opinion on the 
project, and therefore started being responsive to citizens. Furthermore, these developments 
have been positive in that they brought the local authorities and communities a little closer to 
each other. This is crucial for the improvement of the existing democratic conditions in 
Kazakhstan, inasmuch as the authoritarian governance is still present in the country. These 
developments, therefore, can be seen to run contrary to the claims made by Dahl (1956) and 
Sartori (1962) respectively that public participation could damage the political stability of 
government by leading to more authoritarian personalities in power and to a totalitarian regime. 
At least in the case of Kazakhstan, as my later discussions indicate, public participation in the 
decision-making on PPPs can be beneficial to the society by conducing to the development and 
advancement of political pluralism, civil society, social capital and by bringing about other 
democratic benefits for the society, thus reducing the remaining authoritarian system of 




Given the depth of the research questions I seek to answer in this work, and the conceptual 
framework detailed in section 2.1, the methodology employed for this project is primarily of 
qualitative nature. As various scholars have pointed out, the main characteristic difference of 
qualitative methods in social sciences, as compared to quantitative methods, lies in its 
interpretive approach in investigating problems and seeking answers (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998; 
Bryman, 2012). The variety in specific research methods under the broad category of qualitative 




Berg & Lune, 2012; Maxwell, 2013). Noting the scope and aims of the present research, I adopt 
a multi-method approach to investigating the research questions. The methods for gathering 
and analysing the data are comprised of qualitative (semi-structured) interviews, examining 
specific case studies, and qualitative content (text) analysis. Adopting such a multi-method 
approach enables, in the first instance better chances of gathering data that is wideranging in 
nature, and therefore, secondly, a more reliable and accurate analysis that would ensure the 
credibility of the conclusions reached. These are some of the advantages of this approach that 
would not have been achieved with a single-method research technique (Patton, 2002, p. 248). 
Furthermore, as I explain, this approach enabled me to bypass some of the issues and limitations 
associated with specific methods. For instance, the examination of case studies as a way of 
gathering extra data, helped with some of the limitations of interviews where respondents were 
not as forthcoming as hoped. Again, as Patton has noted, another advantage of using a multi-
method approach lies precisely in its ability to reduce errors that can occur in a single-method 
approach (Patton, 2002, p. 248). Such errors occur particularly in methods such as interviews, 
where there is a possibility of obtaining biased or untrue answers. In what follows, I will detail 
each of the elements of the methodology, explaining along the way the limitations that I have 
aimed to circumvent through adopting a multi-method approach to both data collection and 
analysis. 
 
2.2.1. Qualitative (semi-structured) interviews 
 
A substantial part of the data informing this work has been obtained through the fieldwork  
in Kazakhstan. I conducted interviews with government officials and the representatives of 
quasi-state institutions, who are involved in drawing up and implementing the PPP policy in 
the country. In choosing the relevant individuals for this part of data collection, I used a 
sampling strategy (Mason, 2002; Marshall & Rossman, 2011; Gentles, et al., 2015), in 
particular by sampling institutions and organisations involved in PPP policy and its 
implementation. I conducted the interviews with individuals representing relevant institutions, 
in the city of Shymkent, located in South Kazakhstan region, and in Astana, the capital city, 
located in Akmola region.  
The questions asked here were open-ended and aimed at creating an overall picture of the 
way in which the PPP policy and its practical implementation take place in Kazakhstan. The 
questions can be broadly grouped together in the following themes: the workings of PPP policy 




influences the PPP policy in Kazakhstan, how public consultation as a widespread form of 
participation is ensured in the decision-making on PPP projects in Kazakhstan, and how new 
legislation (Law ‘On Public-Private Partnership’) influences the work done in the field of PPP 
in the country (See appendices for more details).  
The first group I decided to interview were the representatives of government bodies, who 
develop and execute the public policy in the field of PPP. For instance, one of the individuals 
in this group was an employee of local executive body, namely the representative of the 
Department for Education of Astana. This individual was deemed to be of importance for 
investigating my research questions, since based on current legislation, local executive bodies 
execute the PPP policy by implementing PPP projects at a local level. At the time of my 
fieldwork, the Department for Education in Astana was indeed in charge of implementing 
several PPP projects in preschool education, and as such, invaluable insights would be gained 
through interviewing individuals responsible for the implementation of local PPP projects. 
Similarly, another individual contacted within this grouping was the representative of the 
central authorised body responsible for the development of public policy in the field of PPP, 
namely the Ministry of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in Astana (See 
Appendices B and F). 
There were, however, limitations associated with my interview approach and these 
officials, due to their workload and busy schedules. Despite having prearranged the time for an 
in-person interview, the representative of the Department for Education in Astana repeatedly 
postponed the meeting due to heavy workload. Similarly, the representatives of the Department 
of Budget Investment and Development of Public-Private Partnership in the Ministry of 
National Economy also did not succeed in finding the time for an interview for the same reason. 
In both of these cases I provided the officials with a list of questions and asked them to write 
their responses in their own time and return them to me by email. In other words, the method 
of obtaining data in these cases, rather than an in-person interviews, took the form of self-
completed questionnaires (Bryman, 2012, p. 232). Although this method ensured the collection 
of data in the face of timing difficulties, it revealed another limitation over which I, as a 
researcher, did not have control. In both of these instances the respondents did not answer all 
the questions listed and in the first case one of the questions was left unanswered, while in the 
second case there were two answers missing. It is worth pointing out that these omissions have 
not posed a significant problem for the findings and despite them, the officials provided enough 




In addition to these two representatives, I also attempted to conduct interviews with two 
other individuals within this group, namely from the local executive body of Astana and of 
South Kazakhstan region. Despite prior arrangements, however, these representatives did not 
organise meetings with me for interviews, and furthermore, despite their repeated promises they 
did not provide written answers to the questions either. This issue represents one of the 
limitations with the interview method, which, as I will expand on further, I attempted to 
circumvent through my multi-method approach. 
The second group of individuals interviewed were those who were chosen based upon 
their roles and duties as the representatives of the quasi-state sector involved in PPP policy. 
Within this group, I conducted two interviews with experts of ‘Kazakhstan Public-Private 
Partnership Centre’ JSC in Astana (hereafter - PPP Centre). This PPP Centre acts as an 
analytical and expert centre for PPP development, and its duties include listing PPP projects 
planned for implementation, making examinations of business plans and tender documentation 
of republican PPP projects. Additionally, I also conducted one interview with an employee of 
‘PPP Expert’ LLP, which is the regional PPP centre for South Kazakhstan region in Shymkent 
city. I further received written answers from ‘Astana Innovations’ JSC, a development 
institution in the city of Astana, which combines the efforts of city authorities, scientific and 
business communities in the sphere of industrial and innovative development, including 
through PPP networks. Similar to the case of the first group of interviewees, the experts of 
‘Astana Innovations’ JSC were also unable to participate in an interview due to their heavy 
workload. Thus, this is another case where instead of an interview, the individuals completed 
my questionnaire themselves, and returned them to me through email. Similar to the case above, 
not all of the questions were answered, once again indicating a methodological limitation.  
In addition to these groups, I also attempted to get the perspective of different private 
companies in each of the two cities. I had contacted four private companies from each of the 
two cities, Astana and Shymkent, to arrange meetings for interviews. However, despite my 
efforts, and despite their multiple reassurances that they would be able to provide the self-
completed questionnaire in their own time, no data was gathered from this sector. Such issues, 
together with the difficulty in ensuring that all the questions are answered in the case of written 
responses to the questionnaire, can be seen as limitations of the interview methodology. In 
particular, they relate to the problem of non-response, which, as different researchers have 
pointed out, can and does arise in the case of qualitative interviews (Patton, 2002; Bryman, 
2012). Despite such limitations, however, as noted above, these difficulties did not hinder the 




instances may not represent a comprehensive picture of the different perspectives in play, it has 
been sufficient for a thorough and meaningful examination and analysis of the subject matter.  
Another limitation that should be noted here, is the reluctance among those interviewed 
to collaborate, or to provide thorough answers. The representatives of government bodies 
tended to give somewhat tendentious answers, insisting that there are no political, legal and 
other problems for the effective implementation of the PPP policy in Kazakhstan. Such answers 
show that the representatives of government bodies are not inclined to say anything negative 
about the PPP policy, and therefore attempt not to speak openly about the existing problems 
while executing the PPP policy. Additionally, based upon my observations during this 
fieldwork, the representatives of public and private sectors were somewhat reluctant to 
collaborate and provide information, despite the fact that they were not asked to reveal any 
confidential information in their answers. This observation lends to the belief that officials are 
to some extent inaccessible and unresponsive to citizens. Furthermore, this inaccessibility and 
the resultant attitude towards the electorate, can undermine the principles of openness, 
responsiveness and accountability, and is particularly problematic when implementing the PPP 
policy in Kazakhstan. Similarly, I also witnessed the reluctance among private business 
representatives to cooperate with me, making it almost impossible to obtain any information 
from them that may even be publicly available under legislation. This leads to the assumption 
that they are as inaccessible as public partners, tending to implement PPP projects behind closed 
doors. It is due to such limitations that the case for a multi-method approach in collecting data 
for the project is made. I attempted to circumvent these limitations through the use of case 
studies and content analysis of normative legal documents.  
 
2.2.2. Case studies 
 
In addition to qualitative interviews, the second strand in my research methodology is 
case studies. I examine two particular cases that are specifically relevant to my research 
questions, namely those of two PPP projects in Kazakhstan, which enable an in-depth 
investigation of whether and how participation is ensured in the decision-making on PPP 
projects, that is, during their planning stages. In the two cases, where meaningful participation 
is largely absent, the adverse effects of not ensuring meaningful participation can be seen and 
investigated. Following Stake (1995), who views a good selection of cases to be one which 
gives the researcher the best opportunity to understand and examine fully the subject matter of 




cases there was non-participation at the initial stages of planning the projects. Only later on, the 
local authorities began to ensure public participation in the form of public hearings, which, 
however, only yielded pseudo-participation. Despite this, as I will detail, meaningful 
participation was ensured later on in one of the cases. Within each of these cases, the 
investigation tracks the practice that is unique within the framework of each project.  
Furthermore, noting the need for taking into considerations different factors which, 
despite being unique to each of the cases under study, contribute to the overall question under 
investigation, in selecting these cases I have been mindful of factors such as time, sector, and 
places where projects are implemented. Noting and acknowledging these factors allows me to 
give more in-depth and comprehensive answers to the research questions. Here, the factor of 
time is especially noteworthy. Since both of these chosen cases are recent PPP projects in 
Kazakhstan – one still ongoing, the other was recently aborted – they permit a timely analysis 
based upon recent and current data, thus adding to the value and use of the answers given.  
Case study research is an “in-depth, multifaceted investigation” (Feagin, et al., 1991, p. 
2), and as such may involve different types of data sources. For instance, as Gentles et al. note, 
in sampling a case, a specific event and sources of data related to that event need to be examined 
and selected (Gentles, et al., 2015, p. 1776). In order to examine the two PPP project cases, I 
collected various data from sources available on the Internet that cover or describe those two 
projects. Amongst the sources with useful information I gathered are electronic newspapers; 
websites of national news agencies; public interviews and statements, official reports, 
document, letters of the representatives of government bodies, NGOs and international 
organisations, which are available online. These form the secondary information on the cases 
under investigation (Stewart, 1984).  
A note should be made here regarding the choice to examine the two cases. Studying two 
or more cases in literature is usually called a ‘multiple-case study’ (Swanborn, 2010; Yin, 
2014). Delineating the use of two cases as a ‘two-case’ case study, Yin points to its benefits to 
conduct a more qualitative case study, compared to a ‘single-case’ research design (Yin, 2014, 
pp. 63-64). Therefore, the use of a two-case design in my research is also in line with my overall 
approach, aimed at conducting a qualitative and in-depth analysis, based upon empirical 
evidence that maximises its validity and reliability. Furthermore, Yin asserts that the use of a 
multiple-case study, including a two-case design, is advantageous in its ability to ensure 
replication, which is itself essential for presenting more valid and reliable findings (Yin, 2014, 
p. 57). This ability lies in the fact that a multiple-case study can be seen as an instance of ‘literal 




approach used here, and my choice of the two cases can be discerned as both, therefore 
satisfying the criteria for replication.  
In the first instance, Yin has noted that insofar as a multiple-case study (i.e. two or more 
cases) can uncover similar results, it can  be seen as an instance of ‘literal replication’ (Yin, 
2014, p. 57), which ensures the possibility to test or develop a specific finding by employing 
not one, but several cases. In both of the cases under consideration in the present research, the 
problem of non-participation of the public in the decision-making with regards to PPP projects 
is the main focus and interest for investigation. As was noted earlier, one of the cases represents 
an instance where the regional authorities do not ensure public participation while making 
certain decisions on the project, that is, during its planning stage. For instance, they do not 
arrange public consultation in the form of public hearings. Additionally, although the regional 
authorities began to hold public hearings long after making the decisions, they did not ensure 
meaningful participation of the public. In the other case, although at first there was no 
participation, only in the course of time the city authorities started holding public hearings. Yet 
the fact that a decision had already been made before these public hearings took place, means 
that the case, rather than representing an instance of meaningful participation, represents one 
of pseudo-participation, similar to the first case. As such, in both of these cases the same 
problem can be traced, namely that of absence of required and meaningful participation of the 
public in the decision-making on PPPs, which leads to adverse outcomes of PPP projects, badly 
affecting the public.  
Secondly, as Yin argues, insofar as the different cases in a multi-case study design 
produce contrasting results on account of expected cause(s), it can be seen as an instance of 
‘theoretical replication’ (Yin, 2014, p. 57). In the two cases under study here, it is revealed that 
in the case where the city authorities arrange so-called pseudo-participation, over time they start 
to ensure meaningful participation. Thus, they begin to take public opinion into account and to 
make decisions based on the public’s suggestions and comments. This change of circumstances 
allows the project to resume, thereby changing its course for the better, in particular for the 
benefit of the public. As a result, the two cases that were previously similar in their disregard 
for public participation, now show dissimilar outcomes due to a specific factor or cause, thus 
satisfying the condition for theoretical, as well as literal replication.  
In addition to studying the two cases of PPP projects in Kazakhstan, I scrutinise several 
other PPP cases in other countries that can be considered as additional case studies. I apply the 
findings of these additional cases as further empirical evidence and argumentation in support 




democratic and effective realisation of PPPs in practice. In particular, I consider one successful 
PPP case in Tanzania, which has brought about the desired positive outcomes not only due to 
public participation in the decision-making on the project, but also on account of participation 
of local communities in the joint implementation of the PPP project. By involving the public in 
the decision-making on the project and taking into account its opinion, the authorities ensured 
the democratic decision-making process. I also examine the case of a PPP project in Taiwan, 
which produced favourable impacts for end users only after a private partner reconsidered its 
decision concerning the tariff for the use of on-board units. It should be noted that although the 
authorities conducted a public survey at the planning stage of the project, a private partner did 
not take into account public opinion while making the decision on the tariff for the use of on-
board units, thus leading to pseudo-participation. It can be discerned from this PPP case that 
the decision-making process regarding the project was not democratic.  As a result, during the 
implementation of the project the public objected to that decision, leading to the reconsideration 
of the previous decision.   
I further examine the case of a PPP project in China, where adverse impacts of the absence 
of public participation can be observed. In this case, the non-involvement of the public in the 
decision-making on the project, that is, the ignorance of local people’s opinions, forced 
provincial authorities to completely abandon the PPP project. Such a fiasco took place due to 
the fact that people preferred to use other free roads rather than the costly toll road. Moreover, 
provincial authorities did not even seek to hear people’s voices while making the decisions 
regarding the project, thus signifying that the decision-making process on the project was 
undemocratic. As such, through these case studies I examine the positive and negative 
influences that public participation, or lack thereof, can have for PPP projects.  
It is worth noting that a multiple-case design I employ by examining cases from countries 
other than Kazakhstan, further strengthens the replication of my study. This is since each group 
of successful and unsuccessful cases of PPP projects can be separately considered as 
illustrations of literal replication, as described by Yin. Similarly, both groups of successful and 
unsuccessful cases of PPP projects with dissimilar results can be regarded as examples of 
theoretical replication defined by Yin. By and large, a multiple-case study approach 
representing both Kazakhstan and other countries, allows for a cross-case analysis, in turn 
enabling me to draw broader practical conclusions, as well as increasing the reliability and 





2.2.3. Content analysis 
 
Apart from interviews and case studies, the final methodology employed in my research 
is content analysis of text documents (Holsti, 1969; Silverman, 2005; Marshall & Rossman, 
2011). The use of content analysis along with the other methods detailed above, enables a more 
thorough understanding of a broader range of data, thus allowing for a more accurate and 
reliable answers to the research questions. Although content analysis of documents can be 
viewed as an additional source of data and information relevant to the research (Holsti, 1969, 
p. 16), the choice of texts (documents) used for analysis is crucial to ensure their relevancy for 
the research.  
Given the focus of the present research, I have selected for analysis specific formal 
documents, namely different categories of normative legal documents adopted by government 
institutions, regulating the matters of public participation in the decision-making processes. 
These documents are particularly useful in answering one of the research questions, namely one 
regarding whether the authorities of Kazakhstan ensure the political rights of the public to 
participate in the decision-making on PPPs, if at all. Since these official documents illustrate 
the socio-legal processes currently in place for allowing and encouraging public participation, 
they are directly useful for answering the question. Furthermore, studying such processes 
currently in place allows for a critical reflection on their efficacy, and therefore for identifying 
areas of improvement. This is an important aspect of content analysis, and as Silverman has 
noted, content analysis is a useful method of qualitative research, since texts in one way or 
another describe the reality of social processes which are the subject of study (Silverman, 2005, 
p. 160). Moreover, analysing normative legal acts (documents) allows for an analysis based on 
objectivity, which as Holsti notes, adds to the reliability of the analysis through limiting the 
researcher’s own subjective inferences on the subject matter (Holsti, 1969, pp. 3-4). Holsti also 
points to the importance of content analysis being conducted systematically, that is, in a certain 
order that could provide robust evidence for research. Yet, as Holsti acknowledges himself, 
there are no standardised methods of selecting and analysing text documents in this way (Holsti, 
1969, p. 102), and as such, which categories of documents are selected for analysis remain at 
the discretion of the researcher.  
I have aimed to be systematic in conducting the content analysis for the present work. 
The categories of normative legal documents have been selected based upon the hierarchy that 
determines their classification. According to article 10 of the Law of the Republic of 




defined according to their legal force, starting with the Constitution of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan. It should be noted that certain types of normative legal acts regulate certain public 
relations. Therefore, I specifically select and analyse the basic legal acts such as codes, laws, 
decrees of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and normative legal orders of 
ministers of the Republic of Kazakhstan (according to the descending order of their legal force), 
which govern public relations concerning public participation in decision-making. An example 
of such legal acts analysed here is the Environmental Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
(2007).  
Amongst the laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan that I analyse are the following: ‘On 
Administrative and Territorial Structure of the Republic of Kazakhstan’ (1993), On Local State 
Government and Self-Government in the Republic of Kazakhstan’ (2001), ‘On Public 
Councils’ (2015).  I also analyse the decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
‘On Amendments to Decrees of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan ‘On 
Determination of the Legal Entity for Concession Projects Consultancy’ No. 428 of 30 April 
2014 and ‘On Determination of the Legal Entity for Accompanying Republican Public-Private 
Partnership Projects’ No. 1057 of 25 December, 2015 (2017).   
Amongst the orders of ministers of the Republic of Kazakhstan, I analyse the following: 
the Order of the Minister of Environmental Protection ‘On Approval of the Rules for Holding 
Public Hearings’ (2007); the Order of the Acting Minister of National Economy ‘On Some 
Issues of Planning and Implementing Public-Private Partnership Projects’ (2015); the Order of 
the Acting Minister of Energy ‘On Approval of the List of Types of Economic Activities within 
Which Projects Are to Be Brought to Public Hearings’ (2016); the Order of Acting Minister of 
National Economy of Kazakhstan ‘On Introducing Changes and Amendments to Some Orders 
of the Authorised Body on State Planning’ (2018).         
Given that each of these legal normative acts is concerned with a certain aspect of public 
participation, analysing them together gives a more comprehensive picture of the socio-legal 
processes in place that allow for public participation in the decision-making on PPPs. As such, 
content analysis of the normative legal acts as a method complements the other two methods 
both in terms of collection of data, as well as its analysis. Therefore, a thorough and 
comprehensive picture of the current state of public participation in the decision-making on 
PPPs in Kazakhstan can be drawn, allowing for answers to the research questions, which are 
nuanced, accurate, and reliable. In this sense, a multi-method approach employed in this 
research and explained in this chapter, indicates the quality of my methodological approach, 




them. Ultimately, this approach enables answers to the research questions outlined in Chapter 








Chapter 3 – Literature Review 
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
The aim of the present chapter is to survey and synthesise the literature on PPP, namely 
the practical implementation of PPP projects in Kazakhstan. The focus in this research is 
particularly on the issue of public participation in the decision-making on PPPs in Kazakhstan. 
Therefore, in this chapter I conduct a thematic literature review around the theme of PPP. 
Despite the focus of the research being on public participation in the decision-making on PPPs 
in Kazakhstan, the review presented in this chapter is not confined to the literature concerned 
with PPP only in the context of Kazakhstan. Rather, through synthesising different scholarly 
work done both in Kazakhstan and other countries, I examine different theoretical and practical 
considerations relating to PPP, such as risks, critical success factors, principles of PPP, and 
challenges while implementing PPP projects. I therefore identify the gap in the literature on 
PPP in the context of Kazakhstan this thesis aims to fill.  
In addition to surveying and synthesising the literature on PPP, I shall raise some critical 
points in this chapter in the form of a traditional literature review (Jesson, et al., 2011). A critical 
approach to the literature, along with its survey and synthesis, leads to defining the context for 
this and future research, identifying the areas of contention and the gaps that need to be filled.   
 
3.2. Risks, critical success factors, principles of PPP, and challenges       
            while implementing PPPs: a critical view    
 
There is a huge body of literature on PPP reporting the research and theories of social 
scientists, practitioners, and international and national institutions involved in advocacy and 
criticism of PPP.   
In studying PPP, scholars consider various theories that pertain to the development of 
PPP. An example of such theories include the following: enforced cooperation (McQuaid, 
2000); game theory (McQuaid, 2000; Kargol & Sokol, 2007); normative and positive theories 
(Martimort & Pouyet, 2006); network theory (Colebatch, 2001; Chowdhury, et al., 2011); and 
power-based economic theory (Tatarkin, et al., 2009). It is important to note that this is not an 
exhaustive list of theories considered in this field, since different social scientists consider 




There is a large number of studies that explore PPP as a concept (Mitchell-Weaver & 
Manning, 1991; Private Finance Panel, 1995; Hastings, 1996; Linder, 1999; Osborne, 2000; 
Wettenhall, 2003; Bovaird, 2004; Broadbent & Laughlin, 2004; The European Parliament, 
2006; Hodge & Greve, 2007; Mouraviev & Kakabadse, 2012; Semenova, 2014; Eshimova & 
Nurpeisov, 2017; Gafurova, 2013 and many others).      
There is also a growing body of literature on principles of PPP, including principles of 
good governance in PPP (Skelcher, et al., 2004; OECD, 2007; UNECE, 2008; Hayllar, 2010; 
Varnavskii, et al., 2010); forms, models, types of PPP (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004; Link, 2006; 
Yescombe, 2007; Maximov, 2010; Zapatrina, 2011); disadvantages (shortcomings) and 
advantages (benefits) of PPP, including value for money (Hall, 1998; McQuaid, 2000; Heald, 
2003; Grimsey & Lewis, 2005; Li, et al., 2005a; Koppenjan & Enserink, 2009; The European 
Commission Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, 2009; Siemiatycki, 2012).     
As can be seen, there is a sizeable amount of literature on issues around PPP. However, I 
would like to focus on the literature describing the practical side of PPP, that is, issues that arise 
in the practical implementation of PPPs as infrastructure projects. In other words, I focus on 
such issues around PPP as risks, critical success factors, principles, challenges (the lack of 
accountability, transparency and of public participation in decision-making) that play a 
significant practical role in implementing PPP projects, requiring constant attention on the part 
of scholars, practitioners, as well as governments that implement PPP policies.   
There are many studies that examine risks in implementing PPPs (Lam, 1999; Grimsey 
& Lewis, 2002; Hodge, 2004; Hardcastle & Boothroyd, 2003; Li, et al., 2005b; Hwang, et al., 
2013; Matayev, 2014a; 2014b). Evidently, there are sundry risks, such as social, political, 
economic, legal ones among others. By way of illustration, Hardcastle and Boothroyd depict 
26 risks associated with the implementation of PFI (Hardcastle & Boothroyd, 2003, pp. 43-47). 
Additionally, there are different subgroups of risks pertaining to a broader risk category. For 
instance, Matayev claims that economic risks are comprised of four different risks: “production 
and economic, commercial, financial, and currency risks” (Matayev, 2014a, p. 181).  
Amongst sundry risks and the various associated risk factors or causes, I would like to 
pay particular attention to public objection to a PPP project, regarded as a social risk factor. As 
Li and others claim, public objection to a PPP project is the factor or reason for a social risk 
(Li, et al., 2005b, p. 28). Hardcastle and Boothroyd also argue that a social risk or a ‘protester 
risk’ arises when the public does not approve of a project or its components (Hardcastle & 
Boothroyd, 2003, pp. 46-47). It is important to note that this social risk factor arises within the 




is due to the authorities’ ignorance of the public interest while making decisions on the PPP 
projects. I especially emphasise this social risk factor, since it causes the emergence of other 
risks such as political, legal and investment, which can also be observed in the case of the PPP 
projects in Kazakhstan examined in the thesis. As such, this social risk factor needs to be taken 
into consideration as one of the possible causes of other risks, or as a factor contributing to 
them. Of particular interest here are the financial, legal and political risks in PPP, which have 
also been considered in the literature, as I discuss below.  
Describing risks in PPP, Matayev, as one of the domestic social scientists in Kazakhstan, 
argues that investment risk, as a type of financial risks, is associated with a probable shortage 
of infusion of funds into PPP projects (Matayev, 2014a, p. 182). Matayev notes the following 
six risk factors or types of an investment risk: “capital risk; a factor connected with selection of 
object for investment; interest risk; operational risk; timing factor; and liquidity risk” (ibid.). 
According to Matayev, capital risk implies the possibility of not making a profit on the money 
invested, while a factor connected with selection of object for investment is associated with the 
wrong choice of an object for investment compared with other options (ibid.). Interest risk is 
related to losses due to the change of interest rates on a market, and operational risk is connected 
with disruptions in the operation of a computer system for processing information related to 
investing funds (ibid.). Timing factor is associated with investing at an unfavourable time that 
inevitably leads to losses, and liquidity risk is associated with losses in the sale of securities 
(Matayev, 2014a, p. 182). Notwithstanding, it should be noted that in practice there may be 
another factor or cause of an investment risk, for example, public objection to a PPP project 
could be a serious deterrent to further investment in a PPP project, especially for the government 
which initiates a PPP project. Such a case of investment risk can also be seen within the specific 
PPP project in Kazakhstan that I scrutinise in the thesis. Furthermore, public objection to a PPP 
project can be an impediment to investment on the part of investors, as can be seen in the other 
PPP project in Kazakhstan that I examine in this research.            
Hardcastle and Boothroyd (2003) depict the cases when a legal risk in PPP can arise. As 
they report, an instance of a legal risk emerged when unauthorised entities such as certain local 
government authorities were not allowed to sign PPP (PFI) contracts (Hardcastle & Boothroyd, 
2003, p. 45). Another case of a legal risk arose when certain additions had to be made to 
legislation in order to empower a legal entity such as NHS Trust to sign a PFI contract that 
caused certain legal costs (ibid.). Nonetheless, as the Kazakhstani practice of PPP demonstrates, 
there could be other cases when a legal risk can occur, causing more detrimental effects. As an 




of both PPP projects examined in the thesis, where NGOs and citizens initiated litigation against 
local authorities, resulting in timing and legal costs, along with moral and material costs 
primarily for citizens, thus adversely affecting the PPP projects.      
Hardcastle and Boothroyd (2003) also describe cases where a political risk can arise. For 
example, they cite a case where the central authority, the Highways Agency of the UK, was 
replaced by local authorities, namely Greater London Authority and Transport London 
Authority, to fulfil the contractual obligation within a PFI project. Here, it is argued that the 
political decision regarding the replacement of public partner in a PFI contract, caused the 
occurrence of a political risk (Hardcastle & Boothroyd, 2003, p. 46). More broadly, the authors 
argue that a case of political risk can occur when the structure of central or local government 
may change, and therefore a new government body or a new government could change a PFI 
scheme or even cancel a PFI project (ibid., p. 46, 52). Indeed, these cases are related to political 
risks in PPP, but as the empirical evidence shows, there can be other cases where such a risk 
may arise. For example, a PPP project can be abandoned not only by a new government, but 
also by the government that initiates a PPP project, due to public objection to the project. Such 
an instance of political risk can be seen in the PPP project in Kazakhstan, which is examined as 
a case study in the thesis.       
Critical success factors of PPP have been studied by various social scientists (Li, et al., 
2005a; 2005b; Yuan, et al., 2009; Chan, et al., 2010; Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2015; Prabhudesai & 
Sarode, 2018). Chan and others, in their literature review on critical success factors of PPP, 
have noted “consultation with end-users” as a success factor among others (Chan, et al., 2010, 
p. 486). This is indeed a crucial factor in terms of enabling people to express their opinions on 
PPP projects, which in turn contributes to achieving more effective ultimate outcomes for 
people as the end users of PPPs.     
Despite its importance, the above factor is indicated only once in the table constructed by 
Chan and others (see Table 3.1. below). To be specific, this success factor is only mentioned in 
one work, namely that of Corbett and Smith (2006), which was presented as a paper at the 
conference in Birmingham, UK (Chan, et al., 2010, pp. 486, 494). Additionally, as can be seen 
in Table 3.1, economic and organisational factors are the most mentioned success factors of 
PPP in the literature, and are notably mentioned more than ‘consultation’, as a form of public 
participation in PPP projects. The appearance of such an essential factor as consultation in only 
one paper indicates the somewhat insufficient attention social scientists have paid to this critical 




Table 3.1: Critical Success Factors of Public-Private Partnership 
from Published Literature    
 
   Table 1. CSFs of PPP from Published Literature 
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Tiong (1996) 
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Birnie (1999) 
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Grant (1996) 
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Kanter (1999) 
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Akintoye 
et al. (2001) 
 
      x            1 
Total number  
of citations for 
a certain CSF   
     7     8      4     5     3       2      7       5      6        1        3     4       4     2       1 62 
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Furthermore, it is important to note that consultation is not the only form of participation 
in decision-making insofar as there are other forms such as advisory boards and citizens 
advisory committees (Arnstein, 1969; Birch, 1993; Bishop & Davis, 2002). There is also a form 
of public participation in decision-making known as ‘web-based forums’, where people can 
express their opinions on government decisions (Boyer, et al., 2016, p. 47). On the whole, these 
different forms of participation can be applied during public participation in the decision-
making on PPPs and can therefore be employed in practice. As such, it would be better not to 
confine public participation to only one factor, namely ‘consultation’ as seen in the Table 3.1, 
but rather, to add factors such as ‘citizen advisory committees (boards)’ and ‘web-based 
forums’, as ways through which the public can voice its opinion on PPPs. Additionally, it should 
be noted that in practice there are cases where, despite holding public hearings, the authorities 
do not in fact take public opinion into account, since they have already made decisions with 
respect to a PPP project or its individual components in question. In other words, the authorities 
formally hold public hearings so as to persuade the public to support decisions which have 
already been made by the authorities. Therefore, such a process of participation in decision-
making is not meaningful but is rather an instance of what Verba (1961) calls ‘pseudo-
participation’. This is evident in the case of the PPP projects in Kazakhstan, which I examine 
as case studies in this thesis. Consequently, in addition to the critical success factors of PPP 
considered in the literature and noted in Table 3.1, scholars should consider ‘the provision of 
meaningful participation of the public in the decision-making on PPPs by the authorities’ as an 
additional critical success factor of PPP.   
Moreover, as the international practice of PPP demonstrates, when decision-makers 
ensure public participation in the decision-making on PPPs regardless of the form it takes, and 
most importantly, when they truly listen to and take into account public opinion, such PPP 
projects attain more effectual outcomes. Instances of such PPP cases have taken place in 
countries such as Tanzania (Bakker, et al., 2000), Australia (Teicher, et al., 2006), the USA 
(Oppenheim & MacGregor, 2004). Even within the framework of a specific PPP project in 
Kazakhstan one positive change is traced, showing that when local authorities began to listen 
to the public by taking into account their comments on the feasibility study for the project, the 
project started receiving the gradual support from people who had not previously backed it, thus 
giving the project a chance to be resumed. By contrast, when decision-makers do not ensure 
public participation in the decision-making on PPPs at all, and even when they conduct hearings 
or surveys, but discount public opinion, thereby conducting pseudo-participation, such PPP 




This is certainly true in some PPP cases in China and Taiwan (Chen, et al., 2013), and as 
mentioned earlier, such adverse consequences have also occurred within the framework of the 
PPP project in Kazakhstan, which are examined in the thesis.   
In addition to participation in decision-making, other factors such as ‘accountability’, 
‘transparency’ and ‘public control and monitoring’, as critical success factors of PPP, should 
be ensured throughout PPP projects. Considering these factors is important, since they can, 
among other things, significantly reduce the corruption risks while implementing PPPs.  
Moreover, they can contribute to effectively ensuring other critical success factors such as 
‘competitive and transparent procurement process’ or even ‘effective management control’ 
indicated in Table 3.1. By contrast, the inadequate provision of accountability and transparency 
by public and private partners when implementing PPPs could prompt adverse consequences 
such as corruption risks, which can adversely affect PPP projects. Such incidents have occurred 
in countries as diverse as the US, Lesotho, India, Brazil, Peru, Pakistan, and France (Hall, 1999; 
Oppenheim & MacGregor, 2004). Moreover, corruption risks in the form of corruption offences 
committed by officials have also taken place within the two PPP projects in Kazakhstan that 
are examined in the present thesis.    
Apart from the work by Chan and others (2010), Osei-Kyei and Chan (2015) also have 
conducted a review on the literature concerned with critical success factors of PPP. Table 3.2 
below presents the result of their review published in their paper, which surveys 27 papers 





Table 3.2 Findings from Studies on Public-Private Partnership Critical Success Factors  
from 1990 to 2003 (years inclusive)  
 
      Table 5 
      Findings from studies on PPP CFSs from 1990 to 2013 (years inclusive)  
Critical success factors  Publications  Total 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
Appropriate risk allocation and 
sharing  
x     x x   x   x   x x x  x  x x x x   13 
Strong private consortium   x x       x x  x   x x x x x  x   x   12 
Political support     x  x       x x x  x x      x  x  9 
Public/Community support      x       x x    x    x x   x x 8 
Transparent procurement x    x   x  x x  x x            x  8 
Favorable legal framework x    x     x   x    x       x x   7 
Stable macroeconomic condition   x x               x x      x x x  7 
Competitive procurement x   x   x                x x  x  6 
Strong commitment by both 
parties 
     x  x   x  x x           x   6 
Clarity of roles and 
responsibilities among parties 
   x  x  x  x x               x  6 
Financial capabilities of the 
private sector 
  x     x       x    x   x      5 
Technology innovation   x               x  x x  x      5 
Good feasibility studies x    x        x    x     x      5 
Open and constant 
communication 
   x  x x x   x                 5 
Detailed project planning x   x  x               x   x    5 
Government providing guarantees  x x            x         x  x  5 
Trust     x x     x           x      4 
Selecting the right project         x          x x  x      4 




Clear project brief and design 
development 
    x   x    x           x     4 
Political stability x                 x     x     3 
Competitive financial proposes          x        x   x        3 
Mature and available financial 
market 
            x  x        x     3 
Acceptable level of tariff   x                 x x       3 
Streamline approval process  x                    x x     3 
Compatibility skills  of both 
parties 
   x                  x      2 
Choosing the right partner                  x   x       2 
Good leadership and 
entrepreneurship skills  
                  x x        2 
Sound economic policy             x  x         x    2 
Well organized and committed 
public agency 
         x   x               2 
Good governance          x   x             x  2 
Clear goals and objectives   x     x                    2 
Employment of professional 
advisers 
     x x                     2 
Financial accountability      x x                       2 
Consistent monitoring    x   x                     2 
Reliable service delivery   x    x                     2 
Environment impact of project                     x  x      2 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 




As can be seen, Table 3.2 also consists mainly of economic and organisational factors, 
and there are no factors connected with public participation in the decision-making on PPPs. 
Furthermore, there are no factors associated with public control or monitoring over PPPs, the 
absence of which may impede the effective implementation of PPP projects in a practical 
dimension. It could be argued that Table 3.2 contains critical success factors such as ‘good 
governance’ and ‘consistent monitoring’, which could include public participation or 
involvement in PPPs, control and monitoring over PPPs. However, in their review, Osei-Kyei 
and Chan (2015) cite understandings of ‘good governance’ as a critical success factor which do 
not include public participation or involvement in PPPs. For instance, the definition by Chan 
and others is cited, in which ‘good governance’ is defined in terms of effective coordination 
between public and private partners (Chan, et al., 2010, p. 491). Another understanding cited 
in the review is one provided by Li and others, who consider ‘good governance’ as a factor 
associated with the effective management of PPP projects (Li, et al., 2005c, p. 465). Li and 
others in turn cite Badshah (1998), who argues that ‘good governance’ plays an important role 
in stimulating and involving private businesses in PPP networks. Furthermore, Abdul-Aziz and 
Kassim (2011), the authors cited by Osei-Kyei and Chan (2015) as the ones determining 
‘consistent monitoring’ as a critical factor of PPP, argue that consistent monitoring enables a 
public partner to monitor the actions of a private partner (Abdul-Aziz & Kassim, 2011, pp. 151-
156). As we can see, therefore, the above-mentioned two factors are not related to public 
participation in the decision-making on PPPs and public control/monitoring during the 
implementation of PPP projects.  
It is promising that a critical success factor of PPP, namely ‘financial accountability’ is 
included in Table 3.2. Nevertheless, the accountability provided merely by a private partner, or 
as Abdul-Aziz and Kassim put it, the “developer’s profit-sharing accountability” (Abdul-Aziz 
& Kassim, 2011, p. 155) as a public partner’s instrument of control, and as a recommendation 
for working with scrupulous developers (private partners), is not enough. Financial 
accountability, along with other forms of accountability and transparency, should be ensured 
by a public partner throughout a PPP project. Additionally, such an obligation should also apply 
to private partners who ought to be accountable to public partners as well as to the public not 
only prior to signing a PPP contract, but also after being granted it.     
Therefore, Table 3.2 once again indicates the insufficient attention scholars have so far 
paid to factors related to public participation in the decision-making on PPPs; transparency and 
accountability both from public and private partners; public control and monitoring over PPPs 
as critical success factors of PPP. In other words, it can be argued that yet public participation 
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in the decision-making on PPP as a political right of the public, and as a critical factor 
contributing to the democratic and effective realisation of PPPs is somewhat overlooked, which 
in turn reflects badly on the practical implementation of PPP projects. Exploring PPP projects 
in Hong Kong and depicting the lack of democratic involvement of the public in PPPs, Hayllar 
(2010) has argued that the word ‘public’ can be replaced by the word ‘government’ in words 
‘public-private partnership’ (Hayllar, 2010, p. 114; Hayllar & Wettenhall, 2010, pp. 2-3). 
Hayllar (2010) argues that the democratic involvement of the public in PPPs is a pivotal factor 
for the effective implementation of PPPs, regarding them as necessary conditions for good 
governance apart from conditions such as involvement and cooperation with private businesses 
(Hayllar, 2010, pp. 110-111).  
Moreover, according to Siemiatycki (2012), one of the challenges in implementing PPPs 
is the inadequacy of accountability and transparency. Siemiatycki further claims that decision-
makers are reluctant to involve the public in decision-making when planning PPP projects, 
despite it being a vital factor for the effective realisation of PPPs (Siemiatycki, 2012, p. 9). 
Likewise, Boyer and others (2016) argue that public involvement in PPP processes, can 
conduce to the effective implementation of PPPs (Boyer, et al., 2016, pp. 47-48). Koppenjan 
and Enserink (2009), similarly view transparency and accountability as instruments of good 
PPP practice.        
This exposition indicates that, contrary to the view found in many scholarly works, 
critical success factors of PPPs should not be limited only to economic and organisational 
factors involving the engagement and interaction of public and private partners alone. Instead, 
meaningful participation in decision-making with its various forms, together with transparency 
and accountability from public and private partners, and constant public control and monitoring 
over PPPs, should all be regarded as critical success factors of PPP.  
Given the significance of the above-mentioned factors, what I would call democratic 
aspects of PPP, of which public participation in decision-making is especially important, I 
would propose to add a new principle to other principles of PPP already in place. This principle 
is that of ‘provision of public participation in the decision-making on PPP projects’, which 
plays a vital democratic and practical role that conduces to the democratic and effective 
realisation of PPPs in practice. With the addition of this principle, the gap in literature this 
suggestion aims to fill is seen more clearly. The current literature on principles of PPP is chiefly 
focused on other elements, especially those of economic nature.  As an illustrative example, 
Varnavskii and others enumerate the following general principles of PPP:   
- equality of parties’ interests and the freedom of selection of actions;  
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- stability of PPP contract, and at the same time the possibility of its change and 
adaptation; 
- responsibility for the execution of contract conditions;  
- competitiveness;  
- transparency and feedback;  
- non-intervention of the state in the sphere of responsibility and activity of private 
partner;  
- incentives and guarantees; 
- recoverability; 
- equal (non-discriminatory) attitude towards foreign companies (Varnavskii, et al., 
2010, p. 24)  
By and large, it can be discerned that the issues related to ensuring accountability, 
transparency, public control and participation in decision-making, play a crucial democratic 
role for the people. This is an important part of the practical realisation of PPPs, since PPP 
projects are primarily implemented for people, and it is their lives that are significantly affected 
by implementing PPP projects. Given this importance, as previously noted, overlooking such 
democratic aspects on the part of decision-makers, significantly and adversely influences the 
effective implementation of PPP projects in practice. These democratic aspects have indeed 
been studied by some scholars and practitioners, particularly in the context of countries that 
have already put PPP policies into effect. For example, Hayllar and Wettenhall (2010), Higgins 
and Huque (2015) have examined issues of accountability, transparency, and public 
participation in the decision-making on PPPs in Hong Kong, and regard these as democratic 
challenges in the context of PPP practice. Examining the case of Malaysia, Beh (2010) also 
draws attention to the lack of transparency and accountability on the part of government bodies 
that need to be addressed for the further effective PPP development in the country. Johnston 
and Kouzmin (2010) deem issues of accountability and transparency as unresolved challenges 
in executing PPP policy in Australia, while Fombad (2013) emphasises the problems of 
inadequate accountability, transparency and participation in the decision-making on PPP 
projects in South Africa.  
As can be seen, in different countries the above-mentioned democratic aspects are enacted 
and ensured in different ways by governments when implementing PPPs, or they are not 
provided at all. The lack of provision of these aspects by governments, however, significantly 
impacts the practical implementation of PPPs, and accordingly their effectiveness. Since the 
Government of Kazakhstan is actively executing PPP policy, the authorities can potentially 
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ensure the above democratic aspects in implementing PPPs. However, it is not known whether 
or not this is done sufficiently and effectively, and therefore, in order to learn about whether 
and how the Kazakhstani authorities ensure the above democratic aspects, especially public 
participation in the decision-making on PPPs, then this issue needs to be examined in detail. As 
I note in the next section, such issues and investigations remain largely overlooked and do not 
receive enough attention by scholars, including those working within Kazakhstan.  
 
3.3. The issue of public participation in the decision-making on PPP projects  
          in Kazakhstan as a literature gap  
 
To date, PPP has been established in Kazakhstan where legislation has been adopted in 
the field of PPP, and PPP projects are being actively implemented both at the central and local 
levels. For example, back in 1991 the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan adopted the 
first normative legal act in the field of PPP, namely the Law ‘On Concessions in the Republic 
of Kazakhstan’, which was later rescinded in 1993 (Law ‘On Recognition Invalid the Law of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan ‘On Concessions in the Republic of Kazakhstan’, 1993). Later on, 
in 2006 the Law ‘On Concessions’ was adopted, and in 2011 the Programme for the 
Development of Public-Private Partnership in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2011-2015 was 
launched (Decree of the Government ‘On Approval of the Programme for the Development of 
Public-Private Partnership in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2011-2015 and Making 
Amendment to the Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 14 April 2010 
No. 302’, 2011). Then, on the 31st of October 2015 the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan ‘On 
Public-Private Partnership’ was adopted (Law ‘On Public-Private Partnership’, 2015).   
As for the practical implementation of PPP projects in Kazakhstan, concession projects 
have been implemented since 2005. As Kazbayeva (2008) states, the PPP project on the 
‘Construction and Operation of the Railway Line between the Shar station and the City of Ust-
Kamenogorsk’ is the first concession project in Kazakhstan, the contract of which was signed 
in 2005 (Kazbayeva, 2008, p. 18). According to the information of PPP Centre, as of December 
2018 there were 1186 PPP projects under consideration, amongst which 473 PPP projects 
contracts were already signed and sealed; 246 of them were at the stage of tendering processes 
or announcement of tendering processes, and 467 projects were at the stage of development of 
tender documentation (Finprom, 2019). It is also revealed that the majority of PPP projects have 
been implemented in the education sector, accounting for 55.7 per cent of the total number of 
PPP projects, whereas the healthcare sector comprises 21.6 per cent and the sphere of physical 
41 
 
culture and sports constitutes 8.9 per cent, with the remaining PPP projects realised in other 
spheres of economic activity (See Figure 3.1 below). Moreover, at a round table in February 
2018 the First Deputy Minister of National Economy, Dalenov, reportedly announced that the 
number of PPP projects was increasing from year to year due to the legislative and institutional 
improvements of PPP in the previous four years (Kursiv.kz, 2018).  
 
Figure 3.1  Shares of sectors wherein public-private partnership are underway (as of 




Source: ‘Kazakhstan Public-Private Partnership Center’ JSC 
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As can be discerned, the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan is actively 
implementing the PPP policy, and is constantly reinforcing its political support for PPP. Indeed, 
the development of PPP in the country as a phenomenon and as a concept has been under 
attention of social scientists, as well as practitioners, both domestic and foreign ones. For 
instance, the work of UK-based scholars such as N. Mouraviev and N.K. Kakabadse over the 
past 10 years has made an invaluable contribution to the literature on PPP in the context of 
Kazakhstan.  
The institution of PPP and its development in Kazakhstan has been studied by social 
scientists such as Kazbayeva (2008), Dyusenova (2013), Serikov (2014), Agumbayeva and 
Dzhumajanova (2015), Isakhova (2015), Akhmetova (2018). It should be noted that these 
authors generally consider the economic side of PPP. In other words, they describe the 
economic benefits and prospects of collaboration between the state and business for further 
stimulation of entrepreneurship in the country that can contribute to further development of 
national economy.     
Different scholars have emphasised the development and implementation of PPP in 
different sectors in Kazakhstan. For instance, Ismailova (2014), Tuyakova (2014), Sakenov and 
Temirbekova (2014) have proposed to develop PPP mechanisms in the health sector. Some 
scholars have suggested employing the opportunities of PPP in agriculture (Shukurov, et al., 
2018), while others have talked  about the need to deploy PPP in preschool education and public 
utility sector (Matayev, 2012; Eshimova, et al., 2017).  Tleppayev and Zeynolla (2015) proffer 
the use of PPP in the energy-saving sector, and Gridneva and Kaliakparova (2017), and Dubina, 
Turginbayeva and Domalatov (2017) stress the necessity for active application of PPP in the 
industrial and innovative sphere of economy by involving various types of public-private 
enterprises (e.g. technology parks, business incubators, venture funds). As can be seen, all these 
authors look at the economic potential of PPP. In other words, they maintain that the use of PPP 
in various spheres of economic activity contributes to the growth of the country’s economy. 
Similar focus on economic prospects of PPP can be seen in the literature concerned with forms 
and models of PPP. For instance, Matayev (2011) and Tastulekov (2014) have focused on 
contractual types of PPP. Some scholars have proposed to employ not only concessions, but 
also other forms, such as management and maintenance contracts (Turysbekova, et al., 2012; 
Amerkhanova, 2013; Tulegenova, 2014), while others suggest life cycle contracts as a form of 
PPP (An, 2014; Matayev, 2016; Eshimova, et al., 2017). In all these instances, again, the focus 
is on the economic elements, and ways of expanding and developing various forms of PPP.  
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Similarly, the scholarly works concerned with PPP on local levels have also largely 
focused on the economic and investment issues. For instance, Gazaliyev (2011) and 
Alashbayeva (2011) argue that the social-entrepreneurial corporations, as one of the forms of 
PPPs created in regions, should be further deployed for the socio-economic development of 
regions. Examining the example of PPP in Pavlodar city, Bayandina (2014) emphasises the 
need to apply PPP mechanisms for resolving municipal problems. Similarly, citing the project 
‘Construction and Operation of Positron Emission Tomography Centre in Aktobe city’, 
Madykhanova and Baizhuma (2017) claim that financing for projects through the PPP 
mechanism can be cheaper than employing solely the budgetary funds. These examples further 
indicate the focus on economic issues around PPPs in the literature.  
Other issues around PPP, such as the engagement of non-governmental organisations in 
PPP projects as partners, especially those not confined to commercial institutions, have also 
been discussed in the literature. For instance, Agumbayeva and others (2016) proffer to employ 
the potential of the non-commercial sector in the field of environmental protection when using 
PPPs. Ziyadin and Takhtayeva (2016) discuss the necessity for the development of PPP in the 
field of children and youth tourism, proposing to involve various youth centres and associations. 
Urazbayeva (2013) and An (2015) suggest applying PPP mechanisms in the sphere of higher 
education by engaging scientific and educational institutions. In a similar vein, Zhaleleva 
(2016) suggests that representatives of civil society should also be involved in PPPs as partners, 
pointing to a problem with the participation of non-commercial organisations in PPP networks 
as partners.  It could be seen therefore, that in effect only commercial entities are now involved 
in PPPs. The lack of engagement of non-commercial organisations in PPPs can mean that they 
are probably not involved in the decision-making on PPPs, which, if indeed the case, signifies 
that these organisations are unable to express their opinions on PPPs.   
Surveying the literature, it seems that scholars in Kazakhstan are by and large concerned 
primarily with the economic potential of PPP, proffering to actively employ it in various spheres 
of economic activity as though it is a panacea. However, it is equally important to study how 
PPP works in practice given the current political, social, democratic, economic, institutional, 
legal and other conditions and processes in Kazakhstan. Given the growing number of PPP 
projects in Kazakhstan, it is necessary to ask and examine whether there are problems for the 
democratic and effective implementation of PPP projects, and how they can be addressed. For 
example, scholars and practitioners could be ascertaining the reasons behind the lack of non-
commercial organisations’ involvement in PPPs given that it is likely to be a significant 
problem in terms of democratic involvement, especially for those members of society whose 
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interests are affected by PPPs. More generally, the government of Kazakhstan, who oversees 
PPP policy in the country, should ask whether PPP projects are being effectively and 
democratically implemented in practice, in a way that primarily benefits the public.    
There are indeed various scholars who pay attention to such practical issues around PPP, 
but their number remains relatively small. For example, Mouraviev and Kakabadse (2015a) 
have examined the legal and institutional issues that have so far hindered the effective 
implementation of PPPs in Kazakhstan. As an institutional challenge, the authors stress that the 
public sector has a huge influence on some managerial issues, such as the regulation of the size 
of the workers’ salary, which prevents private operators from hiring more competent specialists. 
Furthermore, the central authorities of Kazakhstan have a substantial political and 
administrative influence on local authorities, reflecting on the effective implementation of local 
PPP projects as well (Mouraviev & Kakabadse, 2015a, p. 191). In their other works, Mouraviev 
and Kakabadse have delineated the problems of uneven allocation of risks between public and 
private partners, and of incorrect prioritisation of bids’ assessment criteria, citing the PPP 
project on the construction and operation of 11 kindergartens in the city of Karaganda 
(Mouraviev & Kakabadse, 2014; 2015b).    
Other social scientists have noted the problems related to managing PPP projects 
(Beisembinova, 2012; Matayev, 2014b; Charman & Narbaev, 2017; Karibdzhanov, 2018). For 
instance, in examining the case of the project ‘Construction and Operation of the Interregional 
Power Transmission Line from North Kazakhstan to Aktobe Region’, Beisembinova conducts 
an investment assessment of the effectiveness of the project, concluding that the investor’s 
expenses exceeded the incomes, thereby showing that not in all cases a PPP can be lucrative, 
especially for private investors (Beisembinova, 2012, p. 42). Problems regarding the lack of 
professional staff have also been investigated by Eshimova and Nurpeisov (2017), who report 
such problems in the field of PPP at the local level. They therefore emphasise the need to install 
more professional staff to implement PPPs, and to optimise the timing of preparation and 
planning of PPPs.   
As the exposition here demonstrates, various different aspects of PPP in Kazakhstan have 
been studied, including economic and practical issues. However, the review presented here also 
shows that there are still issues related to PPP that remain largely overlooked by scholars. One 
such issue is the democratic aspect of PPP, namely public participation in the decision-making 
on PPP projects. This issue, as discussed in the previous chapter, is crucial for citizens and 
interest groups to be able to democratically express their voices on PPPs, which affect their 
lives and interests. It is worth noting that although some scholars, such as Mouraviev and 
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Kakabadse (2017), have stressed that citizen participation can contribute to the successful 
implementation of PPPs in Kazakhstan and Russia, this issue is yet to receive the sufficient 
attention it deserves given its democratic importance for the public in Kazakhstan in terms of 
influencing government decisions regarding PPPs, and more generally for the society in terms 
of its further democratisation. As such, it can be argued that despite few instances where the 
issue is noted, ‘public participation in the decision-making on PPP projects in Kazakhstan’ has 
not so far been thoroughly studied. This is indeed the gap in the literature this thesis aims to 




The review presented in this chapter demonstrates that there is a large body of literature 
on PPP that describes its theories, concepts, forms, risks, critical success factors, benefits and 
shortcomings. Nonetheless, some of this literature on risks of PPP fail to take into account 
public objection to PPP projects as a risk factor. This should be considered as such, especially 
since it could present a cause not only of social risks, but also for investment, legal and political 
risks. This is an important finding of the literature review, since there may be cases in practice, 
as have indeed occurred in the case of PPP projects in Kazakhstan, where the above-mentioned 
risk factor, en passant, caused by the authorities’ ignorance of interests of the public due to the 
its non-involvement in the decision-making on the projects, has led to not only social, but also 
investment, legal and political risks.     
Additionally, as I have demonstrated, the literature on critical success factors of PPP is 
also lacking important elements. In particular, the literature reviewed largely ignores such 
important critical success factors as ‘meaningful participation, in various forms, in the decision-
making on PPPs’, ‘transparency and accountability from public and private partners’, and 
‘public control and monitoring over PPP projects’. These factors are significant in practice, 
including in the Kazakhstani practice of PPP, where more effectual outcomes are produced 
when decision-makers take these factors into account while implementing PPP projects. 
Similarly, the literature on principles of PPP, as I have argued, ought to include discussions 
aiming at defining and specifying such a crucial principle as ‘public participation in the 
decision-making on PPP projects’, which should complement other PPP principles. 
As the literature on PPP indicates, such democratic factors and in particular public 
participation in the decision-making on PPPs can be ensured in various ways. This is seen in 
practice where different countries ensure such democratic aspects in different ways. It is 
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important to note that the success or failure of PPP implementers in ensuring public 
participation in the decision-making on PPPs as such, has a significant impact on the effective 
and democratic realisation of PPPs. This is seen in cases where local authorities within a 
country or region in a country adopt different ways to ensure these democratic aspects, leading 
to differences in the levels of success and failure in PPP projects within a given country. As I 
note in the literature review, instances of these cases can be seen in China (Chen, et al., 2013) 
and in Hong Kong (Hayllar, 2010).    
As the preceding observations make clear, the provision of public participation as a 
democratic aspect in different countries hinges upon various factors, including the political 
system and level of democratic development of societies. As such, not only do countries have 
their own specific practices of PPP, but they also differ in their way of involving the public in 
the decision-making on PPPs. As I have shown in my review of the literature, the specific 
democratic issue of public participation in the decision-making on PPP projects in Kazakhstan 
has not received sufficient attention and has not so far been thoroughly studied. Having 
identified this gap in the literature, it can be seen that a close examination of this issue, as seen 
specifically in the case of Kazakhstan, can contribute to the literature in important ways. 
Crucially, such an examination would have an important practical, as well as academic and 





















Chapter 4 – International Practices of Public Participation:  




Before proceeding to examining the case of public participation in the decision-making 
on PPP projects in Kazakhstan, and by way of setting the background, it is worth reviewing a 
few instances of international cases, where PPP projects have been implemented to different 
degrees of success in part due to the level of public participation allowed during their planning 
stages. Such a review of international cases is important both in framing the research 
specifically concerned with Kazakhstan, as well as guiding potential ways to better ensure 
public participation in the decision-making on PPPs more generally. In this chapter, I present 
cases of PPP projects, where the respective governments did not ensure public participation at 
all, enabled only pseudo-participation, or ensured meaningful participation of the public in the 
decision-making on PPPs. A close look at such PPP projects will allow an understanding into 
how participation, non-participation and pseudo-participation of the public in the decision-
making on PPPs affect their practical implementation, that is, how positively or negatively they 
affect the effectiveness of PPP projects. More importantly, examining international cases offers 
an insight into understanding how different countries implement PPP projects democratically 
by ensuring public participation or conversely, how the lack of public participation can lead to 
democratic challenges. 
For these purposes, I have selected three PPP projects, each corresponding to the relevant 
categories of study.  Firstly, I examine the PPP case Jin Long Toll Road project in China 
(Zhejiang province), which was launched in the mid-1990s (Chen, et al., 2013). As I will show, 
this is an instance of a case where the lack of public participation in the decision-making on the 
project resulted in the project’s failure. The second PPP project I examine in this chapter is that 
of garbage collection launched in Tanzania’s Dar es Salaam in the late 1990s (Bakker, et al., 
2000), as an instance where the authorities did ensure public participation in the decision- 
making on the project. Lastly, the third project examined is one where the authorities initially 
ensured only pseudo-participation in decision-making, and only later on a private partner 
reconsidered its decision in favour of the people, thus allowing the project to be continued.  
This is the PPP project of electronic toll collection launched in the early 2000s in Taiwan (Chen, 
et al., 2013). Having examined these cases, I conclude the chapter by emphasising the 
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importance of ensuring public participation, especially as it relates to the democratic and 
effective realisation of PPP projects. I will therefore provide a background against which the 
analysis of the particular cases of PPPs in Kazakhstan is presented.    
 
4.2. Case of Jin Long Toll Road Project in China  
 
In the early 1990s a massive programme for the construction and operation of toll roads 
began in China at the expense of private business due to budget constraints. Chen and others 
(2013) have detailed the case of a PPP project in the road sector in this period, namely the Jin 
Long Toll Road Project (JLRT), which was initiated in China’s Zhejiang province (Chen, et al., 
2013, p. 849). 
In 1996 a firm from Hong Kong, KwangYing, became the winner of a competitive 
tendering arranged by the authorities of Jinhua city to implement PPP projects in road sector in 
Lanxi area (ibid.). It should be noted that at this time Hong Kong was not part of China, but 
rather a British colony. The project was endorsed by the government of Zhejiang province, and 
in 1997 a state-owned entity under the government of Lanxi, Transportation Service Company, 
came to an agreement with KwangYing, and signed a contract to establish a Cooperative Joint 
Venture(ibid.). This joint venture, the Jinlong Road Construction Company (JRCC), was to 
construct and operate 17 kilometres of road for twenty years, before handing it back to the 
government. The project was estimated to cost 110 million RMB, most of which KwangYing 
invested from its own funds, with the additional help from a bank loan in the value of 25 million 
RMB (Chen, et al., 2013, p. 849).  
Based upon the PPP contract, JRCC was to be responsible for the operation of businesses 
and toll booths along the toll road and have as its primary source of incomes the toll payments 
supplemented by tax exemptions (ibid.). One of the financial incentives for KwangYing, as the 
project’s main investor, was that it was guaranteed 18 percent return on its investments by the 
government, and with such a rate of return it would seem that within this contract the private 
partner would carry more of the financial risks associated with the project (ibid.). However, the 
financial burdens were in fact transferred to users when the authorities of Zhejiang province 
approved the toll tariffs twice as high as in the market, thereby endowing the private investor 
with additional rewards (Chen, et al., 2013, p. 849). By the end of 1998, with the building of 
the toll road completed, JRCC commenced operating it by collecting toll payments from 
citizens (ibid.). As Chen and others report, however, the toll revenues plummeted in the early 
2000s (Chen, et al., 2013, p. 849). This plunge in revenue was due to the drivers’ avoidance of 
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high-priced toll payments, who sought to use alternative roads instead of the toll road (ibid.). 
This avoidance of toll roads was not limited to Zhejiang province and the Jin Long toll road, 
but rather extended to other provinces and toll roads. This is reflective of the burdens on toll 
roads users, since as Ojiro (2003, cited in Chen, et al., 2013, p. 849) has noted, toll prices in 
China generally are very costly, and are indeed as expensive as that of developed countries. 
This is while the salaries and earnings of many locals in China are considerably less than their 
counterparts in those more affluent states (Ojiro, 2003 cited in Chen, et al., 2013, p. 849).    
Losing its revenues from the toll road year by year, in 2004 JRCC complained to the local 
government of Lanxi, that the Longma cement plant had built a passageway from the plant, 
allowing drivers to bypass toll booths next to the plant and therefore avoiding toll payments 
(Chen, et al., 2013, p. 850).  Avoiding the use of toll roads was becoming more and more 
widespread in Zhejiang province, where many drivers began to bypass the toll road by using 
other roads through various villages, as Chen and others (2013) describe. For instance, in light 
of the problem around the JTLR project, in 2006 an unofficial brochure titled ‘The handbook 
of how to avoid toll booths in Zhejiang province’ was issued and circulated among a large 
number of people through social media (Chen, et al., 2013, p. 850). This large surge in in 
avoiding the use of toll roads even prompted residents of several villages to construct unofficial 
toll booths to eschew the use of nearby official toll booths, and accordingly to set up their 
unlawful, and yet, more importantly, much cheaper and affordable tolls compared to the official 
ones (Chen, 2004 cited in Chen, et al., 2013, p. 850). As such, in 2006, the toll road yielded 
only 20 percent of the expected revenues (Chen, et al., 2013, p. 850). Additionally, contrary to 
the previous agreements, the local government no longer granted tax exemption to JRCC, and 
even decided to hand over the right to run businesses along the toll road to other firms without 
consulting the investor (Chen, et al., 2013, p. 850). JRCC was therefore under severe financial 
pressure, not least because it still had to cover operational costs for managing toll booths, was 
not allowed to employ and dismiss the staff responsible for administering toll roads, and further 
was yet to repay the bank loan it had taken out as part of the investment in the project (ibid.).  
While the JLTR project was in the financial trouble, instructions were issued by China’s 
central authorities to reduce the number of toll booths in the country, thus aiming to tackle the 
problem of unreasonably costly tolls (Chen & Hubbard, 2012, p. 44; Chen, et al., 2013, p. 850). 
Since 2001 the provincial authorities of Zhejiang had begun to remove toll booths across the 
province (ibid.). Afterwards, in 2004 a new regulation was issued by the central government 
saying that there would be no new toll booths in the future, and that the government would not 
continue toll road projects, thus announcing the end of operation of toll roads in the country 
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(Chen & Hubbard, 2012, p. 44). This new policy badly reflected on all existing PPP projects 
on the construction of toll roads in the country, including the JLTR project, many of which had 
not even reached the half-point of their 20-year contract term (Chen & Hubbard, 2012, p. 44; 
Chen, et al., 2013, p. 850). 
As Chen and others argue, the breakdown of the JLTR project can be attributed to the 
authorities’ ignorance of people’s interests, and specifically, their failure to involve the public 
in the decision-making on the project (Chen, et al., 2013, pp. 850-851). As the authors report, 
no public discussion was held on the project nor on the toll charges on the toll road. 
Furthermore, no public information about road tolls was released at the planning stage of the 
PPP project. Such a practice, which fails to engage with the public as end users of PPP projects, 
was not limited to this particular project and was instead common to all similar toll road projects 
in China (Beijing News, 2006 cited in Chen, et al., 2013, p. 851).  
Further examining the failure of the JLTR project, Chen and others note that by not 
ensuring public participation in the decision-making on the project, the provincial authorities 
made a series of decisions which failed to take into account the people’s interests. Firstly, the 
authorities of Zhejiang province imposed the costly tariffs on drivers for using the toll road, 
despite the fact that existing standards prescribed much lower charges for using toll roads, for 
example, the charge for a car was only five RMB (Chen, et al., 2013, pp. 850-851). Secondly, 
there was an excessive number of toll booths in the province of Zhejiang (ibid.). Pointing to the 
regulations noted by Zhejiang’s Ministry of communications, Chen and others note that the 43 
toll booths were located very close to each other, and therefore violated the official regulations 
(Chen, et al., 2013, p. 851). Thirdly, the provincial authorities authorised several highway 
companies to charge an additional fee at toll points, which boosted these companies’ revenues. 
Citing the National Audit Office of China, Chen and others note that the highway companies’ 
income from these fees alone reached 1,955 billion RMB (ibid.).  
The ignorance of people’s interests and opinions within the project was noted in China’s 
National Audit Office in its 2008 review of toll road operations, which made the following 
observation: 
On the one hand, the private investor obtained profits from the high toll charge 
and long-term charge period; on the other hand, the local government obtained 
tax income from the private enterprise profits. This behaviour from both sides 
added to the burden on the public…. The local government wants to develop the 
road system quickly but does not want to take responsibility and therefore shifted 
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the responsibility to society [the public] (The National Audit Office of China, 
2008 cited in Chen, et al., 2013, p. 851).  
What the examination of this PPP case reveals is the potentially dire effects of the authorities 
failing to effectively implement such projects. In the case discussed here, the adverse effects of 
such failure were felt by the local authorities, the private partner, and most importantly the local 
people, who could not avail themselves of using the road service delivered by the public and 
private partners. Crucially, the main reason for the project’s failure was the local authorities’ 
ignorance of people’s interests and opinions, manifested in their failure to ensure public 
participation in the decision-making on the project. As the facts around the project show, the 
authorities’ decision to impose high fees for the use of the toll road led to the public avoiding 
the use of this road and instead seeking alternatives in free roads. As a result, both the public 
and private partners encountered serious financial problems, which ultimately led to the 
breakdown of the project. But more importantly, the poor decision making eroded the citizens’ 
trust in their representatives, who instead of safeguarding the public’s interests, disregarded and 
neglected them. In other words, the authorities’ first priority should have been to take into 
account the citizens’ interests, not the mercantile interests of private companies. Here, I agree 
with the statement of China’s National Audit Office (2008) mentioned above, that the public 
and private partners only pursued their economic benefits but not the interests of citizens, thus 
leaving citizens alone with their problems, which were caused by the authorities’ undemocratic 
decisions.   
It should be noted that the lack of public participation in the decision-making on the 
project was an important element in the failure that resulted. This undemocratic way of 
decision-making on the project, where the citizens were not allowed to have an input, means 
crucially that there was no control over officials’ actions and decisions, thus leaving the 
authorities to abuse this situation by making decisions that disregarded the interests of people. 
An instance where this abuse can be seen clearly is where the local authorities permitted private 
companies to charge an additional fee, despite the already high fees in place for the toll road, 
which were decided without any discussion and input from the public.  
As such, the examination of the JLTR project shows that the authorities’ failure to take 
into account people’s interests by not involving the public in the decision-making on the project 
resulted in the PPP project that was unfit for the interests of people. The public in turn refrained 
from using the toll road, thereby resulting in the abandonment of the project. It can therefore 
be stated that the local authorities themselves are to blame for the breakdown of the project by 
not ensuring public participation in the decision-making on the project. 
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 4.3.    Case of Waste Collection in Tanzania 
 
The PPP initiative on waste collection in Tanzania’s city of Dar es Salaam was initiated 
within the framework of the International Labour Organization’s Sustainable Employment and 
Economic Development Programme (ILO SEED) that aims to resolve economic and social 
challenges in deprived areas (International Labour Organization, 2017). Within the framework 
of ILO SEED, this initiative was supported under the interregional Public-Private Partnership 
Programme to give assistance to local governments in developing micro and small businesses 
by involving entrepreneurs in the joint implementation of government programmes and 
projects, including in the sphere of public services (Bakker, et al., 2000, p. 1). The initiative 
was further commenced within the framework of the project ‘A support to the delivery of 
environmental services by the small-scale private sector’, itself a component of the UNCHS 
Programme to develop environmental sustainability in the city of Dar es Salaam (Bakker, et al., 
2000, p. 1).    
Bakker and others have detailed the background against which this PPP project was 
initiated (Bakker, et al., 2000, p. 2). As they note, working groups under the auspices of the 
UNCHS Sustainable Dar es Salaam Programme were created between 1995 and 1997. Within 
these groups representatives of diverse local institutions and local community groups discussed 
how to make Dar es Salaam a more environmentally clean and economically developing city, 
and waste collection was discussed as one of the working groups’ important priorities (Bakker, 
et al., 2000, p. 4). Bakker and others also note that the problem of garbage collection in Dar es 
Salaam was due in part to the urban planning and infrastructure in the city (Bakker, et al., 2000, 
p. 2). Notably, the irregular city planning meant that roads and houses were built too close to 
each other, thus substantially hindering free movement of people and transport (ibid.). 
Moreover, engineering networks were not connected to communications that reflected the 
accumulation of garbage (ibid.). On the other hand, the garbage produced in the city was not 
being properly collected by the authorities, while the population of the city’s inhabitants was 
rapidly growing by 8-10 percent a year (ibid.). As Bakker and others report, before 1992 barely 
3 per cent of daily waste was being removed, and so by the late 1990s garbage accumulation 
was equal to 2000 tons a day (ibid.). The city authorities repeatedly moved rubbish dumps from 
one place to another (ibid.). In one instance the dump was put in close proximity to residential 
areas, inciting public indignation, while in another case the dump was placed by the sea, and 
thus began to pollute the coastal waters (ibid.). In addition to such issues, the continuous 
relocation of rubbish dumps was also problematic, since the garbage was often washed away 
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after torrential rains, thereby causing a considerable damage to environment (Bakker, et al., 
2000, p. 2). Furthermore, the city of Dar es Salaam had additional social issues, namely 
unemployment amongst its young population. The frustrations arising from local government’s 
inability to handle the issues of waste collection and disposal, together with the existing social 
difficulties, triggered public discontent (ibid.). In response, in 1996 the Presidential decree was 
adopted to reorganise the City Council through creating the City Commission whose members 
would be appointed by the President of Tanzania (Bakker, et al., 2000, p. 2) 
The city authorities soon realised that they would not be able to resolve the problem of 
garbage collection on their own (ibid). In order to stimulate small domestic entrepreneurship, 
the authorities also refused to attract foreign companies to implement the PPP initiative on 
waste collection and disposal (ibid.). This refusal was also due to the authorities’ top objective, 
namely, to tackle the social problem of mass unemployment in the city. They were therefore 
more interested in attracting local entrepreneurs and community-based organisations (Bakker, 
et al., 2000, p. 6). Furthermore, as Bakker and others have argued, the city authorities denied 
foreign companies’ suggestions to deliver waste collection and disposal service by deploying 
heavy special transport for several additional reasons (ibid.). Firstly, the authorities could not 
afford the high budget costs required to attract foreign investors, such as the offered prices of 
heavy machinery (ibid.). Secondly, they could not exclude the possibility that after awarding 
the PPP contract to one company there might be risks associated with monopoly (ibid.). Thirdly, 
since heavy machinery could not be employed in many filthy areas of the city due to the 
problematic urban planning mentioned earlier, the city authorities preferred to involve members 
of community-based organisations to collect waste in hard-to-reach areas (Bakker, et al., 2000, 
p. 6). 
The authorities therefore decided to involve the private sector and local communities in 
dealing with the issue (ibid.). Before the start of the PPP initiative, the city authorities 
announced a competition to recruit potential contractors for the delivery of waste collection 
service by requesting information about potential contactors’ professions and skills, availability 
of transport and offices, and other information (ibid.). At first, only 15 candidates were selected, 
however, due to the city authorities’ political support for engaging community-based 
organisations and non-governmental organisations in tackling social, economic, environmental 
and other problems in the city, eventually, 70 contractors were granted the rights to deliver the 
service (ibid.). Out of these 70 suppliers, 15 medium enterprises were designated to deliver 
waste collection service mainly in the city centre, whereas community-based organisations, 
NGOs and micro businesses (individual entrepreneurs) were responsible for collecting waste in 
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other areas of the city (Bakker, et al., 2000, p. 6). In 1998, the City Commission handed over 
the functions on waste collection and disposal fully to local private companies and community-
based organisations in the city (ibid.). Subsequently, more than 60 local private companies and 
community-based organisations started collecting waste in designated parts of the city (ibid).  
The partnership with the contractors in the person of local private companies and 
community-based organisations required different approaches to managing the PPP project on 
the part of the city authorities (Bakker, et al., 2000, p. 5). Therefore, in order to effectively 
manage the PPP, the city authorities of Dar es Salaam decided to create working groups 
comprising of commissioners, heads of departments and representatives of the Waste 
Management Department which was established in March 1998 (Bakker, et al., 2000, pp. 5-6). 
As a result, four working groups were established whose tasks were to develop instructions on 
how to deliver waste collection and disposal service, working issues such as “zoning; awareness 
campaigns and health education; tariff setting; dumpsite improvement and recycling initiatives” 
(Bakker, et al., 2000, p. 5).  
In their discussion on the participation of community-based organisations in the PPP 
initiative as contractors, Bakker and others have noted that the PPP initiative was promoted 
thanks to the participation of community-based organisations in its implementation (Bakker, et 
al., 2000, p. 13). This is due to the fact that members of community-based organisations, as 
members of local communities, were willing to discuss the PPP initiative and its potential 
outcomes with each other, as well as with members and leaders of local communities (ibid.). 
As a result, the interested parties usually reached mutual understanding about the project and 
agreed on their support for it (ibid.). For example, one of the points of consensus between the 
community-based organisations and local communities was the issue of refuse fees (Bakker, et 
al., 2000, p. 10). The success of this agreement is due to the fact that the city authorities took a 
decision on refuse fees after the contractors in the person of community-based organisations 
had discussed the issue with local residents, that is, after they had heard the people’s voices on 
their willingness and ability to pay refuse fees (ibid.). As such, the city authorities took their 
decision on the matter by taking into account family incomes, and accordingly set the 
differentiated tariffs on waste collection service.  For instance, the households from high-
income areas would pay 2000 Tanzanian shillings (TZS) a month (roughly US$2.50), the 
households in medium-income districts had to pay TZS1000 (approximately US$1.50), and the 
low-income families in certain districts were charged TZS500 a month (around US$0.65) 
(Bakker, et al., 2000, p. 10). Similarly, the contractors collected monthly fees from legal 
entities, ranging in value from US$6 to US$125 per month, depending on the type and size of 
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business (ibid.). In sum, the system for paying refuse fees was convenient and also flexible for 
customers, since customers could also choose to pay refuse fees in daily or monthly instalments 
(Bakker, et al., 2000, p. 11). Bakker and others also emphasise the positive effects associated 
with the involvement of local community leaders and various local organisations in the 
implementation of the PPP. For instance, ‘ward environmental committees’, whose members 
were elected by local residents, played an important role in ensuring that customers pay refuse 
fees, while community leaders of local organisations were involved in “monitoring 
performance; awareness creation; enforcement of cleansing bye laws and regulations” (Bakker, 
et al., 2000, p. 12).  
The first positive results of the PPP were visible from February 1999, after just two 
months since the contractors started collecting waste. In the first instance, the volume of waste 
collection increased from 18600 to 33479 tons, comprising 55 per cent of waste accumulation 
per day (ibid.). Starting from June 1999 the volume of daily waste accumulation was steadily 
ranging at approximately 40 per cent (Bakker, et al., 2000, p. 8). The city authorities, in order 
to stimulate the contractors further, provided free vehicles for ferrying garbage to a rubbish 
dump, which sped up the process of waste removal (Bakker, et al., 2000, p. 11). In addition to 
the success in effective waste removal, there were other visible impacts of the project. During 
the implementation of the PPP, a mass campaign was being carried out to inform the public 
about advantages of recycling garbage, allowing individual garbage collectors and micro 
entrepreneurs to be involved in running businesses in that segment (Bakker, et al., 2000, p. 7). 
Consequently, a new business activity such as the sale of garbage bags for recycling was 
actively encouraged amongst small and micro businesses. Furthermore, with the technical 
assistance of ILO, various training courses on hygiene and safety, garbage recycling, NGO 
management, and start-up businesses were also arranged (ibid.).  
As such, another important impact of the PPP was achieved, namely the provision of jobs 
to many needed people. As Bakker and others report, contractors employed more than 1900 
people, and it was estimated that the net growth of employment in Dar es Salaam was equal to 
900-1000 people (Bakker, et al., 2000, p. 8). Moreover, the results of ILO survey conducted in 
August 2000 showed that 1522 people were employed in waste collection industry, of whom 
women comprised 55 per cent of workforce (ibid.). This is since the majority of street sweepers 
and fee collectors were women, while men were mainly responsible for heavy work such as 
loading and unloading garbage on trucks (Bakker, et al., 2000, pp. 8-9). As such, despite worries 
that community-based organisations may not stay on in the PPP, given their interest in social 
rather than economic welfare, it can be seen that the PPP initiative on waste collection in the 
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city of Dar es Salaam has been successful, as seen by the provision of more effective service to 
the public and employing many people in need.  
The exposition of the PPP initiative on waste collection in Dar es Salaam makes clear the 
success of the project through its effectiveness in bringing about desired results for all 
stakeholders, primarily for end users of the service. The PPP initiative, furthermore, 
substantially contributed to reducing the level of unemployment and improving the situation 
around environmental protection. Crucially, it can be seen that local community-based 
organisations and NGOs achieved their primary social objectives and duties to the local 
community through their participation in the PPP initiative. Private partners in the person of 
micro and small enterprises also benefitted from running business in waste collection industry.  
It is worth noting that one of the critical factors in the effective implementation of the 
PPP initiative was the fact that the partners made their decisions following, and based upon 
their discussions with the public, that is, in a democratic manner, as seen for instance in the 
case of fees charged for waste collection and disposal service. In this instance, as mentioned 
above, the issue was first discussed at public meetings between the local residents and partners 
in the person of community-based organisations (Bakker, et al., 2000, p. 10). As explained 
previously in Chapter 3, public participation in decision-making can take different forms, such 
as consultation which can take place through instruments such as public meetings (Arnstein, 
1969; Bishop & Davis, 2002). What is important here is the fact that the partners in the project 
did not make their decisions behind closed doors, but rather reached the decisions in accordance 
with their discussions with the public. This is what enabled them to take into account a critical 
issue such as family incomes, thus making decisions that were fair and sensible, especially for 
the poorer populations. In other words, by making their decisions through taking into account 
people’s voices, decision-makers in the person of the city authorities and private partners 
ensured meaningful participation of the public in the decision-making process. Accordingly, 
such a rational and fair decision of the partners caused public approval of that decision, which 
in turn contributed to the further promotion of the PPP initiative.  
Evidently, in addition to public participation in the decision-making processes on the 
project through consultation, the participation of community-based organisations in the joint 
implementation of the PPP initiative as partners played a very important and positive role. The 
city authorities’ decision to involve community-based organisations in the joint implementation 
of the PPP initiative has brought its dividends, positively affecting the course of the PPP. As 
mentioned above, members of community-based organisations reached mutual understanding 
between themselves and other members of local communities, and therefore, they came to agree 
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on many issues regarding the PPP initiative. Furthermore, the participation of local community 
leaders and ward environmental committees in the PPP, whose roles were to ensure residents’ 
adherence to rules regarding hygiene and payment for the provision of garbage collection 
services, also had notable positive effects on the project. In sum, it can be said that public 
participation in the decision-making processes on the PPP initiative, as well as the participation 
of community-based organisations as partners had a huge positive impact on the effectiveness 
of the PPP initiative, allowing partners to achieve the desired results, primarily for the end users 
of the public service.     
To sum up, the PPP case in Tanzania illustrates the democratic decision-making process 
on the PPP project through ensuring participation, importantly meaningful participation of the 
public. In this case the decision-makers heard people’s voices and by making decisions based 
on public opinions, they received the public’s approval, which in turn had a positive effect on 
the course of the PPP, leading to its effective implementation. Therefore, based on this 
successful PPP case in Tanzania it can be inferred that public participation in decision-making 
on PPPs is a crucial factor in the democratic and effective realisation of PPPs.   
 
4.4.    Case of Electronic Toll Collection in Taiwan 
 
Since the mid-1990s the authorities in Taiwan began to actively execute PPP by 
implementing PPP projects in various sectors of the national economy, especially in transport 
sector (Chen, et al., 2013). In order to promote PPP, the Public Construction Commission (PCC) 
and the Coordination Committee for the Promotion of Private Participation in Infrastructure 
Projects (CCPP) were established under the executive branch of the government of the People’s 
Republic of China on Taiwan, known as the Executive Yuan of Taiwan (Huang et al., 2003 
cited in Chen, et al., 2013, p. 845).   
One of the large-scale PPP projects in the early 2000s, which was coordinated by the PCC 
and CCPPP, was the Electronic Toll Collection Project (ETC) (Chen, et al., 2013, p. 845). The 
ETC project was managed by the Taiwan Area National Freeway Bureau (TANFB), which 
operates under the Ministry of Transport and Communications, and was a public partner within 
the PPP project (ibid.). As Chen and others explain, since the aim of the project was to reduce 
waiting times at toll points, the authorities decided to collect freeway tolls from drivers 
electronically (Chen, et al., 2013, p. 846). As such, the main task of the project was to install 
the computerised payment machines for users at toll points (ibid.). According to tender 
documentation, a private investor was responsible for the finance, construction, operation, and 
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maintenance of the ETC systems (ibid.). The earnings from tolls were transferred to the 
TANFB’s account, with a certain amount of these transferred to a private partner, namely the 
contractor (TANFB, 2003 cited in Chen, et al., 2013, p. 846). 
Three companies bid to be the private partner on the project, and as Chen and others 
report, at the end of 2003 the company called ‘Far Eastern’ became the winner at the expense 
of the other two bidders, Acer and Yu Tong companies (Chen, et al., 2013, p. 846). However, 
Yu Tong appealed against the decision regarding the choice of the winning bidder and 
complained to the TANFB and later to the PCC, alleging that Far Eastern had violated the 
procedures of the tendering process (ibid.). The PCC indeed confirmed Yu Tong’s allegations 
of Far Eastern’s wrongdoing by revealing that Far Eastern had not provided the necessary 
technical information about the Chinese production of infrared system and had not submitted 
the certified documents for that system (ibid.). More generally, it was revealed that Far 
Eastern’s qualifications did not comply with the tender documentation (ibid.). Notwithstanding, 
TANFB had signed the contract with Far Eastern only one day before the PCC review meeting 
(ibid.). Furthermore, by the time the PCC reached its final decision regarding Yu Tong’s 
allegations of Far Eastern’s violation of tendering procedures, Far Eastern had already installed 
electronic toll collection systems at twenty-one toll points around Taiwan (ibid.). Consequently, 
and in time, the head of Ministry of Transport and Communications and several tender board 
members came under criminal investigation for corruption (Chen, et al., 2013, p. 846). The 
resulting scandal around the ETC project attracted considerable media attention, with mass 
media criticising not only the work of Far Eastern, but also the representatives of the Ministry 
of Transport and Communications and TANFB who were involved in the project (Ho, 2006; 
Lee, 2007, cited in Chen, et al., 2013, p. 846). With the worsening situation, the project also 
got the attention of the Yuan Legislative (parliament), and different NGOs also censured the 
public and private partners responsible for the PPP project (ibid.). For instance, Taiwan 
Consumer’s Foundation gave nine public statements over the course of two years, accusing the 
partners of ripping off users’ money (Chen, et al., 2013, p. 846). 
Furthermore, at the same time the tensions between ETC users and Far Eastern company 
were escalating because of growing discontent around the installed electronic payment system 
(ibid.). As Chen and others report, toll fees were collected through activated prepaid cards 
known as ‘on-board units’, which were installed on vehicles’ windscreens and debited users’ 
cards when a vehicle passed through a toll barrier. What caused outrage among the users, 
however, was the fact that these on-board units were only sold by Far Eastern for a fixed price 
(Chen, et al., 2013, p. 846). The Taiwan People’s Alliance – a non-governmental organisation 
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responsible for public control over programmes and PPP projects, castigated the ETC project 
for not being implemented in the interests of users. A public survey conducted by the media 
during the scandal around the ETC project, showed that 60 per cent of the those interviewed 
were against the installation of on-board units (Hu Zhimin, 2006 cited in Chen, et al., 2013, p. 
846). With the rising public discontent, people decided to boycott the use of ETC systems at 
toll points insofar as they had the choice to pay a service charge either manually or 
electronically (ibid.). On the other hand, Yu Tong appealed to the Taipei Senior Administrative 
Court which decided to cancel Far Eastern’s qualification. The decision was made on the 
grounds that the partners had not taken into account the interests of users, as evidenced by their 
decision to set high charges for using a freeway (Taipei Senior Administrative Court, 2006 cited 
in Chen, et al., 2013, p. 847).  
As such, it can be claimed, as Chen and others do, that the public somewhat triumphed in 
this debate, since its enormous pressure enabled the financial burden to move from users back 
to the government and the private investor, Far Eastern. This shift in the burden led to a financial 
dispute between the partners (Chen, et al., 2013, p. 847). As Chen and others report, the 
Executive Yuan and Ministry of Transport and Communications pressured Far Eastern to 
reconsider its price policy or otherwise losing the contract, thus forcing the company to either 
decrease the price of on-board units or to offer their use for free. In response to this proviso, 
Far Eastern stated that it would demand reimbursement if the contract was terminated, and it 
could reduce the price of  on-board units if the government increased the service charge which 
was a source for Far Eastern’s income (Chen, et al., 2013, p. 847). In March 2006, Far Eastern 
proposed two alternatives to deal with the financial problem (Ho, 2006 cited in Chen, et al., 
2013, p. 847). Initially, the Ministry of Transport and Communications supported the 
company’s plan to sell on-board units at a discounted price, but that decision aggravated public 
anger (Huang, 2006 cited in Chen, et al., 2013, p. 847). With the problem around the ETC 
project unresolved, the Ministry of Transport and Communication appealed to the Supreme 
Court. In September 2006, the Supreme Court ordered to bring the project back to tendering 
process, leaving the existing equipment for a future winning bidder (ibid.). The Supreme Court 
further announced that in case Far Eastern became the winner once again, it would be obliged 
to reduce the price of on-boar units in the interest of users (Chen, et al., 2013, p. 847). Later on, 
with Far Eastern being the only company submitting a bid, it once again became the managing 
party on the ETC project (ibid.).  
Importantly, at this time the number of ETC users was gradually increasing, since the 
service was being delivered to users at an affordable price. As Chen as others note, the main 
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reason for public discontent over the price of on-board units was the fact that despite a public 
opinion survey having been conducted, the partners did not take the interests of users into 
account when making the decision on the price of on-board units (Chen, et al., 2013, p. 848). 
As the public survey demonstrated, 46 per cent of respondents opposed the ETC project due to 
the expected charge for the use of on-board units, and only 54 per cent of respondents were 
generally supportive of the project (ibid.). As such, it is clear that although the authorities 
conducted the public survey, in the final decision on the price of on-board units they did not 
adequately take into account the voices of users. As the exposition provided here indicates, 
neglecting the public’s voice resulted in a social problem emerging during the implementation 
of the project, causing public disagreement over the costly price of on-board units, which was 
imposed by the private partner. Indeed, that situation did not suit the users of the ETC service 
inasmuch as the inadequate financial burdens were imposed on end users. Accordingly, such a 
situation around the project, including the corruption scandal, significantly tarnished the 
project’s reputation, and moreover it shattered citizens’ trust in their representatives.  
As the facts around the project show, the main reason for public discontent over the costly 
price of on-board units was the fact that the private partner made the decision without taking 
into account the interests of people, thus making the decision-making process undemocratic. 
Moreover, although the authorities conducted a public survey, the results of which showed a 
massive objection to the charge for using on-board units, the authorities ignored people’s 
voices.  In other words, it can be said, although the authorities ensured public participation in 
decision-making in the form of consultation through such a tool as a public survey, they did not 
take into account people’s voices, that is, in fact, what took place was pseudo-participation of 
the public in decision-making. Besides, as can be discerned, although the partners ignored the 
problem with the price of on-board units at the planning stage of the project, hoping that the 
problem would eventually be settled, the problem in fact resurfaced at the implementation stage.  
To put it in another way, users began to boycott the use of ETC lanes due to the overpriced on-
board units. Such circumstances around the project had a negative impact on the course of the 
project, putting the project at risk of the possible termination. Nevertheless, in the end the 
problem with the pricing was solved in favour of end users insofar as the private partner had to 
reduce the price of on-board units.  
The PPP case in Taiwan discussed here could and should serve as a lesson for 
governments that fail to ensure meaningful participation of the public in the decision-making 
on PPPs. This can be seen in the case of PPP project (PFI) on maintenance of roads and trees 
in Sheffield (the UK), where the local authorities cut down a lot of healthy trees on some streets 
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of Sheffield despite a public survey showing that the local people were against this decision 
(Saul, 2017).  
 
4.5.    Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to show, through a close examination of practical cases, 
the importance of public participation in the decision-making on PPP projects. The PPP cases 
presented here indicate instances where relevant governments ensured meaningful 
participation, pseudo-participation or did not ensure public participation at all while planning 
PPPs. The cases further demonstrate the different outcomes and consequences for the projects 
according to whether the public was involved in a meaningful way, if at all.  
The first case presented, the JLTR project in China, represents an instance where the 
authorities of Zhejiang province did not involve the public in the decision-making on the PPP, 
that is, there was no attempt to hear the people’s voices. This is therefore a case where the 
decision-making process was not democratic. Accordingly, the authorities made a decision on 
toll charge without taking into account the interests of people. Subsequently, the partners 
imposed costly toll charges on the users of the toll road, who could not withstand such 
unfairness on the part of the partners, and therefore, people began to avoid the toll road, using 
other free roads. As a result, due to the avoidance of using the toll road, the partners began to 
face various problems, including financial ones. In the end, the central government of China 
had to suspend not only the JLTR project, but also other PPP projects on toll roads, ending up 
with a political fiasco. By and large, this PPP example shows not only the failure of the PPP 
project, but more importantly, it shows that representative democracy was undermined.  
In the second case, that of the PPP initiative on waste collection in Tanzania, at the 
planning stage of the PPP project the authorities of Dar es Salaam decided on fee charges after 
discussions with the local communities. That is to say, the partners heard the voices of people 
and only then made a decision, thus ensuring the democratic decision-making process. As 
mentioned above, the authorities made the decision on refuse fees by taking into account family 
incomes, and accordingly, this decision taking into account the interests of the people was 
approved by the local communities, leading to the further promotion of the project. As can be 
seen, the partners ensured not only participation, but also meaningful participation of the public 
in the decision-making on the PPP project. Generally speaking, this PPP case in Tanzania not 
only shows the success of the PPP initiative, but most importantly, it shows that the authorities 
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attempted to be closer to the people trying to hear their voices, thus being responsive to people’s 
demands and strengthening representative democracy.  
Lastly, in the third case regarding the ETC project in Taiwan, the authorities ensured 
public participation in decision-making in the form of consultation through the instrument of a 
public survey. However, they did not take into account the voices of people who expressed 
objection to being charged a costly amount for using on-board units. This instance of pseudo-
participation represents a case of the undemocratic decision-making which led to unwanted 
consequences. As mentioned above, during the implementation of the PPP project, disgruntled 
people with price policy of the private partner began to boycott the use of the ETC lanes. 
Subsequently, due to public pressure, the private partner had to cut the price of on-board units, 
thus allowing the project to be continued. However, it cannot be overlooked that if the problem 
with the price of on-board units had not been resolved, then perhaps the project would not have 
continued. 
It can be seen from these examples of PPP cases, that ensuring public participation in the 
decision-making on PPPs can significantly impact the effective implementation of the PPPs, 
which should first and foremost be aimed at bringing about the desired results for people. 
Conversely, the non-participation, as well as pseudo-participation of the public in the decision-
making on PPPs results in more risks causing the ineffective implementation of PPPs. As I will 
show in the following chapters, the examples of PPP cases presented here can act as valuable 
lessons for the authorities in Kazakhstan who, as will be shown, are yet to ensure public 
participation, including meaningful participation in the decision-making on PPPs. As these 
cases and my further arguments demonstrate, public participation in these cases is not only 
crucial for the effective implementation of PPP projects, but it can also serve in the democratic 
realisation of PPPs. This is since, through participation, the public can have an influence over 
government decisions on PPP projects that affect their lives and interests. Furthermore, through 
creating a line of communication created between citizens and the authorities, public 
participation can bring officials closer to people, making it salient that the people’s demands 






Chapter 5 – Deficiency in Public Participation in the Decision-Making 




Having laid the background to the research in the previous chapter with an examination 
of a few international cases, in the present chapter I examine the status of public participation 
in the decision-making on PPP projects in Kazakhstan. In particular, using the data obtained 
through my fieldwork, and through analysing normative legal acts governing public 
participation and PPP issues, I aim to answer the question of whether or not public participation 
is ensured in the decision-making on PPP projects in Kazakhstan. Analysing the answers given 
by respondents will enable me to discern whether there is a problem of ensuring public 
participation in the decision-making on PPP projects by the authorities in Kazakhstan. The 
analysis of normative legal acts, on the other hand, will enable an understanding into whether 
citizens and other members of society such as interest groups are granted the political rights to 
participate in the decision-making on PPPs, and whether such rights are enshrined in the current 
legislation adopted by the authorities of Kazakhstan. In general, the results of the analyses of 
respondents’ answers and existing legislation will allow to ascertain the extent to which the 
authorities of Kazakhstan protect and promote the democratic interest and rights of people on 
behalf of and for the sake of whom they execute a PPP policy by implementing PPP projects.   
In what follows, I will first give an analysis of the interviewees’ responses to a specific 
question regarding the status of public participation in the decision-making on PPP projects. As 
I show, on the whole these responses signal that there is still a problem with ensuring public 
participation by the authorities in Kazakhstan. Having given the analysis of the interviewees’ 
responses, I will then turn to examine the normative legal acts related to both public 
participation and PPP issues, which are currently in place in the country. As my analysis shows, 
despite the fact that some of these normative legal acts stipulate that there must be public 
participation in decision-making, these tend to be either not applicable to PPP projects, or 
concerned only with PPP projects involving certain types of economic activities. This therefore 
demonstrates that in addition to the existing unresolved problem with not ensuring public 
participation by the authorities, the current legislation in Kazakhstan can also be seen as limiting 
the right of the public to participate in the decision-making on PPP projects that affect their 
lives and interests. It is worth noting that while the discussions in the present chapter aim to 
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answer the certain research question, a complete answer requires further investigation, namely 
into whether or not the authorities in Kazakhstan in fact ensure public participation in the 
decision-making on PPPs when planning PPP projects. This aspect of the question will be 
examined in the subsequent chapters. 
  
5.2. Deficiency in public participation in the decision-making on PPP projects: 
          an analysis of respondents’ replies   
  
As stated in section 2.2., part of my method in this research to collect data has been to 
conduct interviews with the representatives of quasi-state institutions involved in PPP policy. 
In addition to the data gathered from these interviewees, I have also received responses from 
the representatives of central and local government bodies which develop and implement PPP 
policy at the central and local levels. Some of the results from these interviews are employed 
in this section to discern the situation regarding public participation in the decision-making on 
PPP projects, as seen in Kazakhstan today.  
Participation can generally be effectuated through various forms such as consultation, 
advisory boards, citizens advisory committees (Arnstein, 1969; Birch, 1993; Bishop & Davis, 
2002). Additionally, through the use of the Internet, that is through web pages, discussion 
forums, and portals people can express their views on public matters (Thomas & Streib, 2003; 
Boyer, et al., 2016). Moreover, consultation comprises different forms such as public meetings, 
hearings and surveys (Arnstein, 1969; Bishop & Davis, 2002), which can also be arranged by 
means of the Internet and information technology (Thomas & Streib, 2003) It is worth 
remarking that these sundry forms of participation can be applicable to participation in the 
decision-making on PPPs, and therefore can be deployed while planning PPP projects.   
For purposes of clarity and in order not to confuse interviewees with different forms of 
public participation, I have used the phrase ‘public consultation’ in my questions. This is due 
not only to the fact that everyone, including government officials, are familiar with the phrase, 
but also that consultation is viewed as one of the most widespread forms of participation, 
comprising public meetings, hearings and surveys. In what follows I note the answers given by 
interviewees in response to my question about potential issues in Kazakhstan such as the lack 
of public consultation and the inaccessibility of information on PPPs before they are approved, 
and how, if at all, international experience can be used to help solve such issues.  
The first respondent, a former expert of PPP Centre made the following remark in answer 
to my question: 
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The international experience of PPP can certainly be effectively adapted for PPP 
projects in Kazakhstan. However, it cannot be said that work on PPP issues is 
conducted covertly from the public, since for example, one of the principles of 
PPP defined in the Law is the principle of competitiveness, which also involves 
the coverage of forthcoming projects in the mass media (See Appendix A). 
It is noteworthy that this respondent does not mention anything about public consultation, and 
more generally about public participation in the decision-making on PPPs. Although the 
respondent notes that information on the upcoming PPP projects is disseminated in the mass 
media, this point pertains to informing, rather than to public participation in decision-making, 
inasmuch as there is no public discussion of PPP projects before they are approved. The 
interviewee, further, refers to the principle of competitiveness, which pursuant to article 3, 
section 2, subsection 2 of the Law ‘On Public-Private Partnership’ (2015) determines the 
selection of private partner on a competitive basis within the organisation of tendering process. 
However, as can be seen, this information does not relate to public participation in the decision-
making on PPPs. As such, from the responses given by this interviewee, and given the lack of 
mention of public consultation, it may be discerned that there is a problem of not ensuring 
public participation in the decision-making on PPPs by the authorities of Kazakhstan. 
The second respondent to the question, an employee of the Department of Budgetary 
Investment and Development of Public-Private Partnership of the Ministry of National 
Economy of Kazakhstan replied to the same question in the following way:  
There is no confidentiality of information on PPP projects, insofar as central and 
local executive bodies post the information on upcoming PPP projects on their 
official websites, as well as on the websites of the Ministry, ‘Kazakhstan Public-
Private Partnership Center’ JSC, regional PPP centres and in periodicals. At 
present, all normative legal acts are placed on the E-Government portal for 
nation-wide discussion (See Appendix B).  
As can be understood, this respondent also relays issues relating to informing the public, rather 
than public participation. The fact that the relevant information on the upcoming PPP projects 
is posted on the websites of government bodies, PPP Centre, regional PPP centres, and is 
publicised throughout the media, as the respondent notes, clearly relates to informing, but not 
to public participation in the decision-making on PPPs. Furthermore, the representative of the 
Ministry reports that normative legal acts are posted on the E-Government portal for public 
discussion. After conducting the interview with the representative of the Ministry I visited the 
portal ‘Open Normative Legal Acts’, which began functioning in 2016 (EGov, 2016) in order 
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to ascertain whether the information provided is connected with public participation in the 
decision-making on PPP projects. Drafts of normative legal acts of the government bodies of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan, including laws, decrees of the Government, ministerial orders, 
rulings of local representative and executive bodies, are posted on the portal to be discussed 
prior to their adoption (EGov, 2016). Although at the time when I examined the information on 
the portal (September 2016) there were, among these available drafts, those that relate to PPP 
issues, were mostly of general nature, rather than pertaining to specific PPP projects.  
It is worth noting that in order to ascertain whether the public can participate in the 
decision-making on PPPs using the portal ‘Open Normative Legal Acts’, I visited the portal 
again in 2017. While visiting the portal, I identified the draft of the order of the Ministry of 
National Economy regarding the approval of the list of two republican PPP projects planned 
for implementation (Portal 'Open Normative Legal Acts', 2017). At first glance, it seemed that 
central government bodies had begun to involve the public in the discussion of PPP projects 
before their approval, through the use of the portal. However, having additionally examined the 
draft of the above-mentioned ministerial order posted on the portal and some normative legal 
acts, it was revealed that in fact the public cannot participate in the decision-making on PPP 
projects using the portal. This can be explained through the following two arguments.   
Firstly, when I visited the portal, only the text of the draft of the above-mentioned 
ministerial order was posted on the portal, indicating only the names of two republican PPP 
projects (Portal 'Open Normative Legal Acts', 2017). No documents pertaining to the financial, 
technical, legal and other necessary information (drafts of feasibility studies and/or of design 
and estimate documentation) about the upcoming projects were not posted on the portal (ibid.). 
Such a circumstance prevents the public from having an open access to any information about 
the upcoming PPP projects and discussing them. Therefore, due to the absence of information 
about the two republican PPP projects, no comments or suggestions were made by the public 
on the PPP projects (ibid.). In general, such a situation shows that there is a problem with public 
access to the information on PPP projects prior to their approval. 
Secondly, according to article 20 of the Law ‘On Public-Private Partnership’ (2015), the 
authorised body on state planning, the Ministry of National Economy, forms and approves the 
lists of republican PPP projects planned for implementation. Furthermore, pursuant to the Order 
of Acting Minister of National Economy No. 80 of 27 February 2018 ‘On Introducing Changes 
and Amendments to Some Orders of the Authorised Body on State Planning’, the Ministry of 
National Economy should form the list of republican PPP projects based on applications that 
are submitted by central government bodies responsible for the realisation of PPPs. Speaking 
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about the ministerial order on the portal, it can be seen that decisions on two republican PPPs 
had already been made insofar as the list of two PPP projects was already formed by the 
Ministry of National Economy based on applications of certain government bodies. It turns out 
that the Ministry of National Economy simply approves the list of republican PPPs planned for 
implementation by its order and publishes it on the portal for public discussion as a draft of 
normative legal act. Therefore, as noted above, no information about two republican PPP 
projects (drafts of feasibility studies and/or of design and estimate documentation) was posted 
on the portal for public discussion, stating only that the decisions regarding them had already 
been made. Hence, it can be discerned that the public cannot participate in the decision-making 
on PPP projects by using the portal.         
A critical aspect of the way drafts of normative legal acts are posted on the portal should 
also be noted here, as it relates to the problem of meaningful participation. According to section 
4 of the ‘Rules on Posting and Public Discussion of Draft Concepts of Draft Laws and Drafts 
of Normative Legal Acts’ approved by the Order of the Minister of Information and 
Communications of Kazakhstan No. 22 of 30 June 2016, the drafts of normative legal acts are 
posted on the portal before they are concurred by government bodies. In other words, this 
circumstance indicates that public discussion of drafts of normative legal acts takes place prior 
to their concurrence by government bodies. However, I argue that such discussions ought to 
take place simultaneous with, rather than prior to the normative legal acts being concurred by 
government bodies. Such a procedure would address the risk that government bodies may not 
take into account the suggestions and comments of the public. In other words, the way posting 
drafts of normative legal acts on the portal is currently organised can be considered as flawed, 
since it is susceptible to enabling pseudo-participation in the discussion of drafts of normative 
legal acts.   
Assuming that the portal has likely been improved over the last two years, and now 
enables the public to participate in the discussion of PPPs prior to their approval, I visited the 
portal again in 2019. While visiting the portal I identified the draft of the ruling of the local 
representative body of North Kazakhstan region regarding the approval of the list of local PPP 
projects planned for implementation in the region, published on the 17th of April 2019 (Portal 
'Open Normative Legal Acts', 2019). Notwithstanding, it is important to note again that only 
the text of the draft of the local representative body’s ruling was published on the portal, 
indicating only the names of local PPP projects. In other words, no other information on PPP 
projects, for example, the drafts of feasibility studies and/or of design and estimate 
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documentation of PPPs, was published on the portal, thus failing to enable the public to have 
an open access to information on the upcoming PPPs and accordingly to discuss them.  
Furthermore, in accordance with article 25 of the Law on ‘Public-Private Partnership’ 
(2015), local executive bodies form the lists of local PPP projects planned for implementation, 
whereas according to article 24 of the same law, local representative bodies approve the lists of 
local PPPs planned for implementation. Speaking about the above-mentioned draft of the 
ruling, it can be understood that the decisions on local PPPs had already been made, insofar as 
the list of local PPPs was already formed by the local executive body of North Kazakhstan 
region. It can therefore be seen that the local representative body of North Kazakhstan region 
simply approves the list of local PPPs planned for implementation by its ruling and publishes 
it for public discussion as a draft of normative legal act. Therefore, again, no information about 
the upcoming local PPPs (drafts of feasibility studies and/or of design and estimate 
documentation) was published on the portal, inasmuch as the decisions on local PPPs had 
already been made by the local executive body of North Kazakhstan region. Consequently, 
given these arguments, it can be seen that at present the public cannot participate in the decision-
making on PPPs through using the portal.     
Continuing the analysis of the respondents’ answers, another respondent, an expert of the 
regional PPP Centre in South Kazakhstan, ‘PPP Expert’ LLP, responded to the question in the 
following way:   
I believe that the law will gradually be adapted to the economy of Kazakhstan 
(See Appendix C). 
As can be discerned from this brief response, the third respondent also does not say anything 
about consultation, that is, about public participation in the decision-making on PPPs. It is 
noteworthy, however, that the interviewee generally notes that the Law will be improved in the 
future in the country, thereby somewhat recognising that there is a problem of not ensuring 
public participation in the decision-making on PPPs by the authorities of Kazakhstan.   
Next, a worker of ‘Astana Innovations’ JSC gave the following response to the question:  
Given the new Law, I consider that PPP in Kazakhstan has a future. For example, 
a legislator allows us to conduct a so-called competitive dialogue with business 
representatives in the framework of which the technical, financial and legal 
parameters of the future project are discussed when developing PPP project. 
That is to say, the inaccessibility of information is no longer under consideration. 
And I hope that by applying the opportunities that are given by the new Law, we 
will be able to successfully implement PPP projects (See Appendix D).  
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As can be seen, the fourth respondent digressed from the subject by talking about a competitive 
dialogue whereby potential private partners can propose their views on the prospective PPP 
projects, which has nothing to do with public participation in the decision-making on PPPs. 
Such a reply from the respondent could be seen to suggest that presumably government bodies 
do not involve the public in the decision-making on PPPs.  
The fifth respondent, an analyst of PPP Centre, provided the following response to the 
question:   
At the present time, after adopting the Law ‘On Public-Private Partnership’ the 
project implementation process has become more transparent, and so, in the 
process of developing projects potential private partners have the right to take 
part in a ‘competitive’ dialogue, and to offer their own views on the  
implementation of projects. Moreover, investors can independently initiate the 
implementation of PPP projects (See Appendix E). 
Similar to the previous respondent, the analyst of PPP Centre also digressed from the topic, 
once again touching upon the theme of competitive dialogue that is not connected with public 
participation in the decision-making on PPPs. This response also to some extent, gives grounds 
to the belief that there is a problem of not ensuring public participation in the decision-making 
on PPPs by the authorities of Kazakhstan.  
The last respondent, the representative of local executive body, the Department for 
Education of Astana city, replied to the same question as follows:  
All PPP projects are open, there is a procedure for concurring in projects, all 
information is posted on the official websites of government bodies (See 
Appendix F).   
This respondent also does not say much about public participation in the decision-making on 
PPPs, but does point out that information on PPP projects is open and posted on the websites 
of government bodies. Howsoever, again, what the official says pertains to informing the 
public, which has no relation to public participation in the decision-making process on PPPs, 
since the information provided does not facilitate public discussion of PPP projects before they 
are approved.   
The respondent also points to an existing procedure for concurring in PPP projects. There 
are indeed ‘Rules of Planning and Implementing Public-Private Partnership Projects’, which 
were approved by the Order of the Acting Minister of National Economy of Kazakhstan No. 
725 of 25 November 2015, and later reapproved by another Order of Acting Minister of 
National Economy No. 80 of 27 February 2018 (hereinafter - Order No.80). However, these 
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Rules determine the procedure for development and concurrence of tender documentation of 
PPP projects by government bodies (Order No. 80, 2018). Since the Order No.80 is a normative 
legal act being included in the system of legislation, the aforementioned Rules approved by the 
Order No.80 and their relevance to the issue at hand will be discussed in the next section. 
As the analysis of the respondents’ replies above shows, the government bodies of 
Kazakhstan regularly inform the public about the forthcoming PPP projects. Such information 
is posted on the government bodies’, PPP Centre’s, regional PPP centres’ websites, and is also 
publicised through the mass media. Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier, all these ways of 
providing information about the forthcoming PPP projects, rather than relating to public 
participation in the decision-making on PPPs, are indications of informing. In other words, 
informing is merely a formal one-way communication of information on the part of the 
authorities, or just the provision of information to the public about the upcoming PPP projects, 
on which decisions have already been made by the authorities. Such a circumstance does not 
allow the public have their say before PPP projects are approved, which implies that the 
authorities do not yet provide the public with political rights to participate in the decision-
making on PPP projects.       
It is worth noting that in some instances even informing can take place in an improper 
manner, that is, in a way that is not helpful or not in line with the public’s concerns. Reactions 
by two internet users to the news about forthcoming PPP projects, expressed on PPP Centre’s 
Facebook page can illustrate this point. Commenting on information provided by the media 
outlet – Vlast (2017) on upcoming PPP project, the construction of the proton centre in the city 
of Taldykorgan, one woman made the following remark:    
Why is it always written about the intentions to implement projects, and not 
written about the terms and conditions of competitive tendering? (PPP Centre, 
2017).  
Another social media user commented on the information provided by PPP Centre on its 
Facebook page, describing the number of PPP projects being increased in many sectors, 
exemplified in an overview conducted by the information and analytical portal ‘Informburo’ 
(PPP Centre, 2018а). The user commented: 
There is no awareness. We would gladly take, but where are projects? Your 
website is empty, akimats [local executive bodies] do not know anything, blah, 
blah, blah…provide more open information and sources (PPP Centre, 2018а).    
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Summing up, the analysis of the afore-mentioned respondents’ answers demonstrates that 
the public learns about the forthcoming PPP projects from open sources post-factum, that is, 
when decisions on PPPs have already been made by the authorities. This is explained by the 
fact that the government bodies of Kazakhstan still practise informing the public about 
upcoming PPP projects through official websites and the mass media, thereby not enabling the 
public to participate in the discussion of PPPs prior to their approval. Such a circumstance does 
not allow the public to express its voice before PPP projects are approved, which considerably 
limits the political rights of citizens and interest groups to participate in the decision-making 
on PPP projects. Consequently, such a situation indicates that there is still a problem with 
ensuring public participation in the decision-making on PPPs in Kazakhstan, where the 
authorities still circumscribe the rights of citizens and interest groups to have their say in PPP 
projects that concern their lives and interests. 
 
5.3. Deficiency in public participation in the decision-making on PPP projects:   
         an analysis of existing legislation 
 
As noted previously in the introduction, answering the question of whether or not public 
participation is ensured in the decision-making on PPP projects in Kazakhstan requires an 
examination of current legislation. In particular, it is necessary to ascertain whether citizens, as 
well as other members of society such as interest groups are furnished with political rights to 
participate in the decision-making on PPPs, and whether such rights are enshrined in the 
existing legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The examination of existing legislation will 
be a revealing endeavour, especially with regards to the democratic rights of the citizenry in a 
given state. In other words, whether or not such rights are ensured in the legislation of 
Kazakhstan demonstrates the extent to which politicians and officials in the country, that is, the 
representatives of the public protect and promote the interests and rights of electors, on whose 
behalf and for whom the representatives make and execute public policies, along with a PPP 
policy.    
The system of legislation in place in the Republic of Kazakhstan comprises of different 
levels of normative legal acts that are adopted by government bodies of Kazakhstan (Law ‘On 
Legal Act’, 2016). Different public relations are regulated by different types of normative legal 
acts, and therefore, I analyse those types of normative legal acts that regulate issues related to 
public participation in decision-making and PPP. Of particular interest for analysis are codes, 
laws, decrees of the Government and orders of ministers, which according to article 7, section 
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2 of the Law ‘On Legal Acts’ (2016) are considered to be the main types of normative legal 
acts. Amongst these myriad types of normative legal acts, I purposefully examine those whose 
provisions regulate public participation in decision-making. The focus on public participation 
in decision-making is due to the existence of normative legal acts regulating the issues related 
to public participation in decision-making in general, whose provisions may or may not allow 
for public participation in the decision-making on PPPs. In addition to these provisions, I also 
scrutinise the normative legal act regulating the public relations in the sphere of PPP. This is, 
as mentioned in the previous section, Order No. 80, which determines the procedure for 
planning and implementing PPP projects. The provisions of this order also need to be examined 
with regards to the question of whether or not they allow of public participation in the decision-
making on PPPs.  
Surveying the existing legislation of Kazakhstan, the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
‘On Public Councils’ No.383-V of 2 November 2015 is noteworthy. The preamble of this law 
states that the law determines the legal status and the procedure for forming and organising the 
activities of public councils (Law ‘On Public Councils’, 2015). As article 1, section 1 of this 
Law indicates, public councils are considered to be consultative and advisory, and are 
supervisory boards comprising of representatives of ministries and local government bodies, as 
well as non-profit organisations and citizens. Article 3, section 1 of the same Law declares that 
the purpose of the activity of public councils is to express the opinions of civil society on 
socially significant matters. One of the objectives here is to represent the interests of civil 
society and to take into account public opinion when discussing and making decisions at both 
national and local levels, pursuant to article 3, section 2, subsection 1 of the Law (Law ‘On 
Public Councils’, 2015). It is indeed a welcome fact that the Government of Kazakhstan has 
adopted such a law allowing citizens and the representatives of civil society to participate in 
the activities of public councils, and to take part in the decision-making on public affairs.  
However, despite initial appearances, further examination of the Law ‘On Public 
Councils’ reveals that the public cannot in fact participate in the decision-making on PPP 
projects through participation in the activities of public councils. This is seen through the list 
of powers that public councils have at national and local levels, as specified in article 5, section 
1 of the Law ‘On Public Councils’ (2015). These powers include the following:   
- discussion of drafts of budget programmes of an administrator of budget programmes, 




- discussion of the implementation of budget programmes of an administrator of budget 
programmes, of strategic plans or programmes for the development of territories, and 
of state and governmental programmes; 
- discussion of the reports of executive bodies on the achievement of target indicators; 
- discussion of the reports of an administrator of budget programmes on the 
implementation of budget programmes, on the execution of plans for receipts and 
expenditures of money from the sale of goods, works, and services, and on the receipt 
and expenditure of money from charity; 
- participation in the discussion and development of drafts of normative legal acts 
concerning the rights, freedoms and duties of citizens;  
- consideration of individuals and legal entities’ appeals on public administration 
improvement, and organising state apparatus’ transparent work such as compliance with 
official standards of ethics; 
- development of proposals on improving the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 
and their submission to government bodies; 
- implementation of public control in forms stipulated by the Law; 
- consideration of draft statute of public council at first meeting and its submission to a 
government body for approval;  
- creation of commissions in areas of activity; 
- participation in local government bodies’ work on regulation of land relations in 
accordance with the land legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan.  
As the provisions of the Law ‘On Public Councils’ set out above demonstrate, advisory 
boards such as public councils do not provide a way for the public to participate in the decision-
making on PPPs.  As such, on the whole it can be said that the powers of public councils are 
thus far limited. The absence of the opportunity for the public to participate in the decision-
making on PPPs through public councils is also confirmed by the fact that none of the 
interviewees noted above in section 5.2., mentioned anything about public councils in their 
response. It could therefore be stated that the Law ‘On Public Councils’ does not yet enable the 
public to participate in the decision-making on PPPs, thereby circumscribing the political rights 
of citizens and NGOs to express their voices on PPP projects before they are approved.   
Another normative legal act that should be mentioned in this discussion is the Law ‘On 
Administrative and Territorial Structure of the Republic of Kazakhstan’ No.2572-XII, adopted 
on the 8th of December 1993. This Law was supplemented by the new provision based on the 
Law ‘On Introduction of Amendments and Additions to Some Legislative Acts of the Republic 
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of Kazakhstan on Onomastics Issues’, article 14-1, in January 2013, stipulating the 
consideration of public opinion by local government bodies on some public matters, which is 
generally a positive move. However, upon further inspection it is revealed that this new 
provision specifies the consideration of public opinion by local government bodies only when 
naming and renaming the administrative and territorial units, constituent parts of localities, and 
when clarifying and changing the transcription of their names. It seems, therefore, that the 
legislators of Kazakhstan pass laws which allow the public to express their opinions only with 
regards to certain public matters and not others. As such, the legislators circumscribe the 
participation of citizens and NGOs in the decision-making on more important public matters 
affecting their lives and interests, including on PPP projects.  
The next normative legal act whose provisions regulate citizen participation issues in 
public affairs is the Law ‘On Local State Government and Self-Government in the Republic of 
Kazakhstan’ No. 148-II of 23 January 2001. In particular, in 2009 this law was supplemented 
by a chapter providing for citizen participation in local self-government (Law ‘On Introduction 
of Amendments and Additions to Some Legislative Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan on 
Local State Government and Self-Government Issues’, 2009). Indeed, the creation of the 
institution of local self-government in Kazakhstan is a highly positive measure in terms of the 
enhancement of local democracy and of the further democratisation of state governance at large. 
Moreover, in 2013 and 2017, additional amendments were introduced to the law aimed at 
further advancement of local self-government.  
In order to deal with issues of local importance, an assembly and a meeting of local 
community are held in the territories of cities of district significance, rural boroughs, townships, 
villages (Law ‘On Local Government and Self-Government in the Republic of Kazakhstan’, 
2001). As can be discerned, local self-government is carried out exclusively in the territories of 
the above political divisions. Local communities dwelling in the territories of these 
administrative divisions can participate in local self-government through instruments such as 
assembly and meeting.  
In accordance with article 39-3, section 2 of the Law ‘On Local Government and Self-
Government in the Republic of Kazakhstan’ (2001), an assembly of local community is held 
on the following important issues of local importance if necessary:  




- determination for a period of four years of the composition of participants in a meeting 
of local community, to which they are delegated; 
- making suggestions to ‘maslikhats’ (translated from the Kazakh language as a local 
representative body) of districts (cities of  region significance); to ‘akims’ (translated 
from Kazakh language as a head (mayor) of local executive body) of districts (cities of 
region significance), cities of district significance, rural boroughs, townships, villages, 
and to local self-government bodies on issues of local importance; 
- hearing and discussion of akims’ reports on the implementation of their functions of 
local self-government; 
- hearing and discussion of annual reports of akims of city of district significance, rural 
borough, township, village on the results of the implementation of the Plan for pasture 
management and their use; 
- hearing and discussing reports of maslikhat on the work done by maslikhat of  district 
(city of region significance) and on the activities of its standing commissions; 
- other issues of local importance, determined by an assembly of local community. 
According to article 39-3, section 3 of the Law ‘On Local State Government and Self-
Government in the Republic of Kazakhstan’ (2001), a meeting of local community is held on 
the following issues of local importance: 
- discussion and consideration of drafts of programme documents and community 
development programmes; 
- concurrence of the draft budget of city of district significance, rural district, township, 
and of the report on budget execution; 
- concurrence of decisions of the apparatus of akim of city of district significance, rural 
borough, township, village for the management of communal property of city of district 
significance, rural borough, township, village; 
- formation of commission of local community from amongst the participants in a 
meeting of local community in order to monitor the implementation of the budget of 
city of district significance, rural district, township, village; 
- hearing and discussion of the report on the results of monitoring of budget execution of 
city of district significance, rural borough, township, village; 
- concurrence of alienation of communal property of city of district significance,  rural 
borough, township, village;  
- discussion of topical issues of local community, drafts of normative legal acts affecting 
the rights and freedoms of citizens; 
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- concurrence of candidates proposed by akim of district (city of region significance) for 
the position of akim of  city of district significance, rural borough, township, village for 
further submission to the maslikhat of district (city of region significance) for the 
election of akim of city of district significance, rural borough, township, village; 
- initiation of dismissal issue of akim of city of district significance, rural borough, 
township, village;  
- making suggestions on the appointment of heads of state institutions and organisations 
financed from local budget, which located in the respective territories; 
- other issues of local community. 
As can be seen from the foregoing, the above lists of issues considered at an assembly 
and meeting of local community do not contain such the issue of public discussion or 
participation in the decision-making on PPPs before they are approved. In other words, local 
communities do not have the right to participate in the decision-making on PPP projects. 
Moreover, although the institution of self-government is functioning in the country, local 
communities are not vested with the rights to participate in the direct decision-making on PPP 
projects. Thus, it can be said that although the authorities of Kazakhstan ensure the participation 
of local communities in self-government, they do not grant local communities the right to 
participate in the decision-making on PPP projects, let alone participation in the direct decision-
making on PPPs.          
The next normative legal act that I examine is the Order of the Minister of Environmental 
Protection of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 135-p of 27 May 2007, which determines the 
‘Rules for Conducting Public Hearings’. As previously stated, consultation is a form of 
participation that includes public hearings, through which the public can participate in the 
decision-making process, including on PPP projects. Therefore, in general, these rules legally 
allow the public to participate in the decision-making on PPP projects through public hearings 
as a form of participation. However, through a further analysis of the provisions of the above 
rules, it can be ascertained that these rules apply solely to issues related to environmental 
protection. This is explained by the fact that according to the section 1 of the Order of the 
Minister of Environmental Protection of Kazakhstan (2007), the rules have been developed in 
compliance with the Environmental Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 9 January 2007, 
and establish the procedure for organising and conducting public hearings for discussing 
environmental impact assessment materials.  As can be discerned, therefore, the above rules 
circumscribe the public to participate in the decision-making on PPP projects which are 
implemented in other areas of activity.  
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In addition to the ministerial order noted above, there are other normative legal acts that 
regulate the public relations concerning public hearings on environmental protection issues. For 
example, in April 2016 the Environmental Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan was 
supplemented by two articles – article 57-1 ‘Public participation in the decision-making on 
environmental protection issues’ and article 57-2 ‘Conducting public hearings’ (Law of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, 2016). As can be seen, article 57-1 of the Environmental Code (2007) 
stipulates the right of the public to participate in the decision-making on environmental 
protection issues that legally allows of public participation in the decision-making on PPP 
projects that are realised in the sphere of environmental protection. Article 57-2 of the 
Environmental Code (2007) also specifies public hearings through which public participation 
in decision-making can be effectuated. Furthermore, article 57-2 of the Environmental Code 
(2007) allows of holding public hearings not only on projects in the sphere of environmental 
protection, but also in other areas of activity in accordance with the list determined by the 
authorised body in the field of environmental protection. Indeed, such new changes in 
legislation are a positive move, furnishing the public with the right to participate in the decision-
making on projects, including PPP projects that are realised in other areas of activity, not 
confining only to the sphere of environmental protection.   
Article 57-2 of the Environmental Code (2007) specifies certain areas of activity, 
determined by the authorised body in the field of environmental protection, within which 
projects are to be brought to public hearings. Consequently, in order to illuminate the types of 
economic activities on which projects are to be brought to public hearings as a form of 
participation in decision-making, including on PPP projects, I scrutinise the Order of the Acting 
Minister of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 240 of 10 June 2016 ‘On Approval of 
the List of Types of Economic Activities within Which Projects Are to Be Brought to Public 
Hearings’ (hereinafter - Order No. 240). This Order specifies the following areas of activity 
within which projects are to be brought to public hearings: 
- agriculture; 
- forestry; 
- mining industry; 
- processing industry; 
- construction; 
- transport; 
- electricity and energy supply; 
- water supply; 
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- water drainage; 
- waste management; 
- production and use of potentially dangerous biological substances, including genetically 
modified organisms and products; 
- construction and placement of installations at the catchment areas of enterprises using 
for production purposes potentially hazardous chemical, biological substances and 
radioactive materials, leading to pollution and clogging of waters. 
It is clear that the legislators of Kazakhstan have substantially expanded the scope of 
economic activities on which projects are to be brought to public hearings, thus allowing of 
public participation in the decision-making on PPP projects involving other areas of activity, 
not limiting only to the sphere of environmental protection. However, further in-depth 
examination of the Order No. 240 (2016) reveals that the Order is yet to allow public hearings 
to take place on PPP projects involving certain types of economic activities. For example, 
section 5 of the Order No. 240 (2016) specifies the following types of economic activities in 
the sphere of construction within which projects are to be brought to public hearings:  
1) construction of railways (trunk roads); 
2) construction of airports with the length of the main runway at 2,100 metres or 
more; 
3) construction of public automobile roads with the exception of economic 
automobile roads and streets in localities; 
4) construction of commercial ports, berths for loading and unloading, connected 
with coastal and remote ports (with the exception of berths of ferry crossings), which can 
take ships with the displacement of more than 1350 tons; 
5) construction (reconstruction) of dams and other objects designed for the 
retention or permanent storage of water for which a new or additional amount of retained 
or stored water exceeds 10 million cubic metres; 
6) construction of overhead transmission lines of a 220V or more, and with a length 
of more than 15 kilometres, and regardless of extension within the boundaries of 
localities; 
7) construction of landfills for the disposal of hazardous and solid wastes. 
As we can discern from the above list, public hearings cannot be held when constructing 
other crucial facilities, such as hospitals, kindergartens, schools, prisons, resorts, bridges, sports 
buildings or as mentioned earlier, proton centres and many other public facilities. This is while, 
as mentioned in Chapter 3, there are PPP projects that are being implemented in various 
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segments of social sphere, and which involve the construction of such public facilities as 
enumerated above. Such a legal circumstance circumscribes the rights of citizens and interest 
groups to have their say in certain PPP projects that affect their lives and interests. On top of 
that, as indicated above, the public cannot participate in public hearings on the construction of 
streets and economic automobile roads in localities, thus limiting the political rights of local 
communities to have their say in relevant local PPP projects. 
Apart from the normative legal acts analysed above, I also examine the Order of Acting 
Minister of National Economy of Kazakhstan No. 80 of 27 February 2018 ‘On Introducing 
Changes and Amendments to Some Orders of the Authorised Body on State Planning’. It should 
be noted that the Order No.80 (2018) defines the ‘Rules of Submitting, Considering and 
Selecting Concession Projects’ (hereinafter - Rules 1) and the ‘Rules of Planning and 
Implementing Public Private-Partnership Projects (hereinafter - Rules 2).    
As previously discussed in section 5.2., one of the respondents, the representative of the 
local executive body, the Department for Education of Astana city, noted that there is a 
procedure for concurring in PPP projects. Studying the above Rules 1 and Rules 2 reveals that 
the procedure for concurring in concession and PPP projects includes the development, 
examination, concurrence and approval of PPP and concessions projects (Order No. 80, 2018). 
Furthermore, it can be seen that the procedure for developing, examining, concurring and 
approving tender documentation (e.g. feasibility study and/or design and estimate 
documentation) is carried out by government bodies with the involvement of quasi-state 
institutions (Order No. 80, 2018). For example, pursuant to section 18 of Rules 1, the 
responsible government body for the implementation of concession project develops tender 
documentation and concurs with the authorised bodies on state planning, budget execution, and 
of monopoly regulation and control if a concession project relates to the areas of natural 
monopoly (Order No. 80, 2018). With regards to PPP projects, in accordance with section 25 
of Rules 2, the organiser of tendering process, that is a government body responsible for 
implementing PPP projects, submits tender documentation for concurring to the central or local 
authorised body on state planning (Order No. 80, 2018). Moreover, according to section 21, 
paragraph 2 of Rules 2, central government bodies conduct the examination of tender 
documentation of national PPP projects, and accordingly, local government bodies conduct the 
examination of tender documentation of local PPP projects (Order No. 80, 2018). 
As mentioned earlier, quasi-state institutions are involved in the preparation and 
concurrence processes of tender documentation. For example, in section 27 of Rules 2 it is 
indicated that the central or local authorised body on state planning submits tender 
80 
 
documentation for its examination to PPP Centre or legal entities which are designated by local 
executive bodies to do that job (Order No. 80, 2018). It should be remarked that the PPP Centre 
is a quasi-state institution that legally operates under the state ownership. This is due to the fact 
that section 1 of the Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan ‘On the Creation 
of the Specialised Organisation on Concession Issues’ (2008) declares that the PPP Centre has 
been established with a 100 per cent of state participation in its authorised capital.   
With respect to legal entities which are designated by local executive bodies to conduct 
the examination of tender documentation, there is no explanation of these legal entities in the 
Order No. 80 (2018). However, in section 34-1 of the old redaction of the ‘Rules for Planning 
and Implementing Public-Private Partnership Projects’ it was stipulated that the examination of 
tender documentation was allowed to be conducted by financial institutions (e.g. second-tier 
banks, consulting companies) with experiences in financial and investment analyses (Order of 
the Acting Minister of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2015). It is therefore 
possible that now local executive bodies could be involving financial institutions, such as 
commercial companies, in conducting the examination of tender documentation of local 
concession and PPP projects. Notwithstanding, in order to ascertain what legal entities are 
involved by local executive bodies in conducting the examination of tender documentation of 
PPP projects, I endeavoured to find relevant information from online sources. The official 
website of ‘Regional Centre of Public-Private Partnership of the East Kazakhstan Region’ JSC 
(2019) informs that the company develops and conducts the examination of tender 
documentation of local investment projects, including local concession projects. Additionally, 
the official Facebook page of ‘Regional Centre of PPP of the Kyzylorda region’ LLP (2019) 
also informs that this firm develops and conducts the examination of local investment projects, 
along with local PPP projects. Such information is noteworthy, insofar as it means that local 
executive bodies incorporate the regional PPP centres, which are effectively commercial 
organisations, in conducting the examination of tender documentation of local PPP projects. 
This fact further implies that members of society such as non-commercial organisations do not 
have the opportunity to participate in any stage of planning of PPP projects compared to quasi-
state and commercial organisations.  
Rules 1 and Rules 2 also specify the involvement of legal entities which are designated 
by central or local executive bodies to render consultancy on national and local concession 
projects and national PPP projects respectively (Order No. 80, 2018). Nonetheless, it has been 
revealed that the legal entity involved in concession and PPP projects consultancy is also a 
quasi-state institution. To illustrate, according to the Decree of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
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No.33 of 2 February 2017, ‘Kazakhstan Project Preparation Fund’ LLP has been designated to 
render consultancy on national and local concession projects and on national PPP projects. 
Furthermore, it has been ascertained that the founders of this LLP are the National Managing 
Holding ‘Baiterek’ JSC and PPP Centre, possessing 97.7 % and 2.3 % of shares respectively  
(KPFF, 2018). As previously discussed, the PPP Centre is the legal entity with 100 per cent of 
state participation in its authorised capital. The National Managing Holding ‘Baiterek’ JSC on 
the other hand, has as its sole shareholder the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
(Decree of the Governemnt ‘On Approval of the Development Strategy of the Joint Stock 
Company ‘National Managing Holding Baiterek’ for 2014-2023’, 2014). As we can understand 
from these normative legal acts, the authorities mainly involve the quasi-state institutions in 
certain stages of planning of PPP projects, whereas the representatives of non-state sector, that 
is, NGOs are deprived of such opportunities.   
Additionally, Rules 2 also specify the procedure for concurrence and examination of 
business plans for national and local PPP projects, which are developed by potential private 
partners (Order No. 80, 2018). Nevertheless, the analysis of the provisions of Rules 2 governing 
this issue, that is sections 138-149, shows that only government bodies, PPP Centre and legal 
entities which are designated by local government bodies are involved in those processes (Order 
No. 80, 2018). For example, section 146 of Rules 2 stipulates that the PPP Centre is involved 
in conducting the examination of business plans for PPP projects (Order No. 80, 2018). 
Furthermore, pursuant to section 146 of Rules 2, legal entities may also be included in the 
examination of business plans for PPP projects by local executive bodies (Order No. 80, 2018). 
However, the provisions of Rules 2 do not define which legal entities are designated by local 
executive bodies to conduct the examination of business plans for PPP projects. Nonetheless, 
as mentioned earlier, the official Facebook page of ‘Regional Centre of PPP of Kyzylorda 
Region’ LLP (2019) informs that this firm conducts the examination of local investment 
projects, as well as business plans for such projects, including local PPP projects. It can 
therefore be seen that local executive bodies involve the regional PPP centres, which are quasi-
state organisations, in conducting the examination of business plans for PPP projects, thereby 
excluding the participation of NGOs when planning PPP projects.   
By and large, it is worth remarking that the procedure for concurrence and examination  
of tender documentation and business plans for PPP and concession projects is carried out by 
government bodies with the involvement of quasi-state institutions such as PPP Centre and its 
regional branches. Therefore, such processes have nothing to do with public participation while 
planning PPP projects. However, further analysis of the Order No. 80 (2018) demonstrates that 
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there are additional provisions governing the possible creation of project groups, whose 
members can be involved in some stages of planning PPP projects. For instance, in accordance 
with section 7, subsection 1, paragraph 2 of Rules 1, the government body responsible for the 
implementation of concession project “can create a project group by involving subordinate 
organisations under ministries, independent experts, design, engineering, consulting and other 
companies, as well as government bodies for the development of tender documentation” (Order 
80, 2018). It is indeed a welcome sign, based upon these provisions, that independent experts 
can be involved in the work of a project group. However, it is evident that the members of a 
project group can, by and large, be made up of representatives of government bodies, 
subordinate organisations under ministries, and commercial companies. This is while, 
according to the redaction of the aforementioned provision of Rules 2 (section 7, subsection 1, 
paragraph 2), the representatives of NGOs are not considered as members of a project group. 
Most importantly, there is a legal nuance related to the above-discussed provision of Rules 1, 
which shows that a government body responsible for the implementation of concession project 
is not obliged to create a project group. This means that a project group may not be created at 
all, in which case independent experts would not be able to participate in the development of 
tender documentation of upcoming concession projects.     
In section 9, paragraph 1 of Rules 2 it is stipulated that “… if necessary, to ensure the 
quality of project management, an interdepartmental project group is created by involving 
specialists from subordinate organisations under ministries, independent experts, design, 
engineering and other companies, government bodies, representatives of the National Chamber 
of Entrepreneurs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, subjects of entrepreneurship” (Order No.80, 
2018). As the provisions of Rules 2 discussed above indicate, while independent experts may 
be involved in the work of an interdepartmental project group, members of this group would 
again be mainly comprised of representatives of government bodies, subordinate organisations 
under ministries, and commercial organisations. It could however be argued that NCE RK is a 
non-governmental organisation, and thus the interests of this NGO are indeed represented in 
the work of any interdepartmental project group. While it is undeniable that NCE RK is a non-
governmental organisation, the legal interpretation should also be recognised, which states that 
NCE RK exclusively represents the interests of commercial entities. For instance, in accordance 
with article 3, section 2, subsection 2 of the Law ‘On the National Chamber of Entrepreneurs 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan’ (2013), one of the objectives of NCE RK is to represent, provide 
and protect the rights and legitimate interests of business entities as the subjects of 
entrepreneurship. Generally speaking, given the profitability of PPP for private companies, it 
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is justifiable to have NCE RK as an institution that, where possible, promotes and protects the 
interests of private companies, including by participating in the work of an interdepartmental 
project group, while other NGOs are not eligible to do so. Moreover, the other advantage NCE 
RK has over other NGOs, is provided by the legislators of Kazakhstan as seen from the 
provisions of the Law ‘On Public- Private Partnership’ (2015). According to article 28 of the 
Law ‘On Public-Private Partnership’ (2015), the representatives of the NCE RK can participate 
in the work of competition commissions on the selection of private partners and monitor the 
implementation of PPP projects.  
It is worth emphasising here the legal nuance embedded in the provisions of Rules 2 
mentioned earlier, that is, the inclusion of the words ‘if necessary’ in the redaction of the section 
9, paragraph 1 of Rules 2 (Order No.80, 2018). This shows that the government body 
responsible for implementing a PPP project is not obliged to create an interdepartmental project 
group, and therefore may not create it. Therefore, again, independent experts may not be able 
to participate in some stages of planning PPP projects, unless the government body responsible 
for implementing a PPP project decides to create an interdepartmental project group. Generally 
speaking, such non-mandatory provisions of both Rules 1 and Rules 2 on the creation of project 
groups could play into government bodies’ hands, especially for local ones, which may prefer 
not to create such project groups, insofar as their creation might induce timing, administrative, 
organisational and other costs, thereby fulfilling the central authorities’ demand for the 
implementation of certain number of PPP projects over a year. Moreover, it is possible that the 
creation of project groups and the involvement of independent experts in their work might lead 
to animadversions among the members, which could potentially stall the government bodies’ 
plans. This could become problematic, especially given government bodies’ interest in the 
speedy promotion and implementation of PPP projects at large.      
It is arguable that the government bodies of Kazakhstan somewhat are reluctant to involve 
the general public, including the representatives of NGOs in the decision-making on public 
affairs, along with PPP projects. An illustrative example here could be the construction of toll 
roads, based on comments given by the head of the Independent Automobile Union of 
Kazakhstan, Edokov, in an interview to the news channel – KTK (KTK, 2017). In his 
conversation with KTK reporter, Edokov censured the introduction of toll roads in the country, 
including policymakers for ill-advised and inequitable decisions (KTK, 2017). Castigating 
decision-makers, Edokov said that despite the fact that citizens whose incomes were on a 
downward trajectory could hardly maintain their livelihoods, the rulers were about to impose 
road fees on citizens to drive into their own cities (KTK, 2017). To Edokov, the chargeable 
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entry as a money-making activity at the expense of citizens’ pockets, could lead to traffic jams 
and other difficulties as a result of limiting vehicles to enter a city, while other alternatives 
could be deployed such as employing public transport as suburban trains or high-speed buses. 
Decrying toll roads, Edokov basically views all revenues as intended for private actors, when 
they should be directed at replenishing a city budget, and approximately up to 10 per cent of 
proceeds ought to be used for remunerating an operator company, which can be hired by local 
administration for operating toll roads (Edokov, 2017 cited in KTK, 2017). The most critical 
question asked by KTK reporter was, based upon Edokov’s previous acknowledgement of the 
fact, regarding his imperfect relationships with the authorities who do not include the 
representatives of the public such as the union headed by him and other NGOs in discussions 
on toll roads (KTK, 2017). Edokov answered this question in the following 
way:                              
If I think something, I will say it – I will not hold my tongue. And financial 
issues, for example, try to be discussed behind closed doors. Money likes 
silence. And I will ask how much you want to receive from this, what scales, 
why you set such a price, and why 80 per cent should go into your pockets, not 
to a city? I will say this and bring it to public discussion. But who will want it 
… (Edokov, 2017 cited in KTK, 2017).  
What Edokov’s answer here indicates is the possible claim that the authorities are reluctant to 
involve the NGO headed by him, and in principle, other NGOs in the discussion of public 
matters, including toll roads that are often constructed and operated through a PPP mechanism, 
which concern the interests of NGOs.  
In general, it should be remarked that the authorities of Kazakhstan thus far do not 
cooperate with NGOs sufficiently, and the involvement of NGOs in the decision-making on 
public matters remains inadequate. For example, delineating the role and development of NGOs 
in Kazakhstan, Luong and Weinthal (1999, p. 1270) maintain that NGOs are not involved in 
the internal (domestic) politics by the authorities, and therefore they predominantly concentrate 
on external (international) problems. Furthermore, speaking at the international expert event – 
‘Interaction of Civil Society Institutions of Russia and Kazakhstan: State and Prospects’, the 
President of the public fund ‘Eurasian Expert Council’ – Lepsibayev (2017, cited in 
Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 2017a) states that the Government of Kazakhstan has failed to create 
the robust institutional and legal mechanisms for effective cooperation with NGOs.  
 




The aim in this chapter has been to examine the current state of ensuring public 
participation in the decision-making on PPP projects in Kazakhstan. The analysis I have 
presented in this chapter has been based upon my qualitative interviews conducted as part of 
my fieldwork in Kazakhstan, as well as an in-depth analysis of the normative legal acts in place 
that regulate public participation issues in the country. As the analysis of the data from the 
interviews shows, information on forthcoming PPP projects is regularly posted on the websites 
of government bodies and quasi-state institutions and is also publicised through the mass media. 
However, such a process on its own does not constitute the participation of the public in the 
decision-making on PPPs, insofar as there is no public discussion of PPP projects prior to their 
approval. In other words, such a process is merely informing on the part of government bodies 
that inform the general public about upcoming PPP projects post factum, that is, effectively 
after making decisions on PPP projects. Moreover, as can be discerned from the indignant 
reactions by citizens to the way the authorities inform about the upcoming PPPs, even informing 
does not take place in a proper manner. This shows that even in the sphere of informing the 
public, government bodies do not provide the full and necessary information on forthcoming 
PPP projects adequately, leaving aside public participation in the decision-making on PPPs. 
Hence, as the analysis of respondents’ answers demonstrates, the government bodies of 
Kazakhstan still practice informing about upcoming PPP projects, implying that they do not yet 
involve the public in the decision-making on PPPs. Therefore, there is still a problem of not 
ensuring public participation in the decision-making on PPPs by the authorities of Kazakhstan, 
meaning that the political rights of the public to participate in the decision-making on PPPs are 
limited thus far. 
As the analysis of the existing legislation in Kazakhstan shows, there are various 
normative legal acts governing public participation in the decision-making on certain public 
matters. However, the laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan such as ‘On Public Councils’ (2015), 
‘On Administrative and Territorial Structure in the Republic of Kazakhstan’ (1993) and ‘On 
Local State Government and Self-Government in the Republic of Kazakhstan’ (2001) do not 
allow of public participation in the decision-making on PPP projects. As for the Order of the 
Acting Minister of National Economy of Kazakhstan No. 80 of 27 February 2018, it only 
specifies the involvement of government bodies and quasi-state institutions in planning PPP 
projects, thereby excluding the participation of NGOs in planning PPPs. As I have noted, there 
are provisions of the Order No.80 stipulating the possible creation of project groups while 
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planning PPP projects with the possibility of involving independent experts, nonetheless, they 
are non-mandatory. Ergo, the participation of independent experts in the work of project groups 
cannot be guaranteed, inasmuch as it hinges upon on the decision of the government body 
responsible for implementing a PPP project, which is likely to be disinclined to create such 
project groups so as to promote PPP projects without being stalled on the part of independent 
experts. Furthermore, according to the same provisions of the Order No.80 regarding the 
creation of project groups, NGOs cannot be involved in the work of project groups, with the 
exception of NCE RK which protects and promotes exclusively the interests of commercial 
organisations, thus restricting the participation of other NGOs in planning PPP projects. On the 
whole, it can be said that the abovementioned normative legal acts circumscribe the 
participation of the general public in the decision-making on PPP projects.  
Indeed, there is the Order of the Acting Minister of Energy of Kazakhstan No. 240 of 10 
June 2016 that obliges public hearings on projects, which can also be legally applied to PPP 
projects. Notwithstanding, as I have shown, Order No. 240 does not oblige public hearings on 
projects involving certain types of economic activities in its provisions thus far. For example, 
public hearings cannot be held on the construction and operation of schools, kindergartens, 
hospitals, or sports facilities, whereas according to the statistics given in Chapter 3 most PPP 
projects are being implemented in the spheres of education, healthcare, physical education and 
sports, involving the construction and operation of the abovementioned public facilities. 
Additionally, the Order No. 240 does not allow of public hearings on the construction of 
economic roads and streets in localities, which also limits the rights of local communities to 
have their say in PPP projects regarding such constructions. Therefore, the Order No. 240 is yet 
to allow public hearings on PPP projects involving certain types of economic activities. Hence, 
the analysis of the existing legislation in Kazakhstan overall shows that the authorities still limit 
public participation in the decision-making on PPPs, thus signifying that there is a deficiency 
in public participation in the decision-making on PPP projects thus far.   
Given these findings, it is worth noting that although the analyses of respondents’ answers 
and of existing legislation have allowed us to draw certain conclusions regarding the current 
state of public participation in PPPs in Kazakhstan, these analyses do not answer the research 
question fully. In other words, more is needed to ascertain whether the authorities of 
Kazakhstan ensure public participation in the decision-making on PPPs in practice. To do so, 
in the next chapter I closely examine the cases of two ongoing PPP projects in the country.   
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Chapter 6 – Case Studies: Instances of Not Ensuring Meaningful Public 




Having investigated the views of the interviewees and the existing legislation of 
Kazakhstan as it relates to public participation in the decision-making on PPP projects, in this 
chapter I examine more closely the state of public participation in the decision-making on PPPs 
in the country through looking at two particular cases. In particular, my aim here is to ascertain 
whether the authorities of Kazakhstan currently ensure public participation in the decision-
making on PPPs in practice, that is, when planning PPPs. Importantly, I examine two large-
scale PPP projects, the implementation of which concerns two different areas of activity within 
which projects are to be brought to public hearings in accordance with the existing legislation.   
The first project pertains to the organisation of a leisure centre for the public. It envisaged 
the construction of a ski resort on a tract, namely on the Kok-Zhailau plateau located in the 
territory of Ile-Alatau National Natural Park, which is located approximately 10 kilometres 
from Almaty, Kazakhstan’s former capital city. The project’s feasibility study was under 
discussion for years, but in the end the project was aborted by the authorities in late 2019 
(Informburo, 2019). The implementation of the project was under the supervision of the local 
executive body of Almaty, which is a city of national (republican) significance. Given that the 
resort was expected to be built in the territory of the Ile-Alatau National Natural Park, it is 
discernible that the implementation of the project concerns the sphere of environmental 
protection. As I discussed in the previous chapter, the existing legislation of Kazakhstan, 
particularly, the Order of the Minister of Environmental Protection of Kazakhstan No.135-p of 
7 May 2007 prescribes that public hearings are mandatory for public initiatives or projects that 
concern environmental protection issues. It should be noted that this ministerial order also 
applies to PPP projects. However, as I will discuss in more detail, there were problems in 
ensuring public participation in the decision-making process of this project, especially at the 
initial stage of planning, which resulted in public opposition to the project, leading to different 
risks that adversely affected the course of the project. Most importantly, by not involving the 
public in the decision-making on the project, the authorities made a decision not taking into 
account the interests of people, thereby undermining representative democracy.  
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The second project concerns the country’s transport sector and involves the construction 
and operation of a toll road encompassing the territories of several districts in Almaty region. 
As such, the implementation of this project is the responsibility of the local authorities of 
Almaty region. This PPP project is currently at its initial stage, with the toll road being under 
construction, and the PPP contract for its construction was concluded in February 2018. Similar 
to the first case, public hearings are mandated for such projects which involve the construction 
of automobile roads for public use, as legislated by the Order of the Acting Minister of Energy 
of Kazakhstan No. 240 of 10 June 2016. Moreover, the project should also be brought to public 
hearings according to the Order of the Minister of Environmental Protection of Kazakhstan 
No.135-p of 7 May 2007, which also concerns environmental protection issues in connection 
with the construction of the toll road. Similar to the first project, however, this project has also 
encountered different risks due to the failure on the part of the authorities to ensure public 
participation in the decision-making on the project, especially at the initial stage of planning. 
Moreover, due to the non-involvement of the public in the decision-making on the project, the 
regional authorities made a decision not taking the interests of local residents, thereby 
undermining representative democracy. 
Given that both of these cases fall within the categories of projects for which provisions 
of the existing legislation mandate public participation in the form of public hearings, they offer 
valuable insights into current practices related to public participation in the country. In 
particular, examining these two PPP projects will allow me to ascertain whether or not the 
authorities of Kazakhstan currently involve the public in the decision-making on PPPs while 
planning PPP projects. Furthermore, the study of these PPP projects will allow for a broader 
understanding into how public participation or possibly non-participation of the public in the 
decision-making on PPPs affects the course of PPP projects during the planning stage. That is, 
it helps to ascertain the possible consequences for PPP projects that could result from the 
involvement or non-involvement of the public in the decision-making on PPPs by the 
authorities. I will look at each of these cases in turn, enumerating such effects and consequences 
associated with public participation in each case.        
 
6.2. The Construction of the Ski Resort ‘Kok-Zhailau’ 
 
As noted in the introduction, the first case to be examined in this chapter is that of the 
construction of a ski resort, which is planned on the Kok-Zhailau plateau (‘Kok-Zhailau’ in 
Kazakh means ‘green pasture’) located in the territory of Ile-Alatau National Park, 10 
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kilometres from Almaty, in the foothills of the Ile-Alatau mountain range. The location 
envisaged for the project, namely the Kok-Zhailau plateau, is the reason why people have 
alternatively named the project the ‘Kok-Zhailau’ ski resort or simply the ‘Kok-Zhailau’ 
project.  Although the project was frozen once back in 2002 due to the lack of investment, the 
talks on resuming the construction of the ski resort began in 2011 (The Village, 2018). 
According to the information published in The Village (2018), in 2011 the local executive body 
of Almaty and the Ministry of Industry and New Technologies of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
decided to build a ski resort in the Kok-Zhailau plateau. Moreover, as The Village (2018) 
reports, at that time the budgetary funds were already allocated from the city budget of Almaty 
for the development of feasibility study for the project. At the beginning of 2012, speaking to 
reporters, the head of the Department for Tourism of Almaty, Zhulamanov, confirmed the local 
authorities’ plan to construct a ski resort, envisaging the funding for its construction both by 
the government and private investors, that is, through the PPP mechanism (KTK, 2012). In 
what follows, different decisions by the authorities and the public reaction to them will be 
described. As I will discuss, the project encountered various risks, most important of which was 
a social risk, from which other difficulties followed.  
 
6.2.1. Social Risk 
 
Since the talks on the construction of the resort were resumed, information was 
disseminated in the mass media, saying that the authorities of Almaty did not hold a public 
discussion on the project, that is, they did not involve the public in the decision-making on the 
project. For instance, in July 2017 at a press conference, Solyanik, a consultant for the 
ecological protection organisation ‘Crude Accountability’, declared that the Compliance 
Committee for the UNECE Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation 
in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (hereafter - Aarhus 
Convention), had acknowledged that the government’s decision regarding the construction of 
the ‘Kok-Zhailau’ ski resort had breached the provisions of the Aarhus Convention (Sputnik 
Kazakhstan, 2017a). In particular, the Committee pinpointed that article 6, paragraphs 2, 3, 8, 
and article 7 of the Aarhus Convention had been violated (Solyanik, 2017 cited in Sputnik 
Kazakhstan, 2017а). For example, article 6, paragraph 2 of the Aarhus Convention specifies 
that “The public concerned shall be informed, either by public notice or individually as 
appropriate, early in an environmental decision-making procedure, and in an adequate, timely 
and effective manner” (UNECE, 1998, p. 9). Also, article 7 of the Aarhus Convention stipulates 
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that “Each Party shall make appropriate practical and/or other provisions for the public to 
participate during the preparation of plans and programmes relating to the environment, within 
a transparent and fair framework, having provided the necessary information to the public” 
(UNECE, 1998, p. 11).  
The very activist, Solyanik, was one of 12 citizens who had appealed to the Compliance 
Committee for the Aarhus Convention in 2013 regarding the Kok-Zhailau project and had stated 
that the local authorities of Almaty had contravened the Aarhus Convention when selecting a 
site for the construction of the ski resort, thus not involving the public in the decision-making 
on the project (Radio Azattyq, 2013). Solyanik also recognised that by not arranging a public 
discussion on such a crucial public issue, the local authorities precipitated the indignation of 
the public, thus leading to public objection to the project (Solyanik, 2013 cited in Radio 
Azattyq, 2013). For instance, when other activists of the ‘Stand up for Kok-Zhailau’ movement 
inquired about the feasibility study for the project, the local authorities did not fulfil that request, 
explaining that a summation of the feasibility study was on the website of the Department for 
Tourism of Almaty (Radio Azattyq, 2013). 
As the facts enumerated above, including the results of the investigation conducted by 
the Compliance Committee for the Aarhus Convention demonstrate, the local authorities of 
Almaty did not ensure public participation in the decision-making on the ‘Kok-Zhailau’ project. 
Moreover, as can be seen, the authorities contravened not only the provisions of the Aarhus 
Convention, but also the provisions of the Order of the Minister of Energy of Kazakhstan 
No.135-p of 7 May 2007, which prescribes that the authorities must hold public hearings on 
projects concerning environmental protection issues.  
It goes without saying that the non-involvement of the public in the decision-making on 
the project by the city authorities caused a flurry of vexation, prompting people to fiercely 
oppose the project. These were especially people who for years were struggling and attempting 
to prevent the construction of the ski resort, which could substantially damage the rich flora 
and fauna of the Ile-Alatau National Park. For example, in the spring of 2012 ecologists 
gathered around two thousand signatures of tourists who expressed their disagreements over 
the construction of the ski resort in the territory of the Kok-Zhailau plateau as a part of the Ile-
Alatau National Park (Zakon.kz, 2012). Also, on the 17th of March 2013, approximately fifty 
activists climbed to the Kok-Zhailau plateau to protest against the project by laying on the 
ground and portraying the words ‘Kok-Zhailau SOS!’ on the snow (Kapital, 2013). Similarly, 
on the 1st of March 2016, the representatives of the ‘Stand up for Kok-Zhailau’ movement,  
together with the representatives of the National Social Democratic Party organised a picket on 
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the popular walking street of Almaty, Arbat, carrying banners, posters and flags, and 
clamouring “Freedom for national parks, national parks – for people, there is no lease!”, and 
“We are not the country – buy and sell!” (Informburo, 2016a).    
Furthermore, the glaring problem around the project was noted over and beyond 
Kazakhstan, and people in other countries who were familiar with the unique nature of the Kok-
Zhailau plateau did not remain silent and also showed solidarity with domestic NGOs and 
nature lovers (Radio Azattyq, 2013). By way of illustration, the German Conservation Union 
sent a letter to the leadership of Kazakhstan with a request to abandon the construction of the 
ski resort in the territory of the Ile-Alatau National Park (Radio Azattyq, 2013). As Zakon.kz 
(2012) reported, this matter was of importance for ecologists who recognised that the 
construction of the ski resort would cause great damage to the environment and destroy the 
national park with its rare inhabitants and rich vegetation. Ecologists also noted that the natural 
features of the plateau were not suitable for the construction of the ski resort, for the reason that 
the main hills of the plateau have gentle slopes of 10-15 degrees, which is unattractive to skiing 
and snowboarding lovers (Zakon.kz, 2012).  
More importantly, as Zakon.kz (2012) informed, tourists and local residents did not wish 
to be divested of the uniqueness of ecological tourism in the Kok-Zhailau plateau. Therefore,  
rather than being against the development of tourism in the region, ecologists argued that 
instead of constructing the ski resort, along with shopping and entertainment centres, hotels and 
car parks as a way of developing tourism, it would be more sensible to cultivate ecological 
tourism in the territory of the Kok-Zhailau plateau and to advance the other existing ski resorts 
in the region (KZinform, 2012). Despite this, as Zakon.kz (2012) reported, local bureaucrats 
insisted on promoting the project, and believed that the existing ski resorts such as ‘Akbulak’, 
‘Shymbulak’ and ‘Tabagan’ would not reap the desired economic benefits, whereas the Kok-
Zhailau ski resort could attract a huge number of tourists, as is the case in places like 
Switzerland. Furthermore, the local authorities of Almaty in their letter to the Kazakh 
environmental protection and ecological society ‘Green Salvation’ pledged that during the 
construction of the ski resort international standards would be met by employing less harmful 
technologies and materials. They further promised that necessary measures would be 
undertaken to preserve the unique flora and fauna, and henceforth public hearings would be 
held on the project, Zakon.kz (2012) informs.    
As KZinform (2012) reports, the representatives of the ‘Green Salvation’ society, not 
trusting to the local authorities, and in order to draw the attention of central authorities to the 
problems around the Kok-Zhailau project, sent an open letter to the President and Parliament 
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of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the 30th of January 2012. In the letter the members of the 
‘Green Salvation’ society pointed out that the construction of the ski resort was contrary not 
only to the national legislation in the field of protection of conservation areas, but also to the 
international legal documents, such as the Convention on the Conservation of Biological 
Diversity (KZinform, 2012). It could perhaps be argued that several activists, as discussed 
above, had to resort to the international assistance by appealing to the Compliance Committee 
for the Aarhus Convention due to the possible red tape around the ‘Kok-Zhailau’ project in 
higher echelons of power and the concern about not gaining enough support inside the country.  
Showing disapprobation of the project, at a press conference on the 13th of February 2014 
the members of the ‘Kok-Zhailau’ public expert council voiced their discontent on the project 
(Matritca.kz, 2014). As an example, the head of the environmental protection movement 
‘Tabigat’, Eleusizov, said that for the aim of developing ski tourism, it is possible to deploy an 
alternative place such as ‘Tekeli’, adding further: “from the very first I said that it is not a ski 
resort, it is a privatisation project” (Eleusizov, 2014 cited in Matritca.kz, 2014). Similarly, an 
activist for the ‘Stand up for Kok-Zhailau’ movement, Ashim, underlining the importance of 
Kok-Zhailau plateau, remarked that “Kok-Zhailau for Kazakh people is a sacred place, it is not 
just a green pasture, it is a heavenly pasture” (Ashim, 2014 cited in Matritca.kz, 2014). Another 
public figure, Svoik, added further that “it is necessary, at least, to build a resort that would 
work for a taxpayer, and not just for a few of our fellow countrymen” (Svoik, 2014 cited in 
Matritca.kz, 2014). Another figure present was the master of sports of international class in 
sport tourism and Doctor of Pedagogical sciences, Professor Vukolov, who claimed that “there 
are often avalanches about which we were convinced many times, but no one listens to us” 
(Vukolov, 2014 cited in Matritca.kz, 2014).   
As the discussion of these developments around the project reveal, the local authorities 
of Almaty who were in charge of the project encountered serious issues at the planning stage 
of the project. One of those difficulties was a social risk that effectively evolved into a serious 
social problem precipitating public opposition to the project. As Hardcastle and Boothroyd 
(2003) argue, social risk within PPPs is associated with the protesting attitude of people, where 
individual members of society disapprove of a PPP project, or its separate components, and 
accordingly a PPP project does not find appropriate public support (Hardcastle & Boothroyd, 
2003, p. 46). It can be seen that within the framework of the ‘Kok-Zhailau’ project the 
emergence of a social risk in effect evolved into a social problem, where the public, including 
environmentalists, NGOs, as well as tourists and local residents demonstrated their disapproval 
of the local authorities’ decision on the project by organising recurring protests over several 
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years. It is clear that the main reason for the social risk was that the local authorities of Almaty 
by not involving the public in the decision-making process regarding the construction of the ski 
resort on the Kok-Zhailau plateau, ignored the interests of the public. Such a circumstance, as 
a result, led to the social risk factor of public objection to the project. Voicing a similar 
conviction, as mentioned earlier, one of activists, Solyanik, asserted that the local authorities 
themselves had provoked a “social and environmental conflict” by not discussing such a 
socially important project with the public (Solyanik , 2013 cited in Radio Azattyq, 2013). It can 
therefore be seen from these discussions that the social risk encountered by the local authorities 
of Almaty, in the form of public objection to the project, resulted in a protracted disagreement 
over the project between the public and the local authorities, which in turn affected the planned 
course of the project. As noted earlier, public objection to the project somewhat caused the 
project to be stalled, since although the project was announced and launched in 2011, its 
feasibility study was not yet approved.  
An important fact that should be remarked upon here, is that during a continued and 
passionate dispute between the public and the local authorities, the third public hearing on the 
project was scheduled to be held by the local authorities on the 4th of May 2014 (Panorama, 
2014). Nevertheless, as Panorama (2014) informs, the representatives of NGOs invited by the 
local authorities left the event in protest against the authorities’ ignorance of public opinion for 
many years. One of the activists who left the event was the head of the ‘Tabigat’ movement, 
Eleusizov, who stated that although public hearings were a right and requisite process, the local 
authorities were not listening to the public for years, thereby ignoring the opinions and interests 
of the public (Eleusizov, 2014 cited in Panorama, 2014).  
It could be argued that the local authorities attempted to hold a public hearing on the 
project, thereby allowing the public to participate in the decision-making process regarding the 
PPP project. Notwithstanding, as the facts around the Kok-Zhailau project show, firstly, the 
local authorities of Almaty effectively made a decision on the project prior to any attempt to 
hold a public hearing. For example, as evidence, the representatives of the Compliance 
Committee for the Aarhus Convention revealed the violation of the provisions of the Aarhus 
Convention by Kazakhstani authorities who had not involved the public in the decision-making 
process on the project. Moreover, the local authorities breached the provisions of the Order of 
the Minister of Energy of Kazakhstan No.135-p of 7 May 2007, according to which they had 
to ensure public participation in the discussion of the project by holding public hearings. 
Secondly, it is clear from the words of the afore-mentioned activist, Eleusizov, that despite 
public hearings which only began to be held long after the decision was made on the 
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construction of the ski resort, the local authorities were not listening to public opinion, and 
instead were promoting their blueprint for the project. In other words, by arranging formal 
public hearings, the local authorities merely attempted to assuage public discontent and to 
persuade the public to support the already made decision. Ergo, in this context one cannot talk 
about ‘meaningful’ participation. Indeed, there is participation as a factual action or process, 
but there is no participation in terms of ‘purpose’ or achieving the goal for which the public 
participates in the decision-making on the project. Therefore, such participation is not 
meaningful and influential. It is not for nothing that Pateman (1970) defines ‘participation in 
decision-making’ as an influence in making a decision, resulting in the achievement of the 
requisite results for the participating individuals in decision-making (Pateman, 1970, pp. 68-
69). Moreover, by defining a meaningful and influential form of participation in decision-
making, Pateman distinguishes it from ‘pseudo-participation’ which as a term was introduced 
by Verba (1961), delineating it as participation or discussion on an issue about which a decision 
has already been made (ibid.). Besides, according to Verba (1961, cited in Pateman, 1970, p. 
69), pseudo-participation is viewed more as an instrument of persuading individuals to support 
a decision that has already been taken, rather than as a discussion of an issue in order to come 
to a decision. 
It is perhaps because of these previous encounters that the public observed the 
arrangement of the third public hearing as another attempt by the authorities to convince the 
public to support the decision that had already been made by the city authorities. Furthermore, 
the public was well aware that the local authorities were still ignoring public opinion, and 
therefore, as mentioned earlier, the public left the event in protest against the ‘pseudo-
participation’ of the public in the decision-making process on the project. It turns out that 
although the local authorities began to hold public hearings, they did not ensure meaningful 
participation in the decision-making on the project. That is to say, they effectively continued to 
ignore the opinions and interests of the public. 
 
6.2.2. Legal Risk 
 
Following on from the social problem precipitated by the authorities’ failure to ensure 
meaningful participation of the public, people started turning to court in an attempt to stop the 
construction of the ski resort. Interested activists, for instance, appealed to court several times 
to stop the local authorities’ plan to construct the ski resort, in order to preserve the wildlife on 
the site of the construction. Such a situation indicates the public’s unwillingness to capitulate 
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to the decisions made without consulting it, and its determination to struggle against the local 
authorities’ plan. However, in most cases courts took the local authorities’ side. By way of 
illustration, on the 25th November of 2013 the Inter-District Economic Court of Almaty 
recognised the conclusion on the Kok-Zhailau project as legitimate and refused to designate the 
examination of the preliminary environmental impact assessment as invalid within the 
framework of the feasibility study for the project (Kursiv.kz, 2013). In this instance, the 
announcement of the judge’s decision lasted only two minutes (Kursiv.kz, 2013). The lawsuit 
was filed by the ecological society ‘Green Salvation’ and the movement ‘Stand up for Kok-
Zhailau’ against the Department of Natural Resources and Nature Management of Almaty 
(Kursiv.kz, 2013). On the 31st of March 2014 another lawsuit was brought forward by 
environmentalists to the Medeu District Court of Almaty for violation of the procedures for 
holding public hearings (Zakon.kz, 2014a). However, on the 7th of April 2014 the court ruled 
to leave the case without consideration (Zakon.kz, 2014a). Afterwards, a private complaint was 
filed against this latter court decision, and on the 27th of May 2014 at the second hearing the 
Almaty City Court ruled that the Medeu District Court’s decision should be revoked, and the 
case should be sent for reconsideration to the same court (Zakon.kz, 2014a). Nonetheless, as  
Zakon.kz (2014a) reports, public activists themselves admit that it would be too early after the 
first victory in court to claim that the project would be completely abolished.   
Later on, on the 11th of March 2016 the Specialised Inter-District Economic Court of 
Almaty rejected another lawsuit brought forth by the ‘Green Salvation’ ecological society 
against the local authorities (Radio Azattyq, 2016). This lawsuit had called for the recognition 
of the state environmental examination as illegal within the framework of the project 
‘Construction of the road to the ski complex ‘Kok-Zhailau’’, with the defendant being the 
Department for Automobile Roads of Almaty (Radio Azattyq, 2016). Castigating the court 
decision, the chairman of the ‘Green Salvation’ ecological society, Kuratov, declared that the 
court justified the deforestation of a large number of endangered trees (Kuratov, 2016 cited in 
Informburo, 2016b). Furthermore, as Informburo (2016b) reports, after the court session 
Kuratov indignantly opined that government bodies themselves violate their duties, and 
contrary to their responsibility to ensure the environmental protection for the sake of living 
creatures, including humans, fail to protect and promote the interests of the state and society as 
a whole.  
As can be seen from the above facts, in addition to the social risk, the legal risk emerged 
within the ‘Kok-Zhailau’ project, which also evolved into a legal problem causing the drawn-
out litigation between NGOs and the local authorities. These legal battles also affected the 
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planned course of the project. It is important to note that one of the factors contributing to this 
legal risk was the lack of public support for the project. That is to say, the clear opposition to 
the project by the public who desperately wished to prevent the construction of the ski resort, 
including by undertaking legal (judicial) measures. Delineating a legal risk in PFI, Hardcastle 
and Boothroyd (2003) cite the cases when a legal risk may arise. For example, according to 
Hardcastle and Boothroyd, a legal risk arises when certain local government bodies (public 
partners) do not have the right to sign a PPP contract (Hardcastle & Boothroyd, 2003, p. 45). 
Hardcastle and Boothroyd also describe a case where a legal risk occurred when it was 
necessary to make amendments to the legislation in order to vest private partners (in this case 
NHS Trust) with the right to sign a PPP contract, thus causing certain legal costs (ibid.). 
Howsoever, within the framework of the Kok-Zhailau project, as can be observed, a legal 
risk manifested in the form of litigation between the public and the local authorities, which 
induced more detrimental consequences such as stalling the project, and thus tarnishing the 
reputation of the project. On top of that, the protracted litigation caused not only timing, but 
also moral and material costs, primarily for citizens. It can therefore be argued that, in addition 
to cases described by Hardcastle and Boothroyd (2003), a legal risk in PPP can also involve 
litigation between different parties. For instance, delineating legal risk in the practical 
implementation of PPPs, Hodge (2004) emphasises the legal difficulties in the form of lengthy 
litigation between various participants, including the state, citing the City Link infrastructure 
project in Melbourne, Australia, which incurred supplementary costs to participants, thus 
adversely affecting the project (Hodge, 2004, pp. 42, 44-45). Moreover, Hodge and Bowman 
(2003, cited in Hodge, 2004, p. 45) argue that the continuous legal disputes within the City Link 
project tainted the ‘political success’ of the project. It is clear that in the case of the Kok-Zhailau 
project, the legal problem arose directly as a result of the social problem itself due to the 
authorities’ failure to take public opinion into account when making the decision regarding the 
project. 
 
6.2.3. Investment Risk 
 
Apart from the social and legal risks, the Kok-Zhailau project was subject to a financial, 
or more precisely an investment risk that also adversely affected the project by causing its delay. 
Delineating investment risk as one of the types of financial risks while implementing PPPs, 
Matayev (2014a) argues that this risk implies the likelihood of shortage of cash infusions into 
a PPP project (Matayev, 2014a, p. 182).  Furthermore, Hardcastle and Boothroyd (2003) have 
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argued that an investment risk, or a risk associated with a sponsor can cause PPP projects to be 
delayed or annulled, insofar as investors would not have incentives to finance them (Hardcastle 
& Boothroyd, 2003, p. 47). In this regard, public objection to the Kok-Zhailau project somewhat 
caused an investment risk by not giving full confidence to the local authorities of Almaty to 
pour money into the project. This lack of confidence was due to the fact that investments would 
not be justified if the project was to be finally aborted because of the lack of public support. At 
a press conference, explaining the reasons behind the temporary suspension of the project in 
2015, the mayor of Almaty, Baibek, stated the following: 
Why? Because the public perceived that ambiguously … Therefore we stopped 
in order to examine, and secondly, so as to optimise the project. I think it was 
very expensive (Informburo, 2017). 
As this remark by the mayor demonstrates, the main reason for the suspension of the project 
was public objection to the project, with the secondary reason being the financial factor, that is, 
the costly nature of the project. The latter reason is confirmed by the decision made by the city 
authorities of Almaty on budget issue. As Informburo (2015) reports, according to the 
information of the press office of  the local administration of Almaty, on the 16th of October 
2015, upon reviewing the city budget for 2015, the local representative body of Almaty decided 
to suspend the project in order to reduce the ineffective spending of budgetary funds 
(Informburo, 2015).  Despite this suspension, however, the deputy of the local representative 
body of Almaty, Alshanov, claimed in an interview that according to the governor of the city, 
the project could be resumed as long as any investor, either foreign or domestic, is interested in 
financing it (Kazinform, 2015). This information provided by the deputy indicates that in the 
period when the decision to suspend the construction of the ski resort was made, that is at the 
end of 2015, there was no potential investor who was interested in financing the project. On the 
other hand, the situation shows that the local authorities did not completely abandon the project, 
but temporarily suspended it until they were able to attract a potential investor. Furthermore, it 
could be argued that through suspending the project for a period, the local authorities decided 
to financially optimise the project with the purpose of taking advantage of time to assuage the 
public indignation so as to resume the project later on.      
The ambition of the local authorities to resume and continue the project can also be 
explained further by the fact that they were craving the return of budgetary funds which had 
already been expended on the project. As Informburo (2018a) reported, the local authorities 
had already expended a considerable amount of budgetary funds on the development of 
feasibility study, design and estimate documentation, and several construction works. By way 
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of illustration, the information about the budgetary funds spent on the Kok-Zhailau project for 
2012-2018 (indicated in the national currency of Kazakhstan) is given below (See Table 6.1).   
 
Table 6.1:  The information about the spent money on the resort ‘Kok-Zhailau’ 
  
Items of expenditure 2012-2015 years 2017-2018 years Total 
Feasibility study, and 
design and estimate 
documentation 
3 499 900 480 195 664 000 3 695 564 480 
Construction of 
electricity substation 
4 231 896 000 4 299 672 000 8 531 568 000 
Total 7 731 796 480 4 495 336 000 12 227 132 480 
________________________________________________________________ 
The table of the spent money on the resort ‘Kok-Zhailau’, Informburo, 2018a 
 
As for the local authorities’ intention of continuing the project, at a press conference in 
November 2017 the mayor of Almaty, Baibek, speaking about the possible resumption of the 
project, declared that the local administration had done a lot of work to optimise the project 
taking into consideration the comments of the public since the project was suspended in 2015 
(Informburo, 2017). As an example, the head of the local administration stated that the costs of 
the project were almost halved, and the area where trees were about to be felled was 
substantially pared (ibid.). More importantly, Baibek once again mentioned that the project 
could be resumed at investor’s expense (Informburo, 2017). This remark shows that at the time 
of the press conference, in November 2017, there were still no private partners interested in 
investing in the project. This is while, as Sputnik Kazakhstan (2017b) reported, the deputy head 
of the local administration of Almaty, Madiyev, speaking at the ‘Almaty Invest’ forum a month 
earlier, had acknowledged that the ‘Kok-Zhailau’ project required huge investments which the 
local government was not able to afford, and therefore, the local authorities were seeking 
potential investors to negotiate the project.  
As the facts discussed here demonstrate, the ‘Kok-Zhailau’ project was subject to an 
investment risk as a result of which the project was forced to be suspended, thereby causing 
additional financial costs per day by being on hold. Furthermore, there were no positive 
breakthroughs in the project since 2011, despite the considerable expansion of budgetary funds 
by the local authorities. As Informburo (2017) reported, it is not for nothing that 
environmentalists believed that the local authorities’ decision to construct the resort was not 
only environmentally, but also economically ineffective. Furthermore, it should not be 
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forgotten that apart from the budgetary expenses on the development of feasibility study and 
the construction of electricity substation (Informburo, 2018a), the local government spent 
around KZT10 million on the formation of the authorised fund of a special project management 
company ‘Ski Resort Kok-Zhailau’ LLP (Kursiv.kz, 2012).  
Later on, the information was circulating in the mass media that the further financing of 
the project could be provided by central authorities, as well as through the local budget. As 
Forbes Kazakhstan (2018) reported, the funding for the project would probably be provided 
from the national budget, along with the budget of Almaty city. Such information to some extent 
shows that not only the local authorities, but also the central authorities had an intention to 
resume and promote the project. As Forbes Kazakhstan (2018) additionally informed, speaking 
at the annual public meeting on the 21st of February 2018 the Mayor of Almaty announced that 
the final decision on the construction of the ski resort would be known after the release of the 
renewed feasibility study for the project scheduled for June 2018. However, according to the 
information later published by KazTAG, the preparation period for the renewed feasibility 
study was postponed until the end of 2018 (Zonakz, 2018a). This information indicates that the 
project was put on hold once again, thereby causing extra financial burdens on the city budget 
of Almaty due to its further daily idleness.  
 
6.2.4. Political Risk 
 
In addition to the social, legal, and investment risks enumerated above, the project also 
underwent a political risk which effectively occurred due to public opposition caused by the 
city authorities’ ignorance of the opinions and interests of the public, who had not involved the 
public in the decision-making on the project. As Li and others (2005b) argue, “poor public 
decision-making process” and “strong political opposition/hostility” are considered to be 
political risk factors (Li, et al., 2005b, p. 28). As I will show, these two political risk factors can 
be seen within the framework of the Kok-Zhailau project.   
Describing a political risk in PFI, Hardcastle and Boothroyd (2003) report that a political 
risk may arise when a public partner is replaced to perform contractual obligations within the 
framework of a project (Hardcastle & Boothroyd, 2003, p. 46). To demonstrate, they cite a case 
when the central government body in the person of the Highways Agency was replaced by the 
Grater London Authority and the Transport London Authority (ibid.). Hardcastle and 
Boothroyd further stress that a political risk may arise due to a change in the structure of central 
or local authorities, thus opening the possibility that a new government body or a new 
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government changes the scheme of a project or cancels it altogether (Hardcastle & Boothroyd, 
2003, pp. 46, 52). While I concur with the authors’ arguments, it should be noted that a political 
risk may also emerge in cases where not a new government, but the government that initiates a 
PPP project itself could abandon a project, in particular due to the lack of public support for a 
project. Such a likelihood, that is, the probable cancellation of PPP project by the authorities 
on account of public disapproval, can be seen in relation to the Kok-Zhailau project. Statements 
made by the mayor of Almaty at the annual public meeting on the 21st of February 2018 
demonstrate this possibility. At the meeting, the mayor of Almaty, Baibek, touched upon the 
Kok-Zhailau project, and apprised that since the project was suspended in 2015, the local 
administration was reviewing the feasibility study for the project, saying that a renewed 
feasibility study would be released in June 2018 (Vlast, 2018a). Moreover, in the same meeting 
Baibek also pledged to bring a new feasibility study for the project to public discussion this 
time (ibid.). The mayor also proclaimed that if the public were not to agree with new changes 
in the project, then the project would be annulled, uttering the following: 
If in the end there are more minuses than pluses, this project will not be realised.  
We speak about this straightaway and directly. ……….. (Vlast, 2018a).  
This utterance by the mayor implies that as long as the public disapproved of the new feasibility 
study for the project this time, the project would not go ahead and could be abolished by the 
authorities.   
Moreover, the statement by the mayor also indicates that the local authorities of Almaty 
were developing a renewed feasibility study for the project. However, it was not yet known at 
the time whether the public would approve of that new feasibility study for the project, and 
whether they would support the project at all. Furthermore, there was also a big question as to 
whether the local authorities would involve the public in the discussions of a new feasibility 
study for the project, and more importantly, whether they would ensure meaningful 
participation of the public in the decision-making processes regarding the project. On the whole, 
it can be stated that the ‘Kok-Zhailau’ project was subject to a political risk, for whose 
emergence the authorities effectively only had themselves to blame given the fact that they had 
been ignoring the opinions and interests of the public for years.  
 
6.2.5.  Corruption Risk 
 
Lastly, apart from the social, legal, investment and political risks, a corruption risk also 
arose within the project due to the unlawful actions committed by the officials involved in the 
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project. Generally speaking, a corruption risk in public governance arises due to the inadequate 
public control over decisions taken by officials who are prone to abuse such a situation. For 
instance, Cobârzan and Hamlin (2005) discuss the views of Tanzi (1998) and Rose-Ackerman 
(1999), who have argued that the main motive for corruption in governance to be the 
uncontrolled power in the hands of bureaucrats, in particular of those who influence decision-
making (Cobârzan & Hamlin, 2005, p. 32). In a similar vein, the Director General of the Central 
Asian Foundation for Democracy Development, Umbetaliyeva, speaking about corruption 
problems in the system of governance, including in Kazakhstan, argues that the corruption 
factor in Kazakhstan arises due to the lack of transparency during the decision-making 
processes on public affairs (Umbetaliyeva, 2018 cited in KazakhSTAN 2.0, 2018). It is worth 
noting that one of the reasons for inadequate public control that leads to corruption risks can be 
the non-involvement of the public in the decision-making on public matters. As Umbetaliyeva 
(2018) noted in the interview given to KazakhSTAN 2.0, in Kazakhstan people are not involved 
in the decision-making on public matters, especially in the decision-making processes 
concerning public money. Umbetaliyeva (2018, cited in KazakhSTAN 2.0, 2018) further 
claimed that compared to other countries, the public in Kazakhstan cannot have open access to 
the information regarding the purposes for which budgetary funds are allocated and how they 
are expended.  
As for PPP, at various stages of the implementation of PPP projects, as well as during the 
planning phase, officials are vested with powers to make different decisions. These powers, 
further, could be abused by officials in order to be illegally enriched. For example, when 
planning and implementing PPP projects, various commissions on public procurement are 
created, including on the selection of potential private partners, whose members are mainly 
government officials. In such a situation, and in principle in any other situation when the public 
cannot control the decisions of officials, and when there is no adequate transparency and 
accountability from officials, they may abuse their powers by perpetrating corruption offenses. 
It is for such reasons that scholars such as Cobârzan and Hamlin (2005); Martimort (2008); 
Kwak, Chih and Ibbs (2009); Hwang, Zhao and Gay (2013) pay attention to corruption as a 
serious risk that could happen during the implementation of PPP projects.  
As mentioned earlier, the officials involved in the ‘Kok-Zhailau’ project perpetrated a 
corruption offense. As Zonakz (2018b) reports, in April 2018 the International News Agency, 
KazTAG, requested and published the response of the Ministry of Finance of Kazakhstan, 
informing that several laws within the framework of the construction of power grids for the ski 
resort ‘Kok-Zhailau’ had been violated. According to the information of the Ministry of Finance 
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of Kazakhstan, the financial audit revealed the infringements of relevant provisions of the laws 
‘On Public Procurement’ and ‘On Architectural, Urban Planning and Construction Activities 
in the Republic of Kazakhstan’ within the framework of the project ‘Construction of electric 
networks for external power supply for the mountain resort ‘Kok-Zhailau’ (Zonakz, 2018b). 
Particularly, as the Ministry of Finance informed, a public customer in the person of the 
Department of Energy and Communal Services of Almaty had announced the tendering process 
despite the absence of positive state examination for the design and estimate documentation of 
the project (Zonakz, 2018b). As the Ministry of Finance reported, the information about the 
announcement of competitive tendering was posted on the 28th of January 2014, whereas at the 
time there was no positive state examination yet, and it was only issued on the 20th of February 
2014 (Zonakz, 2018b).  
Furthermore, according to the information obtained by KazTAG, several deputies of the 
lower chamber of the Parliament of Kazakhstan repeatedly made inquiries to the Government 
of Kazakhstan regarding the promotion of foreign manufacturers’ interests by officials to 
purchase transformers to be used for the ‘Kok-Zhailau’ project (Zonakz, 2018b). The Prime 
Minister of Kazakhstan responded to one of these inquiries by stating that the Ministry of 
Finance had assigned the check of public procurement arranged by the Department of Energy 
and Communal Services of Almaty during the period between 2012 and 2017 (Zonakz, 2018b). 
The Attorney General of Kazakhstan also reacted to the abovementioned inquiry by the 
deputies, saying that checks were being carried out by relevant government bodies, and 
moreover, the information concerning the misstatements of incumbents about the manufacture 
of transformers was being checked (Zonakz, 2018b). Notwithstanding, as KazTAG (2018, cited 
in Zonakz, 2018b) reports, the deputies’ queries remained on the agenda, and the deputies were 
not satisfied with certain measures undertaken, especially regarding the fact that one incumbent, 
whose negligence had costed KZT9 billion of budgetary funds in favour of foreign companies,  
got off with only a stern rebuke offered by the Anti-corruption Department of Almaty. As these 
facts demonstrate, the corruption offenses committed by officials involved in the ‘Kok-Zhailau’ 
project incurred the ineffective use of budgetary funds, thereby adversely affecting the project.  
To sum up, it can be seen that the ‘Kok-Zhailau’ project which was announced and 
launched by the local authorities of Almaty in 2011 was doomed to failure from the start, noting 
the fact that it was once forced to suspend in 2015. The main reason for this failure is that the 
city authorities ignored the opinions and accordingly the interests of the public when they made 
decisions regarding the project, thus leading to the undemocratic decision-making process on 
the project. Furthermore, they did not ensure such a form of participation as public consultation, 
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particularly its instrument - public hearings on the project, contrary what they are instructed to 
do according to the Order of the Minister of Environmental Protection of Kazakhstan No.135-
p of 7 May 2007. In other words, the local authorities contravened the political rights of citizens 
to participate in the decision-making on the PPP, thereby precipitating public objection to the 
project. In turn, public objection to the project as a social risk factor prompted other risks such 
as legal, investment and political. These risks with the various problems that they gave rise to, 
adversely affected the course of the project, causing its delay, as well as  the ineffective use of 
budgetary funds, namely of taxpayers’ money. Moreover, the project underwent a corruption 
risk that emerged due to the uncontrolled decisions of officials, which the public could not 
influence by reason of the lack of opportunity to participate in the decision-making processes 
on the project, including in the work of commissions on public procurement. As a result of the 
corrupt actions of local officials involved in the project, a considerable damage was done to the 
state budget, thereby tarnishing the project’s reputation.   
It is worth noting that although the local authorities began to hold public hearings long 
after the decision was made on the project, in fact they were not listening to public opinion. In 
other words, the local authorities merely wished to persuade the public to support the decision 
which had already been taken by them. That is, instead of ensuring meaningful participation 
the city authorities only sought pseudo-participation of the public in the decision-making on 
the project. It can therefore be discerned that despite holding public hearings, the local 
authorities were not yet listening to people’s voices. That is to say, the local authorities were 
still not ensuring meaningful participation of the public in the decision-making on the project, 
insofar as their decision did not involve the results which the public wished to see and achieve, 
signifying that the local authorities did not take public opinion into account. Indeed, such a 
process of decision-making cannot be considered as democratic.  
 
6.3. The Construction and Operation of the ‘Big Almaty Ring Automobile Road  
          (BARAR) 
 
As noted in the introduction, the second case to be examined in this chapter is that of the 
construction and operation of a 65-kilometre ring automobile road in Almaty (hereinafter - the 
road) under the PPP mechanism. The Kazakhstani authorities’ intention to implement the 
project first became public back in 2006, when the project was included in the list of projects 
to be implemented through the concession scheme (Centre-1, 2016). As the time went on, 
information began to spread in the mass media saying that the project had started to undergo 
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difficulties for various reasons during the planning period, and that it had already been 
postponed several times. For example, as Caravan (2009) reported, at the end of 2009 the 
Minister of Transport and Communications of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kusainov, declared 
that the construction of the road had been postponed due to problems with the purchase of lands 
to the tune of KZT18.4 billion. Furthermore, although the Deputy Chairman of the Committee 
of Automobile Roads of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of Kazakhstan,  
Omirbayev, had stated in 2012 that the construction of the road would begin in 2014 and end 
in 2017,  in March 2014 the authorities made the announcement that, due to the devaluation of 
the national currency, the competition for selecting a concessionaire was again postponed 
(Centre-1, 2016). Similar to the first case, as the discussions below make clear, a vast majority 
of the problems encountered by the project were rooted in public opposition and dissatisfaction, 
arising from the authorities’ decisions which failed to take into account the citizens’ interests. 
In what follows, I will enumerate different risks that arose following the non-involvement of 
the public in the decision-making on the project.  
 
6.3.1. Social Risk 
 
Based upon the stories reported by the mass media, the main problem of the project was 
connected with public dissatisfaction. This was due to the fact that the decision made by the 
local administration of Almaty region did not satisfy local residents and peasant farmers who 
were offered to sell their plots of land to government at a reduced price to build the road in the 
territories of their land.  For instance, as Meta.kz (2013) reports, while a large-scale road 
construction was planned for the next year, many people whose houses had fallen under 
demolition refused to abandon them, due to their strong disagreement with the low 
compensation being offered by the authorities, considering them very absurd. According to 
Kursiv.kz (2014), people expressed their disagreement over the unfair prices for the redemption 
of their plots of land by the local authorities. As a result, several protests took place by the 
residents of the Ili district of Almaty region against the local authorities’ decision.  Similarly, 
the residents of Raiymbek and Eltai villages of the Karasai district of Almaty region, whose 
houses and plots of land had been subjected to redemption were protesting against the 
inadequate compensation for their properties. As the Time reported, these residents whose 
houses were acquired and built for a considerable amount of money, were offered only KZT200 
(around US$1.3 as of August 2013) per hundred square metres (Time, 2013). Proektant (2013) 
also reported on the disgruntlement of those whose properties were going to be redeemed by 
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the local authorities, insofar as officials insisted on redeeming the plots of land at the cadastral 
value which was much lower than the market price. As such, these people would be unable to 
acquire similar housing in other areas of the region. 
Some of the anger directed to the authorities by citizens were covered by the mass media, 
indicating the level of indignation due to the low amount of compensation offered for the 
redemption of plots of land. For example, Meta.kz (2013) reported an owner of a peasant farm, 
Udartseva, furiously uttering the following: 
I have 1,5 hectares of land, and they are giving me KZT36 thousand for it! In 
general, KZT200 is given for a hundred square metres!  
Similarly, Tengrinews (2013a) quotes another landowner, Ryazanova, talking about the 
notification of the local authorities on the demolition of her plot of land, as stating the following: 
The agreement has been dispatched to us, indicating the estimation of 4,200 
square metres of land for KZT42 thousand, it is really funny, there are no such 
prices anywhere. 
Another landowner, Aisulu, also cited in Tengrinews (2013a), noted that there were 18 people 
in her family, and they did not wish to be dispossessed, and therefore were not going to move 
out. The Time (2013) reports about another resident, Akhmetova, who in 2007 sold a two-
bedroom apartment in Almaty and bought a plot of land of 2,000 square metres for the price of 
US$140,000, but she did not manage to build a house, and was now residing in a trailer with 
her family. However, as the Time noted, she might even be deprived of that housing, since she 
had to vacate that plot of land by September 2013 (Time, 2013). Another disgruntled resident 
of Rayimbek village in Almaty region, Rakymzhanova, was also quoted as saying the following 
with great vexation:  
We bought the plots for our money, we have not squatted them! We have the 
gas and electricity supplies connected to our houses, and now are being given 
pennies (Meta.kz, 2013).  
Such anger on the part of residents of Almaty region, arising from the perceived lack of concern 
demonstrated by the authorities’ decision to buy off their plots of land at such low prices, also 
signals the residents’ determination. Noting this anger, the Time concludes that the residents of 
the Karasai district in Almaty region were so determined that “they will throw themselves under 
bulldozers, but they will not give the lands!” (Time, 2013). 
It is worth mentioning that the indignation over the authorities’ decision on the unfair 
compensation for buying houses and plots of land induced public unpopularity of the BARAR 
project. Reporting on the BARAR project and noting the public anger, Center-1 (2016) also 
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referred to the statement by the Minister of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 
Dosayev, made during his presentation on the project conception at the EBRD’ headquarters in 
London in December 2014. As Centre-1 reported, Dosayev noted that the main problem around 
the project was the public’s negative attitude towards the project, stating:      
We see many problems yet that have not been solved … A serious problem in 
the first place is the mentality of people. People should change their attitudes to 
PPP (Dosayev, 2014 cited in Centre-1, 2016).  
A point should also be considered here, regarding the non-involvement of the public in the 
decision-making on the BARAR project, especially during the planning stage. As the 
representatives of the ecological society ‘Green Salvation’ pointed out in their letter of 7 June 
2013 to the Compliance Committee for the Aarhus Convention, the local authorities did not 
hold public hearings on the BARAR project. In the letter, the representatives of ‘Green 
Salvation’ further noted that that they had repeatedly made inquiries to the local authorities 
about public hearings on the project, but no answers to the inquiries were received (Katorcha, 
et al., 2013, pp. 2-3). Importantly, according to the feasibility study for the BARAR project 
developed in 2015 (mentioned in the Report on Environmental Impact and Social Assessment 
of the BARAR Project, 2019, pp. 107-108), public hearings were initiated by the Ministry of 
Transport and Communications and held on the 3rd and 4th of May 2013. Nevertheless, as can 
been understood, the public hearings on the project were held only twice, and they were held 
long after the decision to initiate the project was already made in 2006. Moreover, according to 
the Report on Environmental Impact and Social Assessment of the BARAR Project (2019, p. 
107), the authorities did not conduct any public consultations until 2013 and did not provide 
any public information about the project. This included information on the redemption of 
properties, despite the fact that land acquisitions began in 2007. This shows that the authorities 
violated the Order of the Minister of Environmental Protection of Kazakhstan No.135-p of 7 
May 2007, according to which they were obliged to ensure such a form of participation as 
consultation, in particular, public hearings during the planning stage of the PPP project. As a 
result, they made decisions regarding the redemption of houses and plots of land without taking 
into account the interests of local residents. Subsequent public hearings were held only in the 
summer of 2018 (The Report on Environmental Impact and Social Assessment of the BARAR 
Project, 2019), that is, only after signing the PPP contract with a private partner in February 
2018. It can be discerned here that apart from the above-mentioned Order of the Minister of 
Environmental Protection, the Order of the Acting Minister of Energy of Kazakhstan ‘On 
Approval of the List of Types of Economic Activities within Which Projects Are to Be Brought 
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to Public Hearings’ No. 240 of 10 June 2016 was breached too. This is due to the fact that the 
regional authorities began to hold public hearings according to the Order of the Acting Minister 
of Energy only two years later after it was adopted, thereby preventing the public from 
participating in the discussion of the project prior to signing the project contract. 
As the facts discussed demonstrate, the project was subject to a social risk precipitating 
public opposition to the authorities’ decisions regarding the inadequate amount of 
compensation for the redemption of citizens’ houses and plots of land, ultimately resulting in 
public disagreement over the authorities’ decision. It can be seen that public opposition to that 
decision was due to the fact that the local authorities had not taken into account the people’s 
interests when they had made that decision, in particular, they ignored the people’s difficult 
financial situation, thereby made a decision leading to the suffering of many families. As a 
result, such an unfair and undemocratic decision of the local authorities, not taking into account 
the interests of people prompted public disagreement, causing the negative attitude of people 
towards the project. As for the minister’s statement mentioned above, he was right that the 
problem around the project was related to the negative attitude of people to the project. 
However, it is important to recognise that the cause of such an attitude was the unfair and 
undemocratic decision of the authorities who disregarded the interests of the people, and who 
did not hold public hearings on the project at the initial stage of its planning. Therefore, not 
citizens, but their representatives have to change their attitudes towards citizens, whose primary 
duty is to protect and promote the interests of citizens whom they represent.     
 
6.3.2. Legal Risk 
 
A legal risk was caused by the unfair decision of the local authorities regarding the low 
amount of compensation for people’s properties over and above the social risk. As Proektant 
(2013) reports, the main subject of those legal disputes was the problem related to citizens’ 
plots of land, who were categorically against the authorities’ proposal to redeem their plots of 
land for low prices, and therefore the residents of a suburban village, Pokrovka, filed a lawsuit 
against the local authorities. The lawsuits, rather than being limited to this particular village, 
were also filed by residents of other suburban villages, who in 2012 took legal actions against 
the local authorities due to the paltry compensation for their plots of land (Kazakhstanskaya 
pravda, 2017b). As Kazakhstanskaya Pravda (2017b) reports, the legal disputes lasted for 
months, thus affecting the course of the project by delaying the construction of the road. 
According to Tengrinews (2013b), the Head of Almaty region, Musakhanov, at a meeting asked 
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for the central government’s assistance in solving the problem regarding the redemption of plots 
of land for the construction of the road. Speaking about that problem, Musakhanov apprised 
that 704 plots of land were planned to be redeemed, but only 237 of them had been purchased 
from landowners, and 467 plots to the tune of KZT4,2 billion were not yet redeemed. He also 
added that the legal cases which had been commenced in October 2012 were still under 
consideration, notifying that there were still problems with 177 plots of lands, regarding 131 of 
which lawsuits had been initiated by citizens against the local authorities (Tengrinews, 2013b).   
It is worth noting that during the drawn-out legal disputes another complicated legal issue 
emerged that put people who were already exasperated with legal problems at an impasse. 
According to the results of a lengthy inspection by law enforcement bodies, the prosecutor’s 
office of Almaty region announced on the 14th of May 2014 that the local government officials 
had redeemed the plots of land for the construction of the road for inflated prices (Kursiv.kz, 
2014). Furthermore, as Zakon.kz (2014b) reports, the prosecutor’s office of Almaty region 
appealed to court, claiming the annulment of some of the agreements on the purchase of plots 
of land, which had already been concluded, and demanded the return of the overpaid 
compensation to the local budget by the previous landowners. Such circumstances aggravated 
people’s problems, who at that period of time were already litigating against the local 
authorities’ decision, suffering from its consequences. Talking about this legal issue, the Time 
(2015) notes the frustration of landowners towards the authorities and their decisions to first 
take their plots of land, then return them and demand the paid monetary compensation to be 
returned. One landowner cited in Kursiv.kz (2014) voices this immense frustration by noting 
that the authorities are demanding the money back, but they are not yet willing to return the 
plots of land.  
The legal circumstances surrounding this issue, and in particular the cancellation of 
previously concluded agreements and the return of the state-paid compensation, Atameken 
Business Channel (2017) informs, may adversely affect the course of the project, postponing it 
indefinitely. This is evidenced by the fact that at a meeting in parliament the deputy chairman 
of the board of ‘KazAvtoZhol’ JSC, Mendygaliyev, bemoaning the legal issue in question, 
stated that the previous landowners would have to return the money to the state which should 
recount and redeem the plots of land again, which in turn would cause the postponement of the 
project (Atameken Business Channel, 2017).  
As the events discussed here indicate, the BARAR project underwent legal problems in 
the form of protracted litigation between the residents and the authorities of Almaty region. As 
mentioned above, the reason for litigation was the local authorities’ decision on an unfairly low 
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amount of compensation to be paid for people’s properties, which resulted in the worsening of 
citizens’ financial situation, and thus making them suffer. It is therefore fair to state that the 
legal problems faced by the project were rooted in the social problem arising from public 
objection against the unfair and undemocratic decision made by the authorities who had not 
ensured public participation in the decision-making regarding the project, including on the issue 
of compensation.  
 
6.3.3. Investment Risk 
 
The BARAR project has been subject to an investment risk causing its suspension due to 
a financial constraint, over and above the social and legal risks. As stated earlier, on the 3rd of 
November 2009 at a government meeting the Minister of Transport and Communications of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kusainov, announced that the project had been postponed due to 
the budget deficit for 2010 (Caravan, 2009). Moreover, according to the information of Centre-
1 (2016), in 2010 the official information on the suspension of the project was posted on the 
website of the local administration of Almaty, pointing out the reason for suspension – a 
‘financial crisis’. Furthermore, as Tengrinews (2011) reports, in 2011 the Director of the 
Department of Almaty of the Committee for Automobile Roads, Zhasybayev, informed that the 
project had been postponed several times due to a shortage of funds, and added that in 2012 
tenders would be invited for the construction of the road that would be completed before the 
end of 2015. However, the tendering process did not happen, insofar as in March 2014 the 
tendering to select a contractor for the construction of the road was again cancelled, according 
to Centre-1 (2016).  
Moreover, it is important to note that the regular delays in the project were causing the 
increase in the costs of the project. As Tengrinews (2011) reports, in 2011 the estimated cost 
of the project was KZT79,5 billion. In 2017 the Minister for Investments and Development of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kasymbek, declared that the costs of the project would probably 
be around KZT180 billion instead (Tengrinews, 2017). Later on, the Deputy Minister for 
Investments and Development of Kazakhstan, Khairov, apprised at a government meeting that 
the costs of the project exceeded KZT350,7 billion, meaning that compared to initial estimates, 
the costs of the project increased by more than four times (Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 2017b). 
Howsoever, the final costs of the project are now estimated to be over KZT512 billion, 
including the compensation for investment and operating costs, and the remuneration for project 
management by a consortium in the person of private partners (Tengrinews, 2018).  
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It should be remarked that public disagreement over the local authorities’ decision on the 
redemption of plots of land, which was accompanied by protests and litigation, was badly 
affecting the process of attracting potential investors. For instance, as Krysha (2015) reports, 
after negotiations with the authorities of Kazakhstan, potential investors from China who did 
not wish to have disputes between landowners declined to invest in the project due to the lack 
of public support for the project. It can therefore be seen that the consequences of the 
authorities’ decisions prevented the authorities from attracting potential investors, thus 
adversely affecting the course of the project and stalling its beginning.  
 
6.3.4. Political Risk 
 
The BARAR project, in addition to the risks described above, has been subject to a 
political risk adversely affecting its course. As can be discerned from the preceding discussions, 
the project was effectively stalled for years due to the undemocratic and unfair decisions made 
by the authorities of Almaty region, who disregarded the interests of residents of districts, 
thereby prompting their disapproval of the project and preventing the advancement of the 
project. It is not for nothing that Li and others (2005b) argue that “poor public decision-making 
process” and “strong political opposition/hostility” are the key factors of political risk that can 
occur during the implementation of PPPs (Li, et al., 2005b, p. 28).  
As the facts around the BARAR project show, the top-down decision of the regional 
authorities who initially did not ensure public participation in the decision-making on the 
project by holding public hearings, exacerbated the socioeconomic conditions of poor families 
residing in different districts of the region, thereby causing them the moral and material harm. 
One way this could have been better handled was if local government bodies of districts were 
in charge of the PPP project. It is plausible that in different circumstances the authorities of 
districts would fulfil their obligations to residents of districts with more commitment and 
responsibility, compared to the authorities of Almaty region. Accordingly, the officials of 
district administrations would probably involve the local communities of certain districts in the 
decision-making on the PPP project, thereby attempting to be more responsive and accountable 
to their constituents. Such reasoning is in line with the argument provided by Leach and others 
(1992) who claim that in comparison with office-bearers of higher government bodies, officials 
of subordinate local government bodies have more commitment and sense of responsibility to 




6.3.5. Corruption Risk 
 
Apart from the social, legal, investment and political risks, the BARAR project has 
undergone a corruption risk. According to Zakon.kz (2014b), as per the results of inspection by 
the prosecutor’s office of Almaty region, it was transpired that the local authorities had 
redeemed the plots of land at inflated prices for the needs of the BARAR project. Therefore, 
the prosecutor’s office already brought around 100 suits to the court to rescind the agreements 
which had been heretofore concluded between the local authorities and landowners (Zakon.kz, 
2014b). As Zakon.kz (2014b) informed, the regional prosecutors calculated the quantity of 
unreasonable compensation payments from the local budget in the framework of the BARAR 
project and another project pertaining to the construction of another major road ‘Western 
Europe - Western China’. The total amount was calculated to be more than KZT2 billion, and 
the high amount resulted in two corruption cases instituted against local incumbents involved 
in the projects, Zakon.kz (2014b) reports. According to Zakon.kz (2014b), the inspections by 
the prosecutor’s office were likely to continue and there would likely be more prosecutions on 
corruption cases. Furthermore, the most outrageous fact was that previous landowners, from 
whom the prosecutor’s office demands the return of compensations, would have to pay from 
their own pockets for officials’ corruption offenses (Zakon.kz, 2014b). As a consequence of 
this legal issue, the problems of landowners were further exacerbated, who for several years 
were suing the local authorities offering to redeem their plots of land at a lower price. The 
people were at this stage fatigued by the drawn-out litigation, Rezvan, the representative of 
landowners in court has been quoted as stating, noting that several cases had reached the 
Supreme Court, and some of them had been under the consideration of appeals court of  Almaty 
region for several months (Time, 2015).   
Evidently, the above-mentioned corruption offenses on the part of the local officials 
adversely affected the course of the BARAR project, deferring its beginning and causing the 
ineffective spending of the budgetary wherewithal, and thus tarnishing the project’s reputation 
and undermining public trust in officials at large. On the whole, it can be stated that one of the 
reasons for the manifestation of corruption risks in governance, including in PPPs is the non-
involvement of the public in the decision-making processes that prompts office-bearers to abuse 
their powers by making uncontrolled decisions at their discretion. Echoing this claim in the 
sphere of road construction, the representative of the public organisation of motor car 
enthusiasts in Kazakhstan, Lazuta, has stressed that in order to ensure control and quality when 
constructing and commissioning public roads it is necessary to involve the representatives of 
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the public in relevant commissions, including competitive commissions (Kazakhstankaya 
pravda, 2018a). In addition, recognising the problems of corruption in various public spheres, 
the Deputy Minister of Agriculture of Kazakhstan, Nysanbayev, has announced that in the near 
future a bill would be developed, pursuant to which half of the members of land commissions 
will be composed of the representatives of public organisations that would help to substantially 
dwindle corruption risks (Zakon.kz, 2018b). Howsoever, the problem of corruption remains at 
present acute within the system of governance of Kazakhstan, as well as when implementing 
PPP projects in the country. 
There could be additional risks associated with the project. As mentioned earlier, there 
has been a problem regarding the attraction of investors for the project. Recently, according to 
the Minister for Investments and Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kasymbek, 
proclaimed that on the 7th of February 2018 the BARAR concession contract was signed by the 
Turkish and South Korean firms (BNews.KZ, 2018). However, it is important to note that the 
definitive interest of investors has come after 12 years, making people pay dearly for it. 
Furthermore, as was previously discussed, the costs of the project have significantly risen in 
price due to the protracted delays, thus costing the government a deal. As such, it remains 
unknown whether or not the investments of the government and investors will pay off, 
inasmuch as there are risks associated with the failure to receive the projected profits from the 
expected toll road. Therefore, there could be risks connected with the fact that the government 
might not ensure the receipt of desired profits by private partners in the form of fees for using 
the toll road. Describing this kind of risk in PPPs as a political risk, Varnavskii and others 
(2010) argue that such risks are related to the actions of government that affect the ability of 
private partners to serve consumers and earn incomes (Varnavskii, et al., 2010, pp. 112-114). 
As these authors delineate, such actions by the government can lead to the adoption of 
previously unspecified requirements for a private partner, for example, the suspension or early 
termination of a PPP contract, or the imposition of a fine or of new instructions prescribing the 
reduction of fees for the use of a facility, especially toll roads (ibid.). By way of illustration, 
Varnavskii and others cite the PPP projects on toll roads in Mexico, where as a result of public 
pressure to reduce the toll road fees, the government and private partners had to make 
considerable changes to the PPP projects on toll roads. The authors also note the decision of 
the Government of Thailand in 1999, which made a twofold decrease in the toll road fees 
(Varnavskii, et al., 2010, pp. 112-114). 
It is clear that such a political risk could also arise within the framework BARAR project 
as long as the private partner in the person of the consortium imposes high toll road fees on 
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drivers. There may be another scenario, when drivers may be disinclined to pay fees for using 
the toll road, opting for alternative ways in order to economise, similar to the case of Jin Long 
toll road discussed in Chapter 4. As an illustration, the Head of the Independent Automobile 
Union of Kazakhstan, Edokov, in an interview with a reporter of KTK castigated the public 
policy on toll roads and opined that people were not ready for toll roads and were premature 
(KTK, 2017). Furthermore, Edokov argued that the authorities had made reckless decisions 
without thinking about their possible consequences, while the socioeconomic situation of the 
country was not in the best condition and not all citizens could afford to use toll roads (KTK, 
2017).  Edokov also cited the example of Al-Farabi Avenue in Almaty to claim that the majority 
of citizens will drive gratis to their destinations by using other roads that bypass the toll road, 
so long as the city authorities make it payable (KTK, 2017).    
In general, considering that the BARAR project is still at the initial stage, where the toll 
road is yet to be constructed, operated and transferred to a public partner, the project remains 
susceptible to various risks, including political and investment risks. This is due to the fact, as 
Lam (1999) has argued, the most of the risks in BOT models of PPP occur at the later phase of 
construction and at the initial phase of operation of facility, insofar as new conditions for the 
fulfilment of financial obligations may arise, which are also affected by the prices of goods, 
works and services that frequently fluctuate (Lam, 1999, p. 77). Additionally, further social and 
legal risks could arise during the operation of the expected toll road if decision-makers again 
ignore the interests of people, for example, by setting high fees for using the toll road.  
Summing up, the authorities of Almaty region did not initially ensure public participation 
in the decision-making on the project. This is while, according to the Order of the Minister of 
Environmental Protection of Kazakhstan ‘The Rules for Holding Public Hearings’ No.135-p of 
7 May 2007, the authorities should have held public hearings on the project during its planning 
stage. As a result, by not ensuring public participation in the decision-making on the project, 
the regional authorities made decisions regarding the compensation issue without taking into 
account the interests of residents of relevant districts. In particular, as discussed above, the 
regional authorities decided to compensate the residents for redeeming their houses and plots 
of land for unfairly prices that did not satisfy the residents of districts and even aggravated their 
financial difficulties. This unfair and undemocratic decision made by the authorities brought 
about public disagreement. In turn, such a circumstance precipitated the social risk in the first 
place, and subsequently prompted legal, investment and political risks growing into serious 
problems that adversely affected the course of the project.   
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According to the Report on Environmental Impact and Social Assessment of the BARAR 
Project (2019), the regional authorities began to openly discuss the project with the public only 
in 2013, that is, long after making decisions on the project and the issue of compensation for 
redemption of the people’s properties. For example, according to the feasibility study for the 
project developed in 2015 (mentioned in the Report on Environmental Impact and Social 
Assessment of the BARAR Project, 2019), the central authorities arranged the public hearings 
on the project in May 2013, which effectively took place only twice – on the 3rd and 4th of May 
2013. Even though there were the isolated cases of public hearings in May 2013, the authorities 
felt disinclined to change their decisions regarding the low compensation for redemption of 
properties, thus not listening to people’s voices and arranging pseudo-participation of the public 
in the project. Moreover, as discussed above, the Order of the Acting Minister of Energy of 
Kazakhstan ‘On Approval of the List of Types of Economic Activities Within Which Projects 
Are to Be Brought to Public Hearings’ No. 240 of 10 June 2016 was also violated. This was 
since the regional authorities began to hold public hearings according to the above-mentioned 
ministerial order only two years later after it was adopted, thereby not enabling the public to 
participate in the discussion of the project prior to signing the concession contract.  Although 
the authorities have now succeeded in attracting investors to the project, it is as of yet unknown 
whether people will willingly pay for using the toll road. It also remains unknown whether 
people will use the toll road at all, seeing that the unfair and undemocratic decision of the 
authorities was the reason for the unpopularity of the project, especially amongst the local 
populace.  
 
6.4.  Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to examine the state of public participation in the 
decision-making on PPP projects in Kazakhstan. Having examined the Kok-Zhailau and the 
BARAR projects, it can be discerned that the authorities of Almaty and Almaty region 
responsible for these projects respectively, failed to involve the public in the decision-making 
processes on the projects during the initial stages of their planning. This failure on the part of 
the local authorities resulted in the decisions that did not take the opinions and interests of 
people into account. Moreover, in both cases the local authorities violated the political rights 
of citizens and interest groups to participate in the decision-making on PPPs despite the existing 
legal requirements for holding public hearings on the projects. Therefore, these facts show that 
the Kazakhstani authorities themselves improperly adhere to the rule of law, thus featuring the 
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characteristic of an authoritarian regime. As Popov (2004), and Hague and Harrop (2007) state, 
the poor rule of law can be a lineament of an authoritarian regime. 
In the case of the Kok-Zhailau project, the authorities of Almaty began to hold public 
hearings long after the decision on the construction of the ski resort was made. In effect, the 
city authorities violated the rights of citizens and interest groups by not holding the public 
hearings on the project in spite of their mandatory application. Furthermore, in holding these 
public hearings the authorities, rather than considering public opinion, simply attempted to 
convince the public to support the decision that was already made earlier. Therefore, this case 
presents an instance where the authorities sought pseudo-participation of the public. In other 
words, the authorities of Almaty were not ensuring meaningful participation of the public in 
the decision- making on the project, inasmuch as the people were not achieving the results or 
seeing the changes which they wished to see in the decision of the authorities. Therefore, such 
the process of decision-making on the project makes it undemocratic, thus undermining 
representative democracy.  As regards the BARAR project, the authorities of the Almaty region 
also did not ensure public participation in the decision-making on the project at the initial stage 
of its planning despite the fact that in accordance with the existing legislation in the country 
they were required to hold public hearings. The regional authorities began to hold public 
hearings long after making the decisions regarding the project and the compensation issue. Even 
so, the regional authorities were disinclined to change their decisions concerning the 
compensation issue, thereby ignoring people’s voices and not ensuring meaningful 
participation of the public in the decision-making on the project.      
The preceding analysis of the two recent PPP projects therefore allows for the following 
inference – although the local authorities of Almaty and Almaty region started to involve the 
public in the decision-making on PPPs by holding public hearings, they do not yet ensure 
meaningful participation of the public. In other words, even though the local authorities of 
Almaty and Almaty region hold public hearings, they still do not take into account public 
opinion. By and large, taking into consideration the respondents’ answers, the existing 
legislation and the two PPP cases discussed above, it can be generalised that the authorities of 
Kazakhstan do not yet ensure public participation in the decision-making on all PPP projects, 
including meaningful participation of the public. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
analysis of the respondents’ answers shows that government bodies still practice informing the 
public about upcoming PPPs through official websites and the mass media, implying that public 
participation in the decision-making on PPPs is not ensured by the authorities in all PPP cases.  
The analysis of the existing legislation in the country demonstrates that there is still a deficiency 
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in public participation in the decision-making on PPPs, although the authorities hold public 
hearings as one of the instruments of public participation in the decision-making processes on 
PPPs. By way of illustration, the Order of the Acting Minister of Energy No. 240 of June 10 
2016 ‘On Approval of the List of Types of Economic Activities Within Which Projects Are to 
Be Brought to Public Hearings’ still circumscribes public participation in public hearings on 
PPPs involving certain types of economic activities. As previously stated, the two PPP cases 
indicate that although the local authorities ensure public participation in the decision-making 
on PPPs, they do not yet ensure meaningful participation of the public.    
It should also be noted that, as the preceding analysis of the two PPP projects shows, both 
of the projects underwent social, legal, investment and political risks which subsequently grew 
into serious problems adversely affecting the course of the projects. As the analysis makes clear, 
the main cause of these problems was public opposition to the projects due to the fact that the 
local authorities’ decisions did not take the opinions and interests of people into account. Such 
public opposition to the projects in turn adversely affected the course of the projects. In relation 
to the ‘Kok-Zhailau’ project, the city authorities were not taking into account public opinion 
for years, therefore, it was not being advanced. As for the BARAR project, although investors 
have been attracted to the project, it is still unknown whether the regional authorities will take 
into account the opinions of people when setting fares for using the toll road, or they will once 
again ignore their opinions and interests without ensuring their participation in the decision-
making on the project that could have a negative impact on it.   
It is important to note that if the local authorities had taken decisions in accordance with 
the interests of people by involving them in the decision-making on the projects, then the 
consequences of those decisions would have been completely different and more importantly 
much better than they are now. Firstly, although without the support of the people the projects 
would have discontinued, the projects not getting launched would have prevented the adverse 
effects seen by the local authorities and residents alike. In other words, the adverse 
consequences of decisions could have been avoided if the projects’ launch was conditioned on 
the support of the public. Secondly, if the public had taken part in the decision-making 
processes on the projects and consequently had been supportive of the projects, then the projects 
would have circumvented the majority of risks, and therefore the state of the projects would 
have been significantly better. As can be discerned, in both cases the adverse consequences of 
the decisions would have been minimised if the local authorities had ensured participation, 
namely meaningful participation of the public in the decision-making on the projects.     
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Given that the institution of PPP in Kazakhstan was introduced not so long ago, and the 
Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan ‘On Public-Private Partnership’ was adopted in 2015, it can 
be seen that the authorities are actively implementing PPP projects, and their intention to 
implement PPP projects will be further growing in the future. However, at present it cannot be 
said that the existing PPP projects are being implemented effectively, as evidenced by the case 
of the two projects discussed in this chapter. Moreover, the authorities themselves acknowledge 
that there are problems around PPP. For example, at a government meeting on the 6th of 
December 2016, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Sagintayev, after hearing 
the reports of relevant ministers, praised the work done on PPP regarding the legislation and 
procedures that were adopted and simplified respectively, and about the independence given to 
regions (Nur.kz, 2016). Nonetheless, the Prime Minister expressed his criticism about the work 
of government bodies on PPP by uttering the following on the state of play in PPP:  
We see that there are around 300 projects, good reports. Though at the same 
time, as it is said: ‘A bride is ready for a farewell, but there is no groom’. Now 
we are in such position. We talk about it for years, we constantly change laws, 
but at the same time all - plans, plans, plans (Sagintayev, 2016 cited in Nur.kz, 
2016).     
Also, addressing ministers in that government meeting, Sagintayev talked about the possible 
need for gathering investors who desire to work within the framework of PPP so as to ask them 
what impedes, what changes need to be made so as to move forward (Nur.kz, 2016). Moreover, 
Sagintayev drew the attention of government ministers by saying that it is fair that the cabinet 
constantly receives the president’s criticism of the unsatisfactory performance of government 
bodies on PPP (Nur.kz, 2016).       
With the in-depth analyses presented in this chapter and the previous one, a general 
picture of the current state of public participation in the decision-making on PPP projects in 
Kazakhstan has emerged, both in terms of the views of respondents seen in the interviews and 
existing legislation (previous chapter) and in practice (present chapter). However, in the next 
chapter, I will look at how participation, namely meaningful participation of the public affects 
the course of PPP projects. In particular, I will look at the example of the development of the 
Kok-Zhailau project, and the fact that the city authorities developed a feasibility study for the 
project taking into account public opinion, thus ensuring meaningful participation of the public 
in the decision-making on the project. Using this example, I will argue that public participation 
in the decision-making processes on PPPs, namely meaningful participation can lead to the 
democratic and effective realisation of PPPs. Furthermore, using the above example, it will be 
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argued that public participation in the decision-making on PPPs can conduce to the 
development and advancement of political pluralism, civil society, social capital and to the 
enhancement of representative democracy in Kazakhstan. I will also suggest legal measures 
directed at expanding and ensuring public participation in the decision-making on PPP projects, 
whose implications would additionally strengthen representative democracy and promote local, 
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 Having examined the current state of public participation in PPP projects, it can be 
ascertained that there remains a deficiency in public participation in the decision-making on 
PPPs in Kazakhstan. Moreover, as discussed in the previous chapter, although both the 
authorities of Almaty region and Almaty have held public hearings on the projects, they have 
failed to listen to public opinion, thereby only ensuring pseudo-participation of the public in 
the projects. Such a state of affairs as related to the problem of pseudo-participation of the 
public in the decision-making on PPPs significantly impedes the democratic and effective 
implementation of PPP projects, badly reflecting on them and on the PPP policy in Kazakhstan 
at large. This is also true in the cases of the Kok-Zhailau and BARAR projects discussed in the 
previous chapter.   
 It is worth noting that during the time of this research a positive development took place 
within the Kok-Zhailau project. In particular, at the last public hearing on the Kok-Zhailau 
project that took place on the 4th of November 2018, the authorities of Almaty city brought a 
new feasibility study for the project to public discussion, which took public opinion into account 
(Vlast, 2018b). This seems to show that the city authorities had noted the majority of people’s 
opinions and developed a new feasibility study for the project. That is to say, the public had 
been finally able to influence the authorities’ decisions regarding the project, achieving the 
changes that it wished to see in the authorities’ decisions. Accordingly, it could be said that 
meaningful participation had taken place within the framework of the Kok-Zhailau project.  
 Given these developments, the aim of this chapter is to examine the ways in which 
meaningful participation can positively impact the course of PPP projects, and be beneficial to 
the society in Kazakhstan. I will examine the case of Kok-Zhailau project in particular, 
demonstrating the positive effects of meaningful public participation seen in this project. Using 
this example, I will therefore argue for the importance of public participation, and in particular 
meaningful public participation as a means of democratic, as well as effective realisation of 
PPP projects. Likewise, I will argue that public participation in the decision-making on PPPs 
can be shown to be beneficial to the society in Kazakhstan by contributing to the development 
and advancement of civil society, encouraging political pluralism, and by strengthening social 
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capital and representative democracy. Following these arguments, I will also suggest some 
practical measures in the form of legal steps that could be taken in order to expand and ensure 
the rights of citizens and interest groups to participate in the decision-making processes on PPP 
projects affecting their lives and interests. The arguments presented make clear that such legal 
measures can enhance representative democracy and promote local, participatory, as well as e-
democracy, thus additionally benefitting the society in Kazakhstan.    
      
7.2. The importance of public participation for PPPs and society 
 
Considering the exposition given in the previous chapter of PPP projects in Kazakhstan 
and the state of public participation in the decision-making on these projects, in this section I 
will outline some of the broader implications of public participation. Noting certain recent 
developments in the case of the Kok-Zhailau project, where the public were given the 
opportunity to have a say in the decision-making on the project, I will examine some of the 
positive effects that could be observed in the project. I will first outline what a close 
examination of the developments around this project can reveal about the positive effects of 
meaningful participation for the democratic and effective realisation of PPP projects. Secondly, 
I will argue for the claim that beyond being a valuable element in planning and implementing 
PPP projects, meaningful public participation in PPPs can contribute to the development and 
advancement of political pluralism, civil society, social capital, to the enhancement of 
representative democracy, and to the promotion of local, participatory, e-democracy in 
Kazakhstan. These are crucial implications arising from public participation in the decision-
making on PPPs for the society in the country. In both of these subsections I will draw on the 
analyses given in previous chapters and the conceptual framework provided earlier in the thesis, 
as well as empirical evidence from the examination of the domestic and international cases.   
 
7.2.1. Public participation as a means of democratic and effective implementation     
              of PPPs: an analysis of the Kok-Zhailau project  
 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the dispute between the local community and 
city authorities of Almaty began in 2011, when the latter decided to construct the ski resort on 
the Kok-Zhailau plateau through the PPP mechanism. As the analysis of the project shows, the 
main reason for public objection against the project was that the city authorities did not hold 
public discussions on the project during the planning stage, leading to decisions being made 
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which did not take into account the opinions and interests of people. Moreover, although the 
city authorities began to hold public hearings on the project following public pressure, they still 
failed to take into account public opinion for years. Instead, the city authorities were simply 
attempting to persuade the public to support the decisions that were already made and were 
specified in the feasibility study for the project. In other words, the city authorities were 
ensuring pseudo-participation of the public, thus making the decision-making process on the 
project undemocratic. 
Due to the lack of public support for the PPP project, the project was regularly postponed 
and was once even suspended in 2015 (Vlast, 2018a). For example, at one of the public 
meetings held on the 21st February of 2018, the mayor of Almaty city, Baibek, touching upon 
the Kok-Zhailau project acknowledged that the city authorities had to suspend the project, since 
a consensus about the PPP project was not reached (Vlast, 2018a). More importantly, at the 
meeting the mayor also announced that the feasibility study for the project was changed 
substantially in accordance with public opinion, and a new feasibility study was being 
developed and due to appear in early summer of 2018 (Vlast, 2018a). The mayor, declaring that 
many changes in the project were related to the comments made by the public, pledged to bring 
the new feasibility study for the project to public discussion (Vlast, 2018a).  
According to Vlast (2018a), at the above-mentioned meeting Baibek reported that the 
concept of the Kok-Zhailau project would be completely different from its earlier version with 
a new emphasis on hiking tourism. Furthermore, Baibek announced that the city authorities had 
decided to reduce the length of the ski tracks to a third and to shorten the area of commercial 
buildings to a tenth of what was previously planned, and only one lake instead of three would 
be used in snowmaking (Vlast, 2018a). The mayor reassured the audience in the meeting that 
the new changes would considerably lessen the environmental damage and economise on the 
costs of the project (Vlast, 2018a). Baibek further declared that the project would not provide 
for the construction of private cottages, stating that “if it appears in the feasibility study, the 
project will be abandoned”, according to Vlast (2018a). The mayor continued:  
If in the end there will be more minuses than pluses, then this project will not be 
implemented. We talk about it immediately and directly. … We only think about 
the interests of the city (Vlast, 2018a). 
In May 2018, speaking at a press conference about a new scheme for the project, the head of 
the Department of Tourism of Almaty, Zhailaubai, and the Director of ‘Almaty Mountain 
Resorts’ JSC (the company that had acquired the contract to develop the new feasibility study 
for the project), Nurov, informed that the project had changed considerably (Forbes 
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Kazakhstan, 2018). As Zhailaubai informed, the costs of the project were decreased by a factor 
of 7.5 from KZT1.5 billion to KZT200 million (Forbes Kazakhstan, 2018). Furthermore, 
according to Zhailaubai, the city authorities had refused to build private elite hotels and golf 
courses, and desisted from constructing gas mains. The park’s carrying capacity was also 
reduced from ten thousand to five thousand people (Forbes Kazakhstan, 2018). Zhailaubai also 
announced that the area would be landscaped for 50 kilometres of hiking trails and 30 
kilometres of bike lanes (Forbes Kazakhstan, 2018). Informburo (2018a) also confirms a 
considerable increase in the project’s costs to KZT200 million, reporting that the city authorities 
plan to build not a ‘resort’, but a ‘mountain park’. 
Speaking at a press conference on 23rd of August 2018, the mayor of Almaty, Baibek 
again reminded that a new feasibility study for the project was underway which did take into 
account the comments of the public (Nur.kz, 2018a). Here Baibek also stressed that if the public 
did not support the project, the city authorities would abandon the project altogether (Nur.kz, 
2018a). On the 4th of November 2018 the city authorities held a public hearing on the project 
to discuss the new feasibility study for the project with the public (Vlast, 2018b). According to 
the Volunteers League of the city of Almaty (2018, cited in Nur.kz, 2018b), the number of 
Almaty residents supporting the project following this public hearing reached to over 100 
thousand. Furthermore, on its reporting on the 16th of November 2018, Nur.kz (2018b) quoted 
an activist and representative of the Volunteer League of Almaty, Kondybayev, who had made 
the following remark on his Facebook page:  
Most of them [people] signed a petition against the old project in 2014, while 
the project of 2018 is radically different from it. For that matter, I would have 
signed myself against the old version!   
Nevertheless, as The Village (2018b) reports, there were still opponents, in particular 
environmentalists who, as of 6 November 2018, collected 9942 signatures against the project. 
At the time it was still unknown whether the project would continue, but as Total (2018) has 
noted, public hearings on the project would be held. As Total (2018) further reports, the public 
hearing held on 4th of November 2018 saw many people in attendance and expressing their 
views on the project, among whom were public figures, scientists, sportsmen, students, and the 
representatives of various interest groups. Such public engagement is encouraging since it 
indicates that the city authorities have begun to involve the public to discuss socially important 
decisions, including decisions on the PPP project. Some of the opinions voiced in this public 
hearing show public support for being included in such decisions. For example, the President 
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of the Franchise Association of Kazakhstan, Kisikov (2018, cited in Total, 2018) noted the 
following at the public hearing: 
The discussion is hot, but not negative. People express their opinions. I am even 
glad to see such a heated discussion. 
Another participant in the public hearing, the Chairman of the Coordination Council of 
Veterans of Local Conflicts, Abdushukurov, who supports the project, stated the following: 
These are new jobs if 500-600 people will work in the Kok-Zhailau mountain 
park. I advocate that the construction should be controlled by society. Such 
public hearings should be held more often and there will be no questions from 
the people (Total, 2018). 
Another supporter of the Kok-Zhailau project, a businessman – Baitasov, expressed his support 
for the debate encouraged by such public hearings. In an interview with Informburo (2018a) he 
stated the following: 
I am very comfortable with the statements of opponents of the construction of 
the ski resort, and I think that their activities have a positive effect on the 
development of the project which is becoming more quality, and really it is better 
to listen carefully to very different opinions in order to have a good result. 
As can be discerned from the facts mentioned above, the city authorities have substantially 
changed their previous decisions regarding the feasibility study for the project, bringing it to 
public discussion and taking into account public opinion. Importantly, the city authorities had 
held public hearings before the new feasibility study for the project was brought to public 
discussion, through which they were able to hear people’s voices. Therefore, one of the benefits 
of public participation in the project was that it enabled the authorities to hear people’s voices. 
Indeed, in attempting to hear people’s voices, the authorities build a constructive dialogue with 
the public, enabling the public to express their voices on the PPP project that affects their 
interests.   
An important factor revealed by the latest events around the project, is the fact that this 
time not only did the city authorities begin to hear people’s voices, but they also started to listen 
to them and to take them into account when making decisions regarding the project. This 
observation may indeed be considered as a democratic benefit for people. In the case of Kok-
Zhailau project, this outcome was thanks to the activism among the public who were able to 
influence the authorities’ decisions by voicing their concerns and interests, and bringing about 
positive changes, which is regarded as meaningful participation. As Verba and Nie (1972, p. 2) 
and Teorell (2006, pp. 788-789) have argued, participation takes place when people influence 
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government decisions. Moreover, Pateman (1970, pp. 68-69) delineates meaningful 
participation as the participation of people in decision-making when they influence decisions 
whose consequences satisfy their interests. It can be seen that following the aforementioned 
public hearing on the Kok-Zhailau project and the changes that were made based upon public 
opinion, most people who were previously against the project began to support the project. 
Although there were still opponents of the project, for instance ecologists, the project remained 
under discussion and this public hearing would not be the last one. Despite the fact that at the 
time it remained unknown whether or not the project would be approved, it was an important 
development that the city authorities had begun to listen to the people and take their opinions 
into account, thus starting to ensure the democratic decision-making process on the project. 
This is a highly positive change from previous practice where public opinion was not seriously 
listened to, despite public hearings being held. 
As can be seen from the above discussions, the number of people supporting the Kok- 
Zhailau project increased following the introduction of the new feasibility study for the project, 
taking public opinion into account. As such, another positive factor of public participation, 
particularly meaningful participation in the project was an increase in the number of supporters 
of the project. In general, public support for PPP projects can potentially lead to the approval 
and implementation of projects. It is not for nothing that public support is considered to be one 
of critical success factors in PPPs (Jefferies, et al., 2002; Li, et al., 2005c; Jacobson & Choi, 
2008).  
It is important to remark that by ensuring public participation in the decision-making on 
the project through public hearings the city authorities were able to obtain useful expert 
opinions which could enable the authorities to streamline the costs of the project (Vlast, 2018a; 
Informburo, 2018a). For example, based on expert opinions and advice, the city authorities 
decided to reduce the construction of ski trails to a third, and refused to construct gas pipes, 
thereby reducing the costs associated with the project (Vlast, 2018a). Moreover, as the mayor 
of Almaty, Baibek (2018, cited in Vlast, 2018a) announced, in accordance with the views and 
comments of the residents, the city authorities had declined to build private cottages, thus 
bringing a substantial reduction in budget expenses. As we can see, through public participation 
in the form of consultation the city authorities were able to reconsider and optimise their 
decisions regarding the project, allowing them to save public money by a factor of 7.5 (Vlast, 
2018a). Furthermore, as mentioned above, the participants in the public hearing on the project 
noted that public discussion of the project only contributed to its improvement (Informburo, 
2018a). For example, one of the project’s supporters, Baitasov (2018, cited in Informburo, 
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2018a), stated in an interview that having a discussion on the project and getting different 
opinions about the project would help make it better.  
From the above facts, it can be seen that through public hearings the city authorities were 
able to obtain useful information from the public, including expert opinion on the matter that 
allowed the authorities to reconsider their decisions, leading to more effective budget planning. 
It can be discerned that public consultation as a form of public participation contributed to the 
good management of the project in terms of the effective planning and spending of budgetary 
funds. As North (2004) has argued, one of the indicators of effective governance is cost 
reduction. More generally, different authors have considered public consultation as one of the 
forms of public participation to be an effective tool in good governance (Thomas, 1990, 1993; 
Shand & Arnberg, 1996). Moreover, UNECE (2008, pp. 13-14) defines ‘participation’ as a key 
principle of good governance in PPPs.  
As can be discerned from the above discussions, public participation in the project 
allowed the authorities to hear people’s voices, and accordingly, the public was able to express 
its voice on the project that affects its interests. Furthermore, not only did the authorities begin 
to hear, but they also began to listen to public opinion. As was mentioned earlier, public 
pressure caused many decisions made by the authorities to be reviewed and in instances even 
annulled. The process allowing for these effects is a democratic one, since it enabled people to 
influence the authorities’ decisions, especially those that previously did not satisfy the interests 
of a majority of people. For instance, following public pressure and environmental concerns, 
the project concept changed dramatically and envisaged the construction of a mountain park 
(Informburo, 2018b), focusing more on hiking tourism (Vlast, 2018a). As a result, the costs of 
the project were optimised, enabling more effective project management. Moreover, the 
number of supporters of the project increased, strengthening public support for the project. As 
we can see, the above positive factors emerged due to public participation, and importantly 
meaningful participation of the public in the decision-making on the project. 
As the facts around the project indicate, public participation positively affected the course 
of the project, giving it better chances for public approval, compared to the effects that would 
stem from non-participation and pseudo-participation. This claim is evidenced by the 
discussions of both Kok-Zhailau and BARAR projects presented in the previous chapter, where 
it could be seen that non-participation and pseudo-participation of the public resulted in the 
emergence of various risks that adversely affected the course of the projects.  
It is important to note that the approval of the project by the public would mean that 
people were likely to visit the mountain park, and accordingly, such a circumstance would bring 
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about budget revenues, making the project effective. On the other hand, the disapproval of the 
project by the public would mean that it is likely to be abandoned, however, it would also be a 
favourable outcome. This is due to the fact that the government would substantially save the 
budgetary funds, instead of constructing the mountain park without the consent and support of 
the public who most likely will not visit the mountain park, thereby causing the ineffective use 
of budgetary funds. As previously stated, the project was still under public discussion, and in 
April 2019 the mayor of Almaty, Baibek, announced the postponement of the project for further 
scrutiny of public opinion, including of the opinions of ecologists based on the recommendation 
of recently elected president of Kazakhstan, Tokayev (KTK, 2019). This decision also shows 
that the new political leadership of the country welcomes public scrutiny of the project before 
a final decision is made.  
It should be mentioned that in the course of the completion of this thesis, it was revealed 
that the project was cancelled. In particular, speaking at a meeting on the 29th of October 2019 
in Almaty, the newly elected president, Tokayev, prohibited the the Kok-Zhailau project, taking 
into account the opinions of ecologists (Informburo, 2019). Such a situation signifies the 
influence of the public on the authorities’ decision regarding the project. Moreover, such an 
action on the part of the authorities demonstrates that they have truly started to listen to public 
opinion. Furthermore, as explained earlier, the cancellation of the project implies that the 
government has not expended the additional financial resources and accordingly has saved 
them, which is effective in terms of economising on budgetary funds. 
It is important to point out that the empirical evidence presented in Chapter 4 also 
supports the claim that non-participation and pseudo-participation of the public can adversely 
affect the implementation of PPP projects. From the PPP case in China (section 4.2), it can be 
seen that the authorities made decisions without consulting the public, thereby ignoring the 
interests of people, and were ultimately forced to abandon the project as it did not bring about 
the expected results. It can therefore be stated that the decision-making process on the PPP 
project in China was undemocratic. As for the project in Taiwan (section 4.4), the private 
partner took the decision on the tariff for using on-board units without taking into account 
public opinion despite a public survey, thereby failing to satisfy the demands of people. To a 
certain extent, this process also implies an undemocratic decision-making process which led to 
problematic consequences. On the other hand, in the case of the project in Tanzania (section 
4.3), where the authorities ensured public participation in the project during its planning stage, 
the project was supported by the public, and as a result, the project was approved and 
implemented, bringing about the desired outcomes. By involving the public in the project, 
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including local community-based organisations as partners, not only did the authorities of Dar 
es Salaam ensure the effective realisation of the project, but they also implemented it more 
democratically. 
Summing up, based on the example of the Kok-Zhailau project, and taking into 
consideration other examples of PPP cases, it can be stated that public participation can be 
regarded as a means of both democratic and effective realisation of PPP projects. Indeed, a 
positive example of public participation within the framework of the Kok-Zhailau project, 
namely meaningful participation, should serve as a valuable lesson not only for the authorities 
of Almaty, but also for the central authorities and other local authorities of Kazakhstan.  
 
7.2.2. Public participation in PPP projects and its implications for the society in  
              Kazakhstan   
 
Analysing the Kok-Zhailau project, it can be seen that public participation can be 
conducive not only to the democratic and effective realisation of PPP projects, but also to the 
development and advancement of political pluralism, civil society, social capital, and to the 
enhancement of representative democracy in Kazakhstan, thus benefitting the society in the 
country. It is worth noting that these aspects in turn can contribute to the democratisation of the 
society in Kazakhstan. Democratisation of the society is a point of emphasis here, given the 
fact that Kazakhstan is a country with an authoritarian system of governance (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2018), which has not yet completed the transformation into a more 
democratic form of government. As Vestal (1999) asserts, “democratisation is a transition from 
an authoritarian system to a form of government that ensures civil liberties and provides its 
citizens with means to influence or attempt to influence policy outcomes” (Vestal, 1999, p. 17).  
With respect to the Kok-Zhailau project, the fact that the city authorities began to ensure 
public participation in the decision-making on the PPP project and listened to public opinion 
signals the officials’ responsiveness and accountability to the people. Speaking about 
responsiveness, Manin and others (1999, p. 9) stress that when the preferences of citizens are 
taken into account in government policies (programmes), then government is responsive. 
Consequently, one of the criteria for responsiveness is a signal from citizens, which should be 
taken into consideration by their representatives (Manin, et al., 1999, p. 9). In describing the 
concept of accountability, Mulgan (2000) goes beyond the traditional view – to be accountable  
and responsible for someone’s actions (Jones, 1992), and describes accountability as “control, 
responsiveness and dialogue” (Mulgan, 2000, pp. 555-570). In Mulgan’s view, accountability 
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as control implies that citizens can adequately control the actions of officials (Mulgan, 2000, p. 
563), while accountability as responsiveness is understood as officials’ responsiveness to 
people’s demands (Mulgan, 2000, p. 566). As a dialogue, further, accountability is seen where 
citizens can openly engage in discussions with officials so that they can provide answers and 
explanations about policies or programmes (Mulgan, 2000, p. 569). Therefore, it can be seen 
that in addition to responsiveness and accountability, public participation can also strengthen 
public control over the activities and decisions of officials.   
Echoing the same claim, in advocating the idea of participation, Pateman (1970, p. 110) 
maintains that it can allow people to exercise control over their representatives’ activities and 
decisions that affect the lives of people. Similarly, Mikheeva and Mikheev (2018) note that 
public hearings can be considered as one form of public control over the activities of 
government bodies. Furthermore, it is considered that under public control, the decisions of 
officials are made in a more transparent manner, thus preventing corruption risks. As Cobârzan 
and Hamlin (2005, pp. 34-35) argue, transparent decision-making procedures help reduce 
corruption risks by enhancing accountability. As these claims and arguments, together with the 
analysis of the project indicate, public participation contributes to responsiveness, 
accountability and public control, thereby strengthening representative democracy, which plays 
a crucial democratic role for citizens.   
As the facts around the Kok-Zhailau project indicate, the public in the person of scientists, 
sportsmen, students, ecologists, public figures and representatives of various interest groups 
participated in the public hearing which took place on the 4th November of 2018 and expressed 
their opinions on the project (Total, 2018). The participation of different people and interests 
groups in the decision-making process on the project, and the expression of their opinions on 
the project show the diversity of ideas and interests that affects the development of pluralism, 
namely political pluralism which is regarded as the opportunity of people and interest groups 
with different interests to participate in political processes. McLennan (1995) regards 
“facilitation of difference; and representation of difference in all basic decision-making 
arrangements” as the key features of political pluralism (McLennan, 1995, p. 7). Furthermore, 
according to Longley (2019, cited in ThoughtCo, 2019), pluralism in governance signifies the 
peaceful coexistence of people with different interests and their equal participation in political 
processes (ThoughtCo, 2019). The development of political pluralism in Kazakhstan is highly 
positive under the existing democratic conditions, and its development and advancement only 
contribute to the democratisation of society in the country. Moreover, the development of 
political pluralism is conducive to reducing the authoritarian style of governance, one of the 
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features of which is connected with “constraints on political institutions”, thus implying limited 
political pluralism (Link, 1964 cited in Casper, 1995, p.40-41). Casper (1995, p. 40) also 
maintains that authoritarianism is a regime that controls and limits the political participation of 
people and interest groups. 
Returning to the case of the Kok-Zhailau project, the participation of interest groups in 
the decision-making on the project, among which are various NGOs, illustrates the 
development and advancement of civil society in the country by enabling independent NGOs 
to pursue and express their interests. The World Bank provides the following definition of civil 
society: “the wide array of non-governmental and not for profit organizations that have a 
presence in public life, express the interests and values of their members and others, based on 
ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations” (World Bank, 
2019).  It is also worth remarking that the development of civil society contributes to the 
development of democratic society in general. As Kymlicka (2002, p. 80) states, the rights and 
freedoms of citizens are ensured in civil society by means of participation in various voluntary 
organisations. Putnam and others (1994, p. 89) have also stressed that different civic 
organisations contribute to democratic governance, influencing both individual members and 
the whole society. Moreover, according to Dahl (1982, p. 1), independent organisations 
contribute to strengthening democratic processes and political freedoms, thus diminishing state 
influence. Speaking about the concept of civil society, Cohen and Arato (1992, p. 15) argue 
that civil society can be perceived as an objection against authoritarian regimes in Eastern 
Europe as a way to building more democratic societies. Likewise, Whitehead (2002, p. 66) 
contends that without a robust civil society it is unworkable to promote the democratisation of 
society wherein democratic changes are supposed to occur. Indeed, the development and 
advancement of civil society is highly beneficial to the society in Kazakhstan in terms of its 
democratisation.  
Public participation also contributes to social capital that includes mutual understanding 
and interaction of members of society with the aim of achieving common goals, thereby 
producing public good. For example, even the participation of people and interest groups as 
members of society in the discussion of a socially significant issue such as the Kok-Zhailau 
project was carried out in order to achieve a common goal, insofar as this was an important 
issue that concerned not only environmentalists, but also other members of society. Speaking 
about the role of social capital, Field (2008, p. 1) asserts that an individual or a group of people 
enter into relationships with other people to pursue common interests, thereby allowing them 
to achieve shared goals. Putnam and others (1994) have also argued that social capital 
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contributes to the effective functioning of society by means of trust, cooperation and joint 
actions of members of society (Putnam, et al., 1994, pp. 167-176). In the case of the Kok-
Zhailau project, it was thanks to the joint efforts of ecologists, scientists, tourists, public figures 
and local residents that the public was able to draw the authorities’ attention to the detrimental 
impact on the environment due to the construction of the ski resort, which is a common issue 
of importance for all groups. Moreover, according to Putnam and others (1994), social capital 
can generally conduce to promoting democracy by enhancing the role and potential of civic 
community, especially at local levels, where citizens are more interested in interacting and 
pursuing common interests (Putnam, et al., 1994, pp. 181-185). This can be seen in the example 
of Kok-Zhailau project, where the local community of Almaty fighting for its members’ shared 
interests for several years, was able to influence the city authorities’ decisions, thereby 
achieving the political and democratic success. As can be discerned, social capital plays a 
positive democratic role for the society in Kazakhstan.  
Summing up, based on the example of the Kok-Zhailau project it can be stated that public 
participation in the decision-making on PPPs can contribute to the development and 
advancement of political pluralism, civil society, social capital and to the enhancement of 
representative democracy in Kazakhstan. All of these aspects can be regarded as the 
implications of public participation in the decision-making on PPPs for the society in the 
country. Furthermore, these implications have a democratic value for the society in Kazakhstan, 
inasmuch as they can contribute to promoting democratic processes in the country, both 
individually and in conjunction.   
 
7.3. Legal measures ensuring public participation in PPPs, and their  
implications for the society in Kazakhstan 
 
As was discussed in Chapter 5, there are normative legal acts in Kazakhstan that regulate 
the issues of public participation in decision-making. However, some laws do not yet provide 
for public participation in the decision-making on PPP projects. Other legal acts, for instance, 
the Order of the Acting Minister of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 240 of 10 June 
2016 ‘On Approval of the List of Types of Economic Activities within Which Projects Are to 
Be Brought to Public Hearings’ still limits public participation in PPPs involving certain types 
of economic activity. The current state of legal affairs to a certain extent circumscribes the 
political rights of citizens and interest groups to participate in the decision-making on PPPs. In 
this section, it is argued that in order to eliminate such legal restrictions, legal measures 
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providing for the introduction of relevant amendments to normative legal acts are needed. The 
adoption of such legal measures would additionally expand and ensure public participation in 
the decision-making on PPPs. After giving an exposition of the concrete measures proposed 
here, I will examine the implications of such legal measures, arguing that they will strengthen 
representative democracy and promote local, participatory, including e-democracy, thus 
benefitting the society in Kazakhstan. 
It is worth pointing out that some of the legal measures proposed here are based on the 
already existing institutions functioning in the country, through which the public can participate 
in the decision-making on PPPs. For example, as discussed in Chapter 5, there are institutions 
such as public councils and self-government. Tools such as the portal ‘Open Normative Legal 
Acts’, I argue, should be also actively promoted. However, the portal ‘Open Normative Legal 
Acts’ requires substantial improvement to ensure open access to the full and necessary 
information on upcoming PPPs and meaningful participation in the discussion of PPPs as well. 
It is also important to remark that the proposed measures can further help to implement certain 
initiatives (programmes) announced by the authorities of Kazakhstan. Recognising the 
existence of issues pertaining to the distance felt between government bodies and citizens, and 
in order to address such problems, the authorities in Kazakhstan tend to prioritise these matters 
in certain strategic programmes.  For instance, on the 5th of October 2018 in the address to the 
people of Kazakhstan entitled ‘The Growth of the Welfare of Kazakhstani People: Increase in 
Incomes and the Quality of Life’, the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev, 
announced “The state apparatus orientated towards the needs of citizens” to be an essential 
priority for the government (The official website of the President of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, 2018). In particular, in the framework of the first objective of this priority, which 
is “The cardinal increase of the effectiveness of government bodies’ activities”, the President 
proclaimed the following: 
The civil servants of new formation should reduce the distance between the state 
and society. This means the constant feedback, lively discussion and explanation 
to people of specific measures and results of public policy (The official website 
of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2018). 
In the light of such positive initiatives of the authorities, the proposed legal measures can also 
contribute to achieving the government’s priority as set out by the President.     
As discussed in Chapter 5, the government bodies of Kazakhstan still do not fully ensure 
public participation in PPPs before they are approved, instead they practise informing the public 
about upcoming PPP projects. Such conditions preclude the public from participating in the 
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discussion of PPPs prior to their approval. Despite the existence of ministerial orders regulating 
public hearings issues, it is important to legislate for public participation in the decision-making 
on PPPs in the main body of the law governing the relations in the sphere of PPP more 
generally. I would therefore propose that additions be made to the Law ‘On Public-Private 
Partnership’ (2015), providing for mandatory public involvement in the decision-making on 
PPPs by government bodies regardless of various forms and instruments of participation. Such 
a legal measure would ensure public participation in the decision-making on PPPs, making 
government bodies more responsive to the demands of the public and thus strengthening 
responsive democracy. It is worth noting that the same additions are proffered to the Law ‘On 
Concessions’ (2006), which would ensure public participation in the decision-making on 
concession projects.    
The examination of the existing legislation in place reveals the existence of the Order of 
the Acting Minister of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 240 of 10 June 2016 ‘On 
Approval of the List of Types of Economic Activities within Which Projects Are to Be Brought 
to Public Hearings’. Despite this ministerial order, it still confines public participation in PPP 
projects that involve certain types of economic activities. For instance, the public cannot 
participate in public hearings on PPP projects involving the construction of kindergartens, 
hospitals, schools, prisons, sports facilities, whereas according to statistics noted in Chapter 3, 
many PPP projects currently being realised involve the construction of the above-mentioned 
public facilities. Therefore, it is important to make relevant additions to the above-mentioned 
ministerial order to expand the types of economic activities on which PPP projects are to be 
brought to public hearings. Such a legal measure would expand the rights of citizens and interest 
groups to participate in public hearings on PPPs involving certain types of economic activities, 
thus ensuring more democratic opportunities for the public to participate in decision-making 
on PPPs. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the portal ‘Open Normative Legal Acts’ operates in 
Kazakhstan, enabling the public to participate in the discussion of drafts of normative legal 
acts, and thus contributing to the development of e-democracy. There have been reports that 
the central and local government bodies of Kazakhstan have begun to post the drafts of 
normative legal acts on the portal regarding the approval of the lists of republican and local PPP 
projects planned for implementation (Portal 'Open Normative Legal Acts', 2017; 2019). 
Nevertheless, as has been ascertained earlier, the public presently cannot participate in the 
decision-making on PPPs trough employing the portal before they are approved. Indeed, public 
participation in the decision-making on PPPs using the portal would provide people with the 
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rights to have their say in PPPs prior to their approval, thus contributing to the further promotion 
of e-democracy. Norris and Reddick (2013) give the following definition of e-democracy, 
emphasising the centrality of participation of citizens: 
The use of electronic means, principally although not solely through government 
websites and the Internet, to promote and enhance citizen engagement with and 
participation in governmental activities, programs and decision-making (Norris 
& Reddick, 2013, p. 203).  
As Forcella (2006) likewise delineates, e-democracy is a great opportunity for people to speak 
out by participating in the decision-making processes, which also ensures that people are more 
informed about government decisions and policies (Forcella, 2006, p. 101). Notwithstanding, 
as mentioned in Chapter 5, the portal needs to be improved considerably, in order to provide 
the public with open access to all the necessary information on upcoming PPPs in full. To 
address this shortcoming, I propose that an addition be made to the Law ‘On Access to 
Information’ No. 401-V of 16 November 2015, advocating for the full publication of the 
necessary information on PPP projects on the portal before they are approved, rather than 
limiting the published documents on the portal to  drafts of normative legal acts containing only 
the names of PPP projects planned for implementation. Additionally, in order to ensure 
meaningful participation in the discussion of PPPs on the portal, an amendment ought to be 
made to the Order of the Minister of Information and Communications of Kazakhstan No. 22 
of 30 June 2016 ‘Rules on Posting and Public Discussion of Draft Concepts of Drafts of Laws 
and Normative Legal Acts’. In particular, it is proposed that an amendment be made excluding 
the concurrence of drafts of normative legal acts by government bodies after public discussion, 
which should occur simultaneously so as to prevent the risk of pseudo-participation of the 
public in the discussion of PPPs. Such a legal measure would ensure meaningful participation 
of the public in the discussion of PPP projects and the drafts of normative legal acts as well, 
therefore not only improving the portal’s work but also tailoring it towards enabling more 
meaningful participation by the public. Consequently, the above-mentioned legal measures can 
contribute to promoting e-democracy at large.        
An addition could also be made to the Law ‘On Access to Information’ (2015), one that 
mandates government bodies to provide all the necessary information on PPPs before their 
approval and upon public request without referring to the protection of confidential information. 
This and other suggested legal measures would allow the public to have access to the 
information about upcoming PPPs, thereby enhancing the accountability and responsiveness 
from officials to the public. Far from being limited to these proposals, however, other measures 
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could be taken to strengthen accountability from public and private partners whilst 
implementing PPPs, and in particular to ensure the right of both citizens and interest groups to 
obtain any necessary information about PPP projects.  
One of the issues I faced during my fieldwork was the unwillingness on the part of private 
partners to provide information on PPP projects. Given the fact that such unwillingness can 
lead to citizens and interest groups not being fully informed about PPP projects, a provision 
could be added to the Law ‘On Access to Information’, mandating private partners to provide 
information about PPPs upon public request, without referring to the confidentiality of 
information. Moreover, government bodies and private organisations alike should be required 
to report on the progress of PPP projects on a regular basis. Currently, the Law ‘On Local State 
Government and Self-Government in the Republic of Kazakhstan’ No. 148-II of 23 January 
2001 prescribes that heads of relevant levels of local government must report to the populace 
on the execution of certain budgets. Notwithstanding, it is necessary that all central and local 
government bodies, as well as private organisations implementing PPP projects report to the 
public on budget execution, together with the work done and scheduled activities within PPPs 
on a regular basis. These obligations could be specified in the Law ‘On Public- Private 
Partnership’ (2015) in order to enhance the accountability from both government bodies and 
private organisations, as well as public control over their activities while implementing PPPs, 
and to strengthen representative democracy more broadly. 
One of the areas where additional legal measures could be taken is with regards to the 
institution of public councils. In accordance with article 1, paragraph 1 of the Law of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan ‘On Public Councils’ No. 383-V, adopted on the 2nd of November 
2015, public councils are regarded to be consultative and advisory, and supervisory boards 
formed by ministries and local government bodies together with citizens and non-profit 
organisations. One of the objectives of public councils is “to represent the interests of civil 
society and take into account public opinion when discussing and making decisions at 
republican and local levels” (Law ‘On Public Councils’, 2015). Therefore, public councils can 
relay public suggestions and ideas to government bodies when making decisions that concern 
the interests of the public. This is a significant role for public councils, as Bishop and Davis 
(2002) have noted, advisory boards or committees comprising different community members 
act as providers of opinions to government bodies that plays a significant role both for 
government and the public to deal with issues of concern to both (Bishop & Davis, 2002, pp. 
20-22). Nevertheless, as the analysis of the existing legislation has shown, the Law ‘On Public 
Councils’ (2015) does not grant the public the right to participate in the discussion of PPP 
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projects through public councils. In order to grant this right to public councils, it is proposed 
that an addition be made to this law, allowing public councils at both central and local levels to 
discuss PPP projects before they are approved. Such a legal measure would intensify the role 
of public councils both at central and local levels. Furthermore, it would expand the political 
freedoms and rights of the public to participate in the decision-making on PPPs.    
As the analysis of the existing legislation presented in Chapter 5 has revealed, until 
recently only a single NGO, NCE RK, has participated in the decision-making processes on 
PPPs by providing expert opinion on PPP project concepts. Nonetheless, in November 2017, 
amendments were made to the Law ‘On Public-Private Partnership’ (2015), one of which 
excluded the right of NCE RK to render expert opinion on PPP project concepts (Law of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, 2017). It should be noted that non-governmental organisations with 
the exception of NCE RK could not participate in the decision-making on PPPs, and this 
remains true despite the recent amendments to the law. This is explained by the fact that 
pursuant to article 28, subsections 3 and 4 of the Law ‘On Public-Private Partnership’ (2015), 
only the representatives of NCE RK can participate in competition commissions on the 
selection of contractors, and monitor the implementation of PPP projects. Moreover, only the 
representatives of NCE RK can participate in the work of project groups that can be created for 
the effective management of PPP and concession projects. Given such legal limitation on 
participation of NGOs in general, the following measures are proposed.  
It is important that additions be made to the Law ‘On Public-Private Partnership’ (2015) 
prescribing not only the participation of NGOs in competition commissions on the selection of 
contractors, but also the provision of expert opinion on PPP concepts, together with 
participation in competition commissions on the procurement of work, services and goods 
within the framework of PPP projects. Similarly, additions should be added to the Decree of 
the Ministry of National Economy No. 80 of 27 February 2018, specifying the participation of 
NGO’s representatives in the work of project groups, rather than limiting participation to the 
representatives of government bodies, quasi-state and commercial institutions, together with 
NCE RK. Such measures would in the first instance allow other NGOs to have the right to 
participate in planning PPPs, thus developing pluralism. This is an important factor, since as 
Birch (1993) has stressed in his depiction of ideas of American pluralists Madison and 
Hamilton, the objective of pluralism is to curb the dominance of a particular group, organisation 
or party, which should not be given to violate the rights of other actors in society (Birch, 1993, 
p. 161). Secondly, the participation of the representatives of NGOs in a competition 
commission on the selection of contractors, including on the procurement of work, services and 
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goods within the framework PPPs will ensure the robust public control, accountability, and 
transparency in decision-making, which can reduce corruption risks. As an example, speaking 
about the detention of two vice-ministers of energy at a meeting, the Deputy Chairman of the 
Agency for Civil Service and Counteraction to Corruption of Kazakhstan, Bektenov, has 
recognised corruption as a systemic problem that could be addressed with the help of adequate 
public control (Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 2018b). Bektenov (2018, cited in Kazakhstanskaya 
pravda, 2018b) further opined that if the information on expected expenses of public money 
was more accessible to the public, and the acceptance of work and services was carried out 
transparently with the participation of the representatives of the public, then many corruption 
offenses would be prevented.   
Lastly, legal measures can be made to the workings of local governments, in particular 
the institution of self-government, which as discussed in Chapter 5, operates in the territories 
of cities of district significance, rural boroughs, townships and villages. According to article 
39-3 of the Law ‘On Local State Government and Self-Government in the Republic of 
Kazakhstan’ (2001), local communities can participate in local affairs through an assembly and 
meeting convened independently by the mayors of the respective administrative units, or on the 
initiative of at least 10 per cent of the members of a meeting or assembly, residing in the  
respective administrative units. As the analysis of this law shows, however, local communities 
do not have the right to participate in the discussion of PPP projects, nor in the direct decision-
making on PPP projects. To eliminate such legal restrictions, it is proposed that additions be 
made to the above law granting local communities the right to participate in the discussion of 
PPPs and in the direct decision-making on PPP projects. Such legal measures would not only 
be conducive to the institution of self-government, but they will also promote local and 
participatory democracy as a whole. As Barber (1984) argues, a participatory model of 
democracy is more connected with self-government by people rather than government by their 
representatives (Barber, 1984, p. 151). Similarly, Teorell (2006) citing Nagel (1987) stresses 
that participatory democrats perceive participation as participation in “direct decision-making” 
(Teorell, 2006, p. 790). Bulmer also describes local democracy as democratic governance at 
local level, including through self-government (Bulmer, 2015, p.3; Bulmer, 2017, p. 3).  
As can be discerned, the implications of legal measures directed at expanding and 
ensuring public participation in the decision-making on PPPs for the society in Kazakhstan can 
be the enhancement of representative democracy, and the promotion of local, participatory and 
e-democracy in the country. As Birch (1993) asserts, many democrats believe that by virtue of 
participation it is possible to advance both the “quality” and “efficiency” of democracy in 
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practice (Birch, 1993, p. 81). Verba and Nie (1972) have also correlated more participation in 
decision-making with more democracy in practice (Verba & Nie, 1972, p. 1). Moreover, public 
participation in the decision-making on PPPs can also strengthen the existing institutions in 
Kazakhstan such as public councils, which are generally aimed at promoting public 
involvement in the decision-making on public matters. Hence, the implications of public 
participation in the decision-making on PPPs for the society in Kazakhstan can be the 
development and promotion of local, participatory and e-democracy in the country. In turn, 
these implications can contribute to the democratisation of the society in Kazakhstan, which is 
extremely crucial and beneficial to the society, considering the existing democratic conditions 
in the country. As Whitehead (2002) maintains, democratisation is a “long-term, dynamic, and 
open-ended process”, which moves towards a “more rule-based, more consensual” society, and 




The aim of this chapter has been to examine the importance of public participation both 
for the democratic and effective realisation of PPP projects, as well as for the society in 
Kazakhstan. To do this, in the first section of the chapter, and focusing on the recent 
developments around the Kok-Zhailau project, I detailed the various positive effects of 
meaningful participation of the public both for the PPP project and for the society in the country. 
As I noted, the authorities of Almaty started to listen to the public and to take their opinions 
into account regarding the Kok-Zhailau project, thus making the decision-making process on 
the project democratic. This is evidenced by the fact that the new feasibility study for the 
project, one that takes into account public opinion was brought to public discussion on the 4th 
of November 2018. Following previous public discontent, the feasibility study for the project 
was changed dramatically to one that envisages the construction of a mountain park focused on 
hiking tourism, rather than a ski resort. Various decisions made by the authorities were altered, 
such as the previous plans to construct private cottages, golf courses, gas mains that were later 
abandoned, seeing the costs of the project decline from KZT1.5 billion to KZT200 million. 
Importantly, these changes were in line with the majority of public opinion, signalling the fact 
that the authorities did indeed take the interests and opinions of the public into account, thus 
ensuring meaningful participation of the public in the project and democratic decision-making 
process. Furthermore, the fact that the number of those in support of the project increased since 
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the public hearing, means that people also felt that they were heard and empowered by being 
able to influence the city authorities’ decisions.  
It is important to emphasise that the changes in decisions regarding the project had been 
due to people’s activism and their years-long fight to be heard by the authorities. Consequently, 
not only did public participation in the case of this particular project result in more effective  
decisions, but it also empowered people to make their voices heard, thus making the decision-
making process on the project democratic. As I have demonstrated in this chapter, this 
conclusion is not only seen in the case of Kok-Zhailau project, but also in the international cases 
examined earlier in Chapter 4 of the thesis. These examples together make the case for the claim 
that while in the absence of meaningful participation various risk factors prevent the effective 
implementation of PPP projects and lead to public dissatisfaction and uproar, whereas 
meaningful participation acts as a means of boosting both the democratic and effective 
implementation of PPP projects.  
The analysis of the Kok-Zhailau project further reveals that meaningful participation of 
the public also contributes to the development and advancement of political pluralism and civil 
society, to building social capital and to strengthening representative democracy. Public 
participation in the decision-making on the project through public hearings encourages political 
pluralism by giving a platform and legitimacy to a wide range of opinions and interests. Such 
development of political pluralism in turn contributes to reducing the authoritarian style of 
governance that still exists in Kazakhstan. In a similar vein, giving voice and platform to 
different and independent NGOs when making decisions on PPP projects, is an important 
element in the development and advancement of civil society in the country. Indeed, the 
development of civil society can contribute to democratic processes in Kazakhstan, thus 
contributing to building a more democratic society in the country, where different and 
independent NGOs can function. Public participation in PPPs also strengthens the officials’ 
responsiveness, accountability to people, as well as public control, which not only strengthens 
representative democracy, but also helps prevent corruption in government. Lastly, public 
participation in PPPs, through enabling people to cooperate and pursue shared interests, 
contributes to building social capital which is itself an important factor in the promotion of  
democracy, including local democracy. Hence, the above-mentioned aspects can be regarded 
as the implications of public participation in the decision-making on PPPs for the society in 
Kazakhstan. Furthermore, these implications have a democratic value, and therefore, they only 
ameliorate the existing democratic conditions in Kazakhstan, thus benefitting the society in the 
country in terms of its democratisation.     
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Given the importance of public participation as highlighted, it is important to have legal 
measures in place that safeguard the rights of the public to participate in the decision-making 
on PPP projects being implemented in different areas of activity. In the second section of this 
chapter I outlined some of the ways in which the existing legislation in Kazakhstan can be 
modified to allow of public participation in the decision-making on PPPs. For instance, the 
following additions are proposed to the Law ‘On Public-Private Partnership’ (2015), with the 
aim of expanding and ensuring the rights of NGOs to participate in the decision-making 
processes regarding PPP projects:  
- mandatory involvement of NGOs in the decision-making on PPP projects;     
- provision of expert opinion by NGOs on concepts of PPP projects implemented in 
certain spheres of economic activity;   
- participation of NGOs in competition commissions on the selection of potential 
contractors and in the monitoring of PPP projects, without limiting to participation of 
NCE RK;   
- participation of NGOs in competition commissions on public procurement of goods, 
work and services within the framework of PPP projects.  
These additions, as well as others suggested in the course of the chapter, for instance, to 
the laws ‘On Public-Private Partnership’, ‘On Concessions ’, ‘On Public Councils’, ‘On Local 
State Government and Self-Government’, ‘On Access to Information’ can each play a 
significant role in expanding and ensuring public participation of citizens and interest groups 
in the decision-making on PPPs. Legal measures are especially significant as they can promote 
and protect the rights of the public to make its voices heard, influence and provide public control 
over government bodies’ decisions, as well as to eliminate the possibility of preferential 
treatment, as has been the case with NCE RK and no other NGO being able to participate in 
certain procedures for planning PPPs. In general, as previously stated, the legal measures 
directed at expanding and ensuring public participation in PPP can contribute to enhancing 
representative democracy and to promoting local, participatory and e-democracy, all of which 
are beneficial to the society in Kazakhstan.  
In sum, the arguments in this chapter indicate the importance of meaningful participation 
not just for the democratic and effective implementation of PPP projects, but also for the society 
in Kazakhstan. Although the analysis here has been mainly focused on Kazakhstan, I have made 
clear that the conclusions drawn from this analysis goes beyond Kazakhstan and is indeed valid 
in different countries, as the cases throughout this thesis have demonstrated. Furthermore, as I 
have shown, legal steps can and should be taken in order to expand and ensure the rights of 
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people and interest groups to participate in the decision-making on PPP projects. Such legal 
measures can have a considerable effect in empowering citizens and interest groups to have 
their say in PPPs. They can also have a huge impact on the enhancement of representative 
democracy and on the promotion of local, participatory and e-democracy in Kazakhstan, thus 








The aim of the present research has been to study the socio-political issue of public 
participation in the decision-making on PPP projects in Kazakhstan. The importance of this 
topic is manifold. First and foremost, the issue is of great significance to the people of 
Kazakhstan, given the fact that PPP projects are implemented for the interests of people as the 
end users of public services delivered under the PPP mechanism. Secondly, the issue of public 
participation has a vital democratic and political significance for citizens and interest groups, 
in terms of the opportunity it allows to take part in the decision-making on PPPs and influence 
government’s decisions regarding PPP projects that affect their lives and interests. Thirdly, 
investigating the issue is critical from a practical point of view, since different modes of 
participation, including non-participation and pseudo-participation of the public in the decision-
making on PPPs affect the course of projects. As the cases examined throughout the thesis 
demonstrate, the traditional economic driving force behind PPPs overlook the significance of 
meaningful public participation and more generally the democratic implementation of PPP 
projects for their success. Importantly, apart from advancing democracy, meaningful public 
participation can also ensure the economic efficacy of PPP projects by means of providing 
information and feedback from citizens for whom public services are delivered under the PPP 
mechanism.  Similarly, the study of the issue is vital in terms of highlighting the implications 
of public participation in the decision-making on PPPs for the society in Kazakhstan more 
broadly. It is worth pointing out that these aspects of the issue of public participation in PPP 
projects in Kazakhstan form the basis upon which the key research questions in this work have 
been investigated and which I have endeavoured to answer.    
Given the in-depth analysis presented in the previous chapters by way of answering the 
research questions, in this final chapter I will present a summary of the arguments and the key 
findings of the study as revealed in the previous chapters. Having highlighted these key 
findings, I will then enumerate the theoretical and conceptual contributions of the research, 
which could advance the field of democratic theory, as well as the practical contributions 
offered by the findings of this study. Lastly, I will give recommendations for further research 




8.2. Summary of arguments and the key findings 
 
To answer the research questions, in this work I have employed a multi-method approach, 
in particular interviews, content analysis and case studies, to collect and analyse relevant data. 
The interviews for this research were conducted in 2016, when I met with the representatives 
of government bodies and quasi-state institutions involved in the execution of the PPP policy 
in Kazakhstan. As noted in Chapter 5, the analysis of respondents’ answers indicates a 
deficiency on the part of the government bodies of Kazakhstan in ensuring public participation 
in the decision-making on PPP projects. This can be seen through the fact that the respondents 
do not mention public consultation in their answers, which is one of the most widespread forms 
of public participation. Additionally, as some of the respondents note in their responses, 
information about the forthcoming PPPs is posted on the official websites of government 
bodies, PPP Centre and of its regional centres, as well as in the mass media. This practice of 
informing the public about the forthcoming PPPs, however, excludes any public participation 
in the decision-making on PPPs before they are approved. Such a process, rather than being a 
two-way one, where the public participates in a dialogue with the representatives of 
government, can be considered as one-sided and accordingly the public cannot discuss PPP 
projects prior to their approval. Furthermore, there have been indications that even informing 
about the forthcoming PPP projects is not effectuated in a proper manner. For instance, during 
2017-18 some Internet users remarked on the official page of PPP Centre that government 
bodies published only limited information about the forthcoming PPPs (Kazakhstan Public-
Private Partnership Centre, 2017; 2018a). In addition to poor communication in informing the 
public, this is further indication of the fact that the government bodies of Kazakhstan still 
practice informing about the forthcoming PPPs through official websites and the mass media, 
thus substantiating the problem of ensuring public participation in the decision-making on 
PPPs. 
One revelation during the fieldwork that has received considerable attention in the thesis, 
was the launch of the portal ‘Open Normative Legal Acts’ in Kazakhstan in 2016, by means of 
which the public can participate in the discussion of drafts of legal normative acts. Howsoever, 
as has been ascertained, at present the public cannot participate in the decision-making on PPPs 
prior to their approval using the portal. This claim is supported by the following two 
observations. 
Firstly, no information regarding the upcoming PPP projects was to be found during the 
study of two drafts of normative legal acts regarding the approval of the lists of PPPs planned 
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for implementation. These were drafts of the order of the Ministry of National Economy, and 
the ruling of the local representative body of North Kazakhstan region, posted on the portal in 
2017 and 2019 respectively. Only the texts of drafts of normative legal acts were posted on the 
portal, indicating solely the names of PPP projects. It is clear that in such circumstances the 
public do not have access to the full and necessary information, preventing them from having 
meaningful discussions on the upcoming PPP projects prior to their approval. Secondly, the 
Ministry of National Economy and the local representative body of North Kazakhstan region 
posted the drafts of normative legal acts on the portal, only after relevant central government 
bodies and the local executive body of North Kazakhstan region had compiled the lists of PPP 
projects. In other words, decisions on both republican and local PPPs had already been made 
by relevant central bodies and the local executive body of North Kazakhstan region, prior to 
publication of documents on the portal. This is due to the fact that according to articles 24 and 
25 of the Law ‘On Public-Private Partnership’ (2015), the lists of republican and local PPPs 
planned for implementation are approved by the authorised body on state planning, that is the 
Ministry of National Economy, and local representative bodies. Moreover, in accordance with 
the Order of Acting Minister of National Economy ‘On Introducing Changes and Amendments 
to Some Orders of the Authorised Body on State Planning’ (2018), these lists are compiled by 
central and local executive bodies, which are submitted to the authorised body on state planning 
and local representative bodies for their approval. It can therefore be seen that the lists of PPPs 
planned for implementation, republican and local ones, are approved by the Ministry of 
National Economy and local representative bodies respectively after decisions are made on 
PPPs by central and local executive bodies. Such facts also demonstrate the reason why the 
Ministry of National Economy and local representative bodies do not post documents such as 
the drafts of feasibility studies and/or of design and estimate documentation of upcoming PPP 
projects on the portal. Taken together, these observations indicate the fact that at the present 
the portal does not enable the public to participate in the decision-making on PPPs prior to their 
approval.   
An additional drawback regarding the portal has also been noted in the arguments, as it 
hinders meaningful participation of the pubic in the discussion of drafts of normative legal acts. 
This is related to the Order of the Minister of Information and Communications ‘On Approval 
of the Rules on Posting and Public Discussion of Draft Concepts of Draft Laws and Drafts of 
Normative Legal Acts’ (2016), which provides for public discussion of drafts of normative 
legal acts prior to their concurrence by government bodies. In other words, this ministerial order 
allows the public to discuss the drafts of normative legal acts only before government bodies 
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agree on them, thus creating the possibility that government bodies may not take into account 
the public’s comments. This circumstance indicates the risk of pseudo-participation of the 
public in the discussion of drafts of normative legal acts.    
The second method employed in this research has been content analysis of documents, 
pertaining to normative legal acts concerned with public participation in decision-making in 
Kazakhstan. As the research demonstrates, in Kazakhstan there are ministerial orders providing 
for public participation in projects through the instrument of public hearings. For example, there 
is the Order of the Minister of Environmental Protection No. 135-p of 27 May 2007 ‘On 
Approval of the Rules for Holding Public Hearings’. Legally, this ministerial order can apply 
to all PPP projects, however, until mid-2016 the Order was limited, insofar as public hearings 
could only be held on projects related to environmental issues. Only in 2016, after making 
amendments to the Environmental Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2016), the authorities 
expanded the use of public hearings on projects involving other types of economic activities. 
As a result, the Order of the Acting Minister of Energy ‘On Approval of the List of Types of 
Economic Activities within Which Projects Are to Be Brought to Public Hearings’ was adopted 
on the 10th of June 2016.  
As I have argued, while the adoption of this ministerial order is a positive step towards 
expanding the rights of the public, it still circumscribes the public’s rights to participate in 
public hearings on PPP projects involving certain types of economic activities. By way of 
illustration, the public cannot participate in public hearings on PPP projects involving the 
construction of kindergartens, schools, hospitals, student dormitories and sports buildings. This 
is while statistics mentioned in Chapter 3 show that the majority of PPP projects being realised 
involve the construction of such public facilities (Finprom, 2019). The ministerial order also 
limits public participation in public hearings on PPP projects involving the construction of 
economic roads and streets in localities. It is therefore clear that despite changes, the ministerial 
order continues to circumscribe the political rights of citizens and interest groups to participate 
in the decision-making on PPPs involving certain types of economic activities. 
It is important to remark that there are laws such as ‘On Administrative and Territorial 
Structure of the Republic of Kazakhstan’ (1993), ‘On Local State Government and Self-
Government in the Republic of Kazakhstan’ (2001) and ‘On Public Councils’ (2015) that do 
provide for public participation in the decision-making on public matters.  Notwithstanding, 
these laws do not allow of public participation in the decision-making on PPP projects. Such a 
circumstance indicates the fact that public participation in the decision-making on PPPs has 
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received insufficient attention from the authorities, and the issue has been regulated only at the 
level of ministerial orders, but not at the level of laws.   
Another point of interest in analysing normative legal acts has been the Order of Acting 
Minister of National Economy No. 80 of 27 February 2018 ‘On Introducing Changes and 
Amendments to Some Orders of the Authorised Body on State Planning’. This ministerial order 
defines the ‘Rules of Submitting, Considering and Selecting Concession Projects’ and the 
‘Rules of Planning and Implementing Public Private-Partnership Projects’. The analysis of the 
provisions of this order shows that NGOs are not yet involved in certain procedures for planning 
PPPs before they are approved. For instance, NGOs cannot render expert opinions or 
consultancy on PPP projects during their planning, nor can they be involved in the work of 
project groups and competition commissions for the selection of potential contractors. NGOs 
cannot be involved in the monitoring of PPPs either, with the exception of NCE RK, which 
represents exclusively the interests of commercial organisations. Such circumstances indicate 
the existing limitations on the participation of the public in the person of NGOs in certain 
procedures for planning PPPs prior to their approval.  
As the analysis presented in this work demonstrates, the existing legislation, particularly, 
the Order of the Acting Minister of Energy No. 240 of 10 June 2016 ‘On Approval of the List 
of Types of Economic Activities within Which Projects Are to Be Brought to Public Hearings’ 
provides for public participation in the decision-making on PPPs through public hearings. 
Nonetheless, this order still circumscribes the political rights of the public to participate in the 
decision-making on PPPs involving certain types of economic activities. Such a legal state of 
affairs indicates a deficiency in Kazakhstan with regards to ensuring public participation in the 
decision-making on PPP projects.   
In employing the third strand of methodology for this work, namely case studies, I have 
presented two specific examples of PPP projects in Kazakhstan, examined in Chapter 6. These 
projects, have allowed for a more in-depth analysis of the ways in which public participation is 
ensured, or limited, in planning PPP projects in the country and the effects both for the 
individual projects and the society. The first case examined in this light was that of the Kok-
Zhailau project, which according to the initial version of the feasibility study envisaged the 
construction of a ski resort in the territory of the Ile-Alatau National Park. As discussed in 
Section 6.2 of Chapter 6, the authorities of Almaty city did not ensure public participation in 
the decision-making on the project during its planning. This action on the part of the city 
authorities contravened the Order of the Minister of Environmental Protection No. 135-p of 27 
May 2007 ‘On Approval of the Rules for Holding Public Hearings’. The city authorities, 
146 
 
further, breached the provisions of the Arhus Convention, pursuant to which they had to involve 
the public in the discussion of the project during its planning. Evidently, these facts illustrate 
that the city authorities violated the rights of the public to participate in the decision-making on 
the project, thus making the decision-making process illicit and undemocratic. 
As the facts around the project show, the violation of the public’s rights and accordingly 
the ignorance of the interests of people and interest groups by not involving them in the 
decision-making on the project caused various adverse consequences for the project.  First of 
all, a social risk had emerged, which grew into a serious social problem in the form of public 
objection to the project, leading to protracted protests. Subsequently, and following from the 
social risk other risks occurred also growing into serious problems hindering the promotion of 
the project. For instance, a legal problem emerged in the form of litigations between the local 
community and local authorities of Almaty, which caused timing, material and moral costs. The 
project was also subject to an investment problem, which arose due to the lack of public support 
for the project. The city authorities, fearing that the project would not be promoted due to the 
lack of public support, stopped allocating funds for the project, thus causing its temporary 
suspension in 2015. Furthermore, due to the disregard for public opinion and the continuous 
public objection to the project, a political risk emerged, badly reflecting on the project. The 
project was also subject to a corruption risk, resulting in corruption offenses committed by local 
officials and thereby leading to the ineffective use of budgetary funds. As discussed in Chapter 
6, all of these problems adversely affected the course of the project, delaying its begining for 
several years and in one instance even causing its suspension.  
As I have noted, in the case of the Kok-Zhailau project, the city authorities began to hold 
public hearings long after making decisions regarding the project. Nevertheless, as the facts 
illustrate, although the city authorities held public hearings, they still did not take into account 
public opinion, thus simply persuading the people to support the decisions made earlier. That 
is, even though the city authorities ensured participation, it was not meaningful since they did 
not listen to people’s voices. To put it in another way, there was only pseudo-participation. As 
mentioned in Chapter 6, such disregard for public opinion continued until the new feasibility 
study for the project was brought to public discussion in November 2018. 
The second PPP case that I have scrutinised in this research is that of the BARAR project 
on the construction and operation of a toll road encompassing the territories of several regions 
in Almaty region. As discussed in Section 6.3 of Chapter 6, the regional authorities in this case 
also failed to ensure public participation in the decision-making on the project during its 
planning stage. Such an action on the part of the regional authorities therefore, similar to the 
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previous case, also violated the Order of the Minister of Environmental Protection No. 135-p 
of 27 May 2007 ‘On Approval of the Rules for Holding Public Hearings’. Not holding public 
hearings at the planning stage, the regional authorities made decisions without taking into 
account the opinions and interests of local people. In particular, the regional authorities decided 
to redeem plots of land and properties at inadequately low prices, thereby causing public 
opposition to the authorities’ decision. Indeed, such a decision-making process was 
undemocratic. 
Such an undemocratic and unfair decision of the regional authorities precipitated public 
resentment, bringing about a serious social problem as a result. In turn, this social problem led 
to other problems such as legal, investment, political and corruption ones. It can be discerned 
that problems akin to those which occurred within the Kok-Zhailau project, also emerged within 
the BARAR project. By way of illustration, the BARAR project was subject to a legal problem 
also involving drawn-out litigations between the local residents and local authorities of Almaty 
region, causing timing, material and moral costs. Furthermore, due to the problem with land 
redemption and unpopularity of the project, the potential investors from China declined to 
invest in the project (Krysha, 2015), bringing about an investment problem. Additionally, the 
regional authorities themselves postponed the project several times by reason of financial 
difficulties. The project also underwent a political risk, which arose due to the decision made 
by the authorities not taking into account the interests of the local people, thus inducing public 
opposition to the authorities’ decision leading to the project being postponed. Although the 
regional authorities were able to sign a project contract 12 years after they announced the launch 
of the project, it remains unknown whether or not it will be implemented, and whether or not 
investments will be paid off given the continued unpopularity of the project. Therefore, a further 
political risk could occur if the regional authorities again make decisions about the project 
without taking public opinion into account, such as the decision on the tariff for using the toll 
road. Moreover, similar to the Kok-Zhailau project, the BARAR project was subject to a 
corruption risk too, leading to corruption offenses committed by local officials, thereby 
resulting in the ineffective use of budgetary funds. As has been demonstrated, all of these 
problems adversely affected the course of the project, delaying it for 12 years, thus considerably 
increasing the initial costs of the project. In comparison with the Kok-Zhailau project, the 
regional authorities have achieved a success by signing a PPP contract to implement the 
BARAR project in accordance with which construction works are now underway. Howsoever, 
it is still unknown whether or not people will willingly use the toll road, and whether or not the 
project will be successfully implemented. Therefore, there is still a possibility that the project 
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could undergo certain risks if, for example, the authorities again take decisions regarding the 
project without taking into account the interests of end users.   
Importantly, as I have noted, in the case of the BARAR project, the regional authorities 
began to hold public hearings long after making decisions regarding the project, including the 
issue of the redemption of plots of land and properties. Despite public hearings, the regional 
authorities were disinclined to reach a consensus with local residents concerning the price of 
plots of land for redemption, thus leading to pseudo-participation.   
The analysis of the two cases illustrates that the authorities of Almaty and Almaty region 
did not ensure public participation in the decision-making on PPPs during their planning. As a 
result, the local authorities made decisions which did not take into account the opinions and 
interests of people. Evidently, these facts show that the representatives of people ignored the 
interests of the electorate, thereby not fulfilling their primary obligations to them. Therefore, 
here I can concur with the claim put forward by Pateman (1970), that the representatives of 
people often fail to protect and promote the interests of people, thereby undermining 
representative democracy. Pateman (1970) associates such a flaw, namely a flaw in the 
“classical theory of democracy”, with insufficient attention paid to participation of people, 
which lessens the “democratic character” of the theory (Pateman, 1970, pp. 103-104). As for 
the two projects, it can be seen that by not involving the public in the decision-making on PPPs, 
the local officials made decisions in an undemocratic manner, as they failed to take into account 
the opinions and interests of people. As a result, in both PPP cases the undemocratic decisions 
of the local authorities led to adverse consequences in the form of social, legal, investment, 
political risks. All these risks grew into relevant problems negatively impacting the course of 
the projects, thereby postponing the projects several times. The fate of the BARAR project 
remains unclear despite the authorities’ success in promoting the project and signing a project 
contract with investors. Moreover, due to the non-participation of the public and accordingly 
the lack of proper public control, both projects were subject to corruption risks resulting in 
corruption offenses committed by local officials, thereby causing the ineffective use of 
budgetary funds. As such, the facts around the two projects make clear that non-participation 
of the public in the decision-making on PPPs can lead to risks during their planning that 
adversely affect the course of PPP projects.  
Furthermore, in both cases we are confronted with instances of pseudo-participation. This 
is since, even though the local authorities began holding public hearings in the two cases, they 
did not take into account public opinion. Indeed, in both cases people were also of the belief 
that the authorities did not listen to people’s voices, and as such the public were not willing to 
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support the local authorities’ decisions regarding the projects. This lack of support in turn 
adversely affected the promotion of the projects. It can therefore be argued that pseudo-
participation, as well as non-participation of the public can have adverse consequences for PPP 
projects, hindering their course by bringing about various risks.   
Additionally, I have also shown that the non-participation and pseudo-participation of the 
public in the decision-making on PPPs can also adversely affect PPP projects during their 
implementation. This is illustrated in the discussion of the PPP case in China in Section 4.2. of 
Chapter 4, where the authorities did not seek to hear people’s voices, nor did they make 
decisions taking into account the interests of the end users of the toll road. Evidently, such a 
decision-making process was undemocratic. As explained in Chapter 4, the provincial 
authorities set a costly tariff for using the toll road, which disproportionately affected many 
impoverished families. As a result, during the implementation of the project, local people 
started to circumvent the toll road, leading to the forced abandonment of the project by the 
authorities. The PPP example in Taiwan discussed in Section 4.3. of Chapter 4 also indicates 
that pseudo-participation was the reason for the negative impact on the project during its 
implementation. As the facts around the project show, even though the authorities conducted a 
public survey during the planning stage, in the end the decision-makers in the person of the 
public and private partners did not take into account public opinion when taking the decision 
on the price for using on-board units. Therefore, this decision-making process was also 
undemocratic. As a result, the public expressed its objection to the decision regarding the high 
price for using on-board units, thereby leading to a temporary suspension of the project. The 
project would have discontinued if the private partner had not reconsidered its price policy in 
favour of the people.  
The analysis of the Kok-Zhailau and BARAR projects also allows for the inference that 
although the local authorities in Kazakhstan involve the public in the decision-making on PPPs, 
they do not yet ensure meaningful participation. That is, even though the local authorities ensure 
the actual participation of the public in the decision-making on PPPs in the form of public 
hearings, they still do not take into account public opinion.   
As I discussed in Chapter 7, some positive developments took place in the framework of 
the Kok-Zhailau project that are noteworthy. In particular, considering the comments and 
suggestions made by the public, the authorities of Almaty developed a new feasibility study for 
the project and brought it forward to a discussion at the public hearing held on the 4th November 
2018. This development indicates that following long disagreements between the local 
communities and authorities of Almaty, the city officials began to take public opinion into 
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account when making decisions. In other words, it can be seen that the city authorities started 
to ensure meaningful participation, since the public can now see changes in the decisions made 
by the authorities, which are more in line with public interests and wishes. For instance, as 
discussed in Chapter 7, the city authorities changed their decisions by declining to construct 
private cottages, golf courses and gas mains (Forbes Kazakhstan, 2018). Instead, they decided 
to build hiking trails and bike lanes. The concept of the project was changed, providing for the 
construction of a mountain park, rather than a ski resort (Informburo, 2018a). Moreover, the 
costs of the project were reduced by 7.5 times, thereby significantly saving the budgetary funds, 
that is, taxpayers’ money. All these changes in the authorities’ decisions illustrate that people 
influenced the previous decisions of the city authorities, thus making the decision-making 
process on the project more democratic than it was before.  
As the facts around the Kok-Zhailau project demonstrate, the number of people 
supporting the project increased since the public hearing held on the 4th November of 2018, 
which is a welcome development, given the various risks that emerged due to the lack of public 
support for the project. At that time, there were still opponents to the project such as ecologist 
groups, however, other public hearings were to take place (Total, 2018), giving different groups 
the chance to voice their opinions.  As KTK (2019) reports, in April 2019 the mayor of Almaty 
city, Baibek, announced that the project would be postponed, in order for a detailed study of 
public opinion, especially that of environmentalists, to be carried out. This decision was made 
upon the recommendation of the newly elected president of Kazakhstan, Tokayev, signifying 
the welcomed fact that the new political leadership of the country is interested in scrutinising 
public opinion before making an ultimate decision on the project. Crucially, the principally 
important outcome in this case was not whether or not the project would be implemented, but 
rather, whether the final decision was to be made based upon public interests and needs, taking 
into consideration their opinions. It should be noted that in the end the authorities aborted the 
project. Indeed, such a circumstance demonstrates that the authorities heard and listened to 
public opinion, thus ensuring the democratic decision-making process on the project. Moreover, 
such an outcome has enabled the government not to allocate and expend additional public 
money on the project, thereby minimising the economic detriment to state budget.  
It is important to emphasise that by involving the public in the discussions of the project, 
not only were the city authorities able to make decisions taking into account public opinion, but 
they were also able to reconsider their previous decisions, attaining several positive effects. For 
instance, the city authorities optimised the costs of the project, thus significantly reducing the 
budget funding, leading to effective budget allocation and project management on the whole. 
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More importantly, the city authorities began to ensure meaningful participation, that is, they 
started to listen to people’s voices, thereby making the decision-making process on the project 
democratic. As the facts around the project indicate, the course of the project changed for the 
better, increasing the chance of public support for the project and of its possible approval due 
to participation rather than from non-participation and pseudo-participation. Hence, the case of 
participation, namely meaningful participation within the framework of the Kok-Zhailau 
project indicates that public participation is a critical factor in the democratic and effective 
implementation of PPPs.   
Other empirical evidence from the international cases discussed in Chapter 4 also 
demonstrates the importance of public participation as a means of democratic and effective 
realisation of PPPs. This is seen in particular in the PPP case in Tanzania. As previously stated, 
the authorities of Dar es Salaam involved the local community in the discussion of the project 
during its planning. For example, the city authorities set fees for garbage collection after 
discussing the issue with the local community, taking into consideration the financial 
capabilities of households and entities. As a result, such a sensible and fair decision of the 
authorities found support amongst the local community, promoting the project and leading to 
its effective implementation, thereby achieving the desired results in addressing the 
environmental and social problems in the city of Dar es Salaam. Indeed, by involving the local 
community in the discussion of the project and listening to the people’s voice, not only were 
the city authorities able to effectively implement the project, but they were also able to realise 
it democratically.  
Evidently, the case of meaningful participation in the framework of the Kok-Zhailau 
project is a positive development which comes on the back of people’s activism and is therefore 
a vital democratic achievement. It is hoped that the city authorities will understand what the 
benefits of ensuring public participation in PPPs can be, and henceforth will continue to ensure 
meaningful participation of the public in the decision-making on PPP projects. These positive 
outcomes and developments regarding meaningful public participation within the Kok-Zhailau 
project could and should serve as an invaluable lesson for other local authorities of Kazakhstan, 
as well as for central ones. In other words, it is important that meaningful participation of the 
public is ensured by central and local government bodies alike, in planning each and every PPP 
project. Indeed, the public hearing on the project that took place on the 4th of November 2018 
demonstrates that the authorities of Almaty city started ensuring meaningful participation. 
Despite this, however, as the analyses of the respondents’ answers and of the existing legislation 
of Kazakhstan indicate, the authorities still do not ensure public participation, including 
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meaningful participation in all instances of PPP projects in the country. In other words, the 
authorities of Kazakhstan do not yet ensure public participation in the decision-making on PPPs 
on a mass basis, implying that there is still a deficiency in public participation in the decision-
making on PPP projects in the country.     
It is important to note that public participation, in addition to contributing to the 
democratic and effective implementation of PPP projects, can also conduce to the development 
and advancement of civil society, political pluralism, to strengthening social capital and 
representative democracy. For example, the fact that the city authorities began involving the 
public in the discussion of the feasibility study for the Kok-Zhailau project and taking into 
account public opinion shows that the city authorities have become more responsive and 
accountable to people. Accountability and responsiveness to the public also strengthen public 
control over decisions and activities of officials. Accordingly, representative democracy is 
strengthened by ensuring responsiveness, accountability and public control.      
With regards the Kok-Zhailau project, the participants in the public hearing held on the 
4th of November 2018 were of different background with different interests, and included 
scientists, public figures, activists, environmentalists, sportsmen, students, as well as the 
representatives of various interest groups. A wide range of people and representatives of interest 
groups who participated and expressed their views on the project is indicative of diversity of 
ideas, which is regarded as a key attribute of pluralism. Therefore, the opportunity to participate 
in the decision-making on socially significant issue as the Kok-Zhailau project and the ability 
of citizens and interest groups to express their opinions only develops political pluralism. This 
development can in turn help reduce the authoritarian style of governance that still exists in 
Kazakhstan, thereby contributing to the democratisation of the society as a whole. 
Moreover, amongst the participants in the public hearing there were also the 
representatives of various NGOs, who expressed their views on the project. The existence and 
functioning of various independent NGOs contributes to the development of civil society. 
Indeed, the development of civil society in Kazakhstan can affect the formation of democratic 
processes, thus making the society more democratic.  
Additionally, public participation in the decision-making on PPPs also conduces to 
building social capital which involves the interaction of people to achieve shared interests. For 
example, even public participation in the framework of the Kok-Zhailau project demonstrates 
that people are not indifferent to such issues that are of social importance. Therefore, people 
and various interest groups joined forces and worked together, and as a result began to move 
towards achieving their common goal, that is, to be heard by the authorities through influencing 
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their decisions. As a result, through communication and cooperation, people were able to attain 
that collective goal, that is, they succeeded in drawing the authorities’ attention to serious 
environmental consequences of the construction of the resort. Moreover, thanks to their joint 
efforts and actions, the local residents, activists and NGOs of Almaty were able to influence 
the initial decisions of the local authorities, thus attaining a democratic success, which can be 
seen as a step towards strengthening local democracy. It is not for nothing that Putnam and 
others (1994) argue that social capital can contribute to local democracy by enhancing the role 
of civic community, whose members are more interested in cooperating to achieve common 
goals.  
As the arguments presented here and throughout the thesis indicate, public participation 
in the decision-making on PPPs can have vital implications for the society in Kazakhstan such 
as the development and advancement of political pluralism, civil society, social capital, as well 
as the enhancement of representative democracy. These implications in turn can contribute to 
advancing democratic processes in the country, which is highly crucial and beneficial to the 
society.    
As discussed in Chapter 6, normative legal acts currently in place in Kazakhstan, such as 
the laws ‘On Administrative and Territorial Structure of the Republic of Kazakhstan’ (1993), 
‘On Local State Government and Self-Government in the Republic of Kazakhstan’ (2001), ‘On 
Public Councils’ (2015), provide for public participation in decision-making. However, they 
do not yet provide for public participation in the decision-making on PPPs specifically. It is 
important to note that there are ministerial orders allowing of public participation in the 
decision-making on PPPs in the form of public hearings. Notwithstanding, the existing Order 
of the Acting Minister of Energy ‘On Approval of the List of Types of Economic Activities 
within Which Projects Are to Be Brought to Public Hearings’ (2016) still limits public 
participation in public hearings on PPP projects involving certain types of economic activities. 
To eliminate such legal restrictions, I proposed certain legal measures in Chapter 7, which could 
be added to relevant legal acts, in order to expand and ensure the rights of the public to 
participate in the decision-making on PPPs. For instance, additions are suggested for laws ‘On 
Concessions’ (2006) and ‘On Public Councils’ (2015) regarding the mandatory involvement of 
the public in the decision-making on PPPs and concession projects. Such measures would 
oblige government bodies to ensure public participation at the legislative level, thereby 
intensifying responsiveness, accountability, along with public control. As can be discerned, the 
suggested legal measures, through strengthening the provisions for public participation in the 
decision-making on PPPs, would contribute to enhancing representative democracy and to 
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promoting local, participatory, together with e-democracy, thus benefitting the society in 
Kazakhstan.   
Further additions are suggested in order to furnish the public with the right to participate 
in the decision-making on PPPs through existing institutions such as public councils and self-
government. In particular, additions are proffered to the laws ‘On Local State Government and 
Self-Government in the Republic of Kazakhstan’ (2001) and ‘On Public Councils’ (2015). Such 
measures would not only expand the rights of public councils and local communities to 
participate in the decision-making on PPPs, but would also promote local and participatory 
democracy at large. Also, amongst other additions, it is suggested that a provision be added to 
the law ‘On Access to Information’ (2015), obligating government bodies to post all the full 
and necessary information on upcoming PPP projects before they are approved on the ‘Open 
Normative Legal Acts’ portal. This measure would allow the public to have open access to the 
information on upcoming PPPs, thus enabling them to discuss PPP projects prior to their 
approval through employing the portal. Accordingly, this measure can also contribute to the 
promotion of e-democracy on the whole.      
Apart from laws, I have proposed additions that could be made to ministerial orders. For 
example, it is proffered to make additions to the Order of the Acting Minister of Energy ‘On 
Approval of the List of Types of Economic Activities within Which Projects Are to Be Brought 
to Public Hearings’ (2016), in order to expand the list of economic activities within which PPP 
projects are required to be brought to public hearings. Such a measure would expand the right 
of the public to participate in public hearings on PPP projects involving certain types of 
economic activities, thereby providing the public with more political freedoms. Another 
example is the Order of the Acting Minister of National Economy No. 80 of 27 February 27 
2018, where a provision is proposed to be added for granting NGOs the right to participate in 
the work of project groups as well, thus not confining participation to government bodies, quasi-
state and commercial institutions, including NCE RK. This measure would expand the right of 
the public in the person of NGOs to participate in project groups, thereby enhancing 
transparency, openness and public control while planning PPP projects.   
Summing up, one of the key findings of the research is the indication of the fact that there 
remains a deficiency in public participation in the decision-making on PPPs in Kazakhstan, 
signifying that participation, including meaningful participation is not yet ensured by the 
authorities in all PPP cases. The next key finding of the research is that public participation in 
the decision-making on PPPs, during both planning and implementation stages, leads to 
favourable results, such that it can be seen as a critical success factor in the democratic and 
155 
 
effective realisation of PPP projects. Conversely, the non-participation and pseudo-
participation of the public in the decision-making on PPPs adversely affect PPP projects, both 
during their planning and implementation stages, leading to various risk factors. In other words, 
in cases where the public does not have a say in PPPs that are usually negotiated solely between 
government and business, PPP projects result in outcomes that do not match the demands of 
people as the end-users of public services delivered under the PPP mechanism. The cases and 
argumentations presented therefore, show that a PPP process without meaningful public 
participation risks the economic ineffectiveness of PPP projects. As the other key finding of 
this work suggests, the positive influence of meaningful participation of the public in the 
decision-making on PPPs goes beyond the democratic and effective realisation of PPP projects. 
Crucially, it has been shown that public participation in the decision-making on PPPs can have 
vital implications for the society in Kazakhstan such as the development and advancement of 
political pluralism, civil society, social capital, the enhancement of representative democracy, 
as well as the promotion of local, participatory and e-democracy. In turn, these implications 
can advance democratic processes in the country, thus conducing to the democratisation of the 
society in Kazakhstan.      
 
8.3. Contributions of the research 
 
The present research argues for the importance of public participation as a democratic 
tool through which the public have the ability to influence the decisions of government on 
matters that affect their lives and interests, namely PPP projects. As the arguments presented 
throughout this work indicate, public participation can be seen as a requisite and effective tool 
which effectuates and makes salient the power of people, that is, democracy. Given the focus 
of the research on public participation as a democratic aspect and the clear link made between 
democratic decision-making and the rights and powers granted to the public, some of the 
theoretical implications of the research relate to democratic theory. Additionally, given the 
central importance of the notion of participation, there are also implications for the way 
participation as a concept is defined and understood, namely as implying public participation 
in decision-making so as to influence government decisions.       
One of the key demonstrations of this research is the significance of the principle of 
‘public participation in decision-making’ for democratic theory. The arguments and analyses 
presented indicate that public participation in voting as one of the attributes of democracy, 
particularly representative democracy is not sufficient for the democratic realisation of PPPs. 
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According to the empirical evidence analysed here the representatives of people do not always 
take into account the opinions and accordingly the interests of people when taking decisions on 
PPP projects. In this sense, the decision-making processes on PPPs can be undemocratic and 
by extension may undermine representative democracy more generally. As such, the 
importance of public participation in decision-making is made salient as a vital principle of 
democracy, over and above the participation of people in voting. Furthermore, this principle 
plays a pivotal role in the conceptualisation of ‘participatory democracy’, a separate model of 
democracy, which has public participation in political processes at its core. Indeed, Pateman 
(1970) has advocated for a modern democratic theory, namely, ‘the theory of participatory 
democracy’, which is itself based on the fundamental principle of public participation in 
decision-making (Pateman, 1970, p. 111). It can therefore be seen that the contributions of this 
research extend to cover the concept and theory of participatory democracy.  
In addition to theoretical and conceptual contributions, this research also has clear 
practical contributions, specifically for the effective realisation of PPP projects. As the analysis 
presented illustrates, by involving the public in the decision-making processes on PPP projects, 
the authorities can hear the opinions of people, including the views of experts. Through 
listening to different points of views, including those of professionals, the authorities can make 
decisions that are likely to lead to more favourable outcomes, thereby reducing risks or 
preventing them while planning and implementing PPP projects. In other words, public 
participation in PPPs can be seen to be instrumental in the effective management of PPP 
projects which are implemented for the demands of the general public. Accordingly, the 
effective management of PPP projects can result in their effective implementation, thereby 
conducing to the effective execution of PPP policy at large, which is adopted for the interests 
of the public.    
Further practical contribution of this research is also noteworthy, especially in terms of 
the development and advancement of political pluralism, civil society, social capital, of the 
enhancement of representative democracy, and of the promotion of local, participatory, as well   
as e-democracy. Being developed and effectuated in practice, these aspects significantly help 
to advance democratic processes in countries, particularly in those where the authoritarian style 
of governance continues to exist.  
  




It is clear that due to the limitations of space and in accordance with the defined scope 
and framework, certain issues have been examined in this work, while others remain that 
require further study. These include the issues regarding the participation of other stakeholders 
in the realisation of PPP projects in Kazakhstan. For example, there is a need for scrutinising 
the issue of decentralisation of powers in the field of PPP to lower government bodies at local 
level. In other words, the participation of low-level representative and executive bodies in the 
implementation of PPP policy, as well as PPP projects ought to be examined more fully.  
As discussed in Chapter 6, the local administration of Almaty city, with the status of a 
city of republican significance, is responsible for the implementation of the Kok-Zhailau 
project, while the authorities of Almaty region are in charge of the BARAR project. In Chapter 
5 it was also discussed the fact that local representative bodies at the level of regions approve 
the lists of local PPPs planned for implementation, implying that they participate in the 
realisation of PPP policy. Nevertheless, it should be noted that according to the law ‘On 
Administrative and Territorial Structure of the Republic of Kazakhstan’ (1993), in addition to 
regions, cities of republican significance and a capital, there are other political divisions or 
administrative units of local government such as districts, cities of district significance, rural 
boroughs, townships and villages. These administrative units of local government are inferior 
to regions. Therefore, it is necessary to ascertain how, if at all, the representative and executive 
bodies of these lower-level administrative units participate in the PPP policy-making and   
implementation of local PPP projects.      
In order to be able to exercise the functions and powers in the sphere of PPP, local 
government bodies ought to be vested with the rights to form and execute their own budgets. It 
is worth pointing out that the legislative body of Kazakhstan has granted the financial self-
sufficiency to certain administrative units of local government. For instance, in 2017 the Law 
‘On Local State Government and Self-Government in the Republic of Kazakhstan’ (2001) was 
supplemented by article 38-1, which allows the apparatus of leader of a city of district 
significance, rural borough, township or village, to independently form and execute a relevant 
budget (Law ‘On Introduction of Amendments and Additions to Some Legislative Acts of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan on Local Self-Government Development Issues Law of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan’, 2017).  
Investigating such issue is essential in examining the extent to which the central 
authorities of Kazakhstan devolve the power in the field of PPP to local authorities. In other 
words, exploring this issue can reveal the ways in which representative democracy at local level 
and local democracy are promoted in Kazakhstan at large. As Blomqvist and Bergman (2010) 
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note in their discussion of decentralisation, local authorities can provide local people with more 
opportunities to participate in the decision-making processes on public affairs, since the 
distance between the local populace and local authorities is much shorter (Blomqvist & 
Bergman, 2010, p. 44). Similarly, portraying J. S. Mill’s ideas of promoting local democracy, 
Leigh (2000) has also stressed that central government bodies should develop strategic 
functions, whereas local government bodies ought to deal with implementation of those 
strategic functions on the ground (Leigh, 2000, p. 9).  
Another issue that needs to be examined further, is the participation of other state 
institutions apart from government bodies in the implementation of PPP policy, including PPP 
projects. This is explained by the fact that according to article 1, subsection 5 of the Law ‘On 
Public-Private Partnership’ (2015), a public partner is defined as “the Republic of Kazakhstan, 
on behalf of which government bodies, state institutions, state enterprises and limited liability 
partnerships, joint-stock companies, fifty and more percent of shares in the authorised capital 
or of voting  shares of which are directly or indirectly owned by state, conclude a public-private  
partnership agreement”. As this definition makes clear, in addition to government bodies, other 
state institutions can act as public partners within PPP networks. At present, there are PPP 
projects in Kazakhstan, within which central government bodies (ministries) and local 
executive bodies act as public partners. Howsoever, it is necessary to explore how, if at all, PPP 
projects are being implemented, within which state institutions, state enterprises, limited 
liability partnerships and joint-stock companies act as public partners. In other words, it is 
important to examine how state institutions, state enterprises, limited liability partnerships and 
joint-stock companies implement PPP projects in practice.    
   
8.5. Concluding remarks 
 
The issue of participation in the decision-making on PPPs in Kazakhstan plays a vital 
democratic role for the public, inasmuch as it allows people and interests groups to influence 
the government decisions on PPPs that affect their lives and interests, thus promoting 
democracy in practice. Moreover, public participation is also essential in terms of the effective 
realisation of PPP projects which are implemented by governments for the benefits of people 
in the first place. As I have argued throughout this work, public participation in the decision-
making on PPPs can be a critical factor in the democratic and effective implementation of PPP 
projects not only in Kazakhstan, but also in other countries.  
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As the findings of the research show, the implications of public participation in the 
decision-making on PPPs for the society in Kazakhstan can be the development and 
advancement of political pluralism, civil society, social capital, the enhancement of 
representative democracy, as well as the promotion of local, participatory and e-democracy,  
which have the democratic benefits for the society in the country. In this sense, it is argued that 
public participation in the decision-making on PPPs can contribute to the development and 
advancement of the aforementioned aspects not only in Kazakhstan, but also in other less 
democratic countries, especially in those where the authoritarian system of governance 

























Appendix A – Transcript of the interview with a former employee of ‘Kazakhstan 
Public-Private Partnership Centre’ JSC (Interview date September 7, 2017) 
1. What are the main objectives and functions of ‘Kazakhstan Centre for Public-
Private Partnership Centre’ JSC (hereinafter - Centre)? 
Answer: The main objectives and functions of the Centre are the development of PPP in 
the Republic of Kazakhstan, including through conducting research in the field of PPP, 
evaluating and examining PPP projects, as well as training and raising the level of skills 
of specialists in the field of PPP.   
   
2. As the Centre monitors PPP projects in the country, what kind of organisational, 
technical and legal issues occur in the process of their realisation? Does the Centre 
participate in solving such types of problems? 
Answer: Yes, it participates. The Centre actively interacts with central and local 
government bodies, quasi-state organisations, private companies, foreign investors, 
associations, etc.  
 
3. Does the Centre scrutinise the international experience of PPP on a periodic basis, 
and does it report the results of the analysis to the Government of the Republic 
Kazakhstan for policy-making?   
Answer: One of the objectives of the Centre is to conduct research in the field of PPP, 
including the study of international experiences and making recommendations.  
 
4. Are there any difficulties in the Centre’s cooperation with other public institutions 
(central and local authorities), associations of private businesses, national (quasi) and 
non-commercial organisations?  
Answer: There are not.  
  
5. In October 2015 the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan ‘On Public-Private 
Partnership’ was adopted. How is the Law working now?    
Answer: In my opinion, the Law allows of PPP to be actively developed both at the local 
and central levels, since the draft of the Law was actively discussed with representatives 
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of the private sector, together with international consultants and representatives of 
international organisations. 
 
6. The Centre had also been participating actively in the development of the Law. 
Which countries’ experience had been used in the preparation of the Law? 
Answer: During the development of the Law the best international practices were applied, 
including the practice in Canada, Australia, France and others. 
 
7. Why had the Government decided to employ the experience of that (those) specific 
country (countries) in public-private partnership (PPP)?  
Answer: I do not think that the Government uses the experience of only one country. 
Rather, on the contrary, the best experience from around the world is used, adapted to the 
context of Kazakhstan. 
 
8. What kind of political, economic, legal or other issues hinder the further 
development of PPP in Kazakhstan?  
Answer: In my view, in general, the major problems of the above are not observed as 
such. For the development of PPP there is a need for a high activity of representatives of 
government bodies at local level. 
 
9. What measures should the Government of Kazakhstan undertake in the first place?   
Answer: The Government carries out activities for the development of PPP on a regular 
basis. Thus, for example, a package of amendments to the legislation on PPP has been 
developed and submitted to the Parliament, which simplifies the procedures for 
developing PPP projects.  
 
10. Do you consider that the proposed international experience of PPP will be 
effectively adapted for Kazakhstani practice of PPP within the framework of the existing 
issues such as the lack of public consultation and to a certain extent the inaccessibility of 
information about PPP projects prior to their approval?  
Answer: The international experience of PPP can certainly be effectively adapted for PPP 
projects in Kazakhstan. However, it cannot be said that work on PPP issues is conducted 
covertly from the public, since, for example, one of the principles of PPP defined in the 
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Law is the principle of competitiveness, which also involves the coverage of forthcoming 
projects in the mass media. 
        
11. Could you briefly tell what basic measures or novelties have been implemented by 
the Law? 
Answer: The law itself is new. Its main novelties include the expansion of the possibility 
of implementing PPPs in various industries; the simplified procedures for small PPP 
projects at a local level; the decentralisation of the decision-making process for 
implementing PPP projects; the introduction of private financial initiative and others.  
 
12. Is the activity of the private sector (domestic and foreign companies) being 
observed in the realisation of PPP projects since the Law was enacted? 
Answer: Yes, it is being observed.     
     
13. What personal ideas (suggestions) do you have for the further improvement of PPP 
in Kazakhstan? 
Answer: A high activity of representatives of government bodies is needed at local level 
when working with potential PPP investors. 
 
14. Can you say that at present Kazakhstan is experiencing an effective system of PPP 
that benefits all concerned parties and the general public in the first place?  
Answer: Yes, I think so. However, it is necessary to understand that the PPP mechanism 
requires continuous improvement and update to meet the growing needs of the public.   
 
15. When will the society in Kazakhstan experience an effective model of the 
development of PPP in the future? 
Answer: The society is already experiencing some positive results of PPP – in various 
regions. For example, education and health care facilities are being opened on the basis 






Appendix B – Transcript of the answers of a representative of the Ministry of 
National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Answers received in writing on 
September 8, 2016) 
1. What are the main objectives and functions of the central authorised body – 
Ministry of the National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan?     
Answer: The Ministry of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, being the 
central authorised body for state planning, implements the state policy in the field of PPP 
within its competence, and also implements the inter-sector coordination and 
methodological guidance in the field of PPP. 
 
2. As the Ministry has responsibility for the overall state policy in PPP, what kind of 
organisational, technical and legal issues happen in the process of PPP realisation? How 
does the Ministry solve such types of problems?      
Answer: In the process of performing a policy in the field of PPP, all issues are 
coordinated with concerned public agencies, the Government and business entities. 
Organisational and technical problems do not happen.  
 
3. Does the Ministry scrutinise the international experience of PPP on a periodic basis, 
and does it report the results of the analysis to the Government of the Republic 
Kazakhstan for making policy?  
Answer: The Ministry jointly with ‘Kazakhstan Public-Private Partnership Centre’ JSC 
study the international experience on the implementation of PPP projects on a regular 
basis. All innovations on the legislation, and the overall policy of PPP are consented by 
the Government. 
 
4. Are there any difficulties in cooperation of the Ministry with other public 
institutions (central and local authorities), associations of private businesses, national 
(quasi) and non-commercial organisations?  
Answer: Sometimes there are several problems, mostly minor ones, which we try to solve 
in the working order by coordinating the answers with the administration.  
 
5. In October 2015, the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan ‘On public-private 
partnership’ was adopted. How is the Law working now?  
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Answer: At the central and regional levels, the development of PPP has become more 
attractive. All new mechanisms envisaged in the Law are used in planning and 
implementing PPP projects. The mechanism of the ‘private financial initiative’ is actively  
employed at the regional level.    
 
6. The Ministry is the main developer of the Law. Which countries’ experiences have 
been used in the preparation of the Law?  
Answer: It is difficult to point out the countries whose experience has been applied in the 
development of the Law. The international experience, pros and cons of PPP development 
have been studied. It is possible to mention such countries as the UK, South Korea and 
Russia, as the Kazakhstani model of PPP is similar to the models of these countries. 
 
7. Why had the Government decided to employ the experience of that (those) specific 
country (countries) in public-private partnership (PPP)?  
Answer: As I stated earlier, the whole international experience has been examined. 
 
8. Do you discuss the drafts of laws with any associations of legal units or other non-
government organisations that protect interests of the private sector? Are there any 
disagreements with the private sector on provisions of the draft laws? How do you usually 
solve this kind of problem as a representative of the public sector?   
Answer: All normative legal acts relating to business entities must be coordinated with 
accredited organisations under the Ministry. All comments and suggestions are indicated 
in the letter on the approval of the draft normative legal act, on which the Ministry should 
express its position specifying in the explanatory note. 
 
9. What kind of political, economic, legal or other issues hinder the further 
enhancement of PPP in Kazakhstan?  
Answer: At the moment, there are no obstacles on the development of PPP, all 
innovations that contribute to the further improvement of the PPP legislation are 
supported by the administration of public agencies, including the Ministry. 
 
10. What measures should the Government of Kazakhstan undertake foremost? 
Answer: The Ministry along with central and local executive bodies, as well as with the 
participation of authorised organisations continuously monitors the legislation in the field 
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of PPP. To date, a new package of amendments to the secondary regulatory legal acts is 
being prepared to improve the legislation in the sphere of PPP. 
 
11. Do you consider that the proposed international experience of PPP will be 
effectively adapted for Kazakhstani practice of PPP within the existing issues, such as the 
lack of public consultation and to a certain extent the inaccessibility of information about 
PPP projects prior to their approval? 
Answer: There is no confidentiality of the information on PPP projects, insofar as central 
and local executive bodies post the information on upcoming PPP projects on their 
official websites, as well as on the websites of the Ministry, JSC ‘Kazakhstan Public-
Private Partnership Centre’ JSC, regional PPP centres and in periodicals. At present, all 
normative legal acts are placed on the E-government portal for the nation-wide 
discussion. 
 
12. Could you tell what basic measures or novelties have been implemented by the 
Law? 
Answer: The law provides: 
- removal of sectoral restrictions;  
- expansion of the powers of local executive bodies; 
- introduction of small forms of PPP for the implementation of projects at the 
regional level; 
- introduction of new types of contracts;  
- introduction of private financial initiative; 
- application of government support measures; 
- expansion of the circle of participants; 
- simplification of procedures for passing ‘small projects’; 
- introduction of the institutional PPP. 
 
13. Is the activity of the private sector (domestic and foreign companies) being 
observed in the realisation of PPP projects since the Law was enacted? 
Answer: At the present time, the mechanism of ‘private financial initiative’ is actively 
being used in the project planning. Domestic and foreign companies express their 
willingness to cooperate with the state to implement PPP projects in case of providing the 




14. Do you have your personal ideas (proposals) for the further improvement of PPP in 
Kazakhstan? 
[The answer has not been provided]. 
  
15. Can you say that Kazakhstan is experiencing an effective system of PPP right now 
that benefits all concerned parties, and the general public in the first place?  
Answer: Since PPP in Kazakhstan is developing there are not so many projects at the 
implementation stage, the additional time is needed to achieve the effective level of the 
PPP development in the country. 
 
16. When will the society in Kazakhstan be ready to experience an effective model of 
the development of PPP in the future? 





Appendix C – Transcript of the interview with a representative of ‘PPP Expert’ 
LLP (Interview date August 19, 2016) 
1. What are the main objectives and functions of local executive bodies in the sphere 
of PPP policy?   
Answer: The local executive bodies of the South-Kazakhstan region carry out all 
functions defined in article 25 of the Law ‘On Public-Private Partnership’.    
  
2. How many PPP projects are underway in your region? Do you intend to implement 
them on time and within budget?  
Answer: In the South-Kazakhstan region, there are 6 projects at the implementation stage, 
and the work is underway to implement them.  
 
3. Do you analyse the weaknesses and strengths of PPP at the local level, and do you 
report the results of the analysis to the higher authorised government bodies for 
policymaking? 
Answer: Yes, we carry out an analysis at the local level, and provide information and 
ways to solve them to higher authorized government bodies.  
 
4. Are there any difficulties in cooperation of local authorities with other public 
institutions (local authorities of other regions), associations of private businesses, national 
(quasi) and non-commercial organisations?  
Answer: No, there are not.   
 
5. Do you discuss or propose any suggestions on PPP policy to the Government of the 
Republic Kazakhstan or to the central authorised body?  
Answer: Yes, we submitted our proposals to the PPP Centre when drafting the Law ‘On 
Public-Private Partnership’.  
  
6. In October 2015 the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan ‘On Public-Private 
Partnership’ was adopted. How is the Law working now?    




7. Why had the Government decided to employ the experience of that (those) specific 
country (countries) in public-private partnership (PPP)?  
Answer: We use international experience in implementing PPP projects, including for 
attracting foreign investment. 
 
8. Do you discuss the draft laws with any associations of legal entities or other non-
government organisations that protect interests of the private sector at the local level? Are 
there any disagreements with the private sector on provisions of the draft laws? How do 
you usually solve this kind of problems?  
Answer: No, we do not discuss, we work within the framework of the Law.  
 
9. What kind of political, economic, legal or other issues hinder the further 
enhancement of PPP in Kazakhstan? 
Answer: The further development of PPP in the South Kazakhstan region is hampered by 
the Government Decree No.1095 of December 28, 2015. It is necessary to provide the 
type of activity such as ‘Consultancy for concession projects and public-private 
partnership projects’ to legal entities under municipal ownership.  
 
10. What measures should the Government of Kazakhstan undertake in the first place? 
Answer: It is necessary to provide the type of activity such as ‘Consultancy for concession 
projects and public-private partnership projects’ to legal entities under municipal 
ownership.  
 
11. Do you consider that the proposed international experience of PPP will be 
effectively adapted for Kazakhstani practice of PPP within the existing issues, such as the 
lack of public consultation and to a certain extent the inaccessibility of information about 
PPP projects prior to their approval? 
Answer: I think that the law will gradually be adapted to the economy of Kazakhstan.   
    
12. Could you tell what basic measures or novelties have been implemented by the 
Law? 
Answer: The private financial initiative, the participation of quasi-state sector and 
additional types of contracts. 
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13. Is the activity of the private sector (domestic and foreign companies) being 
observed in the realisation of PPP projects since the Law was enacted? 
Answer: No, today we practically apply all the principles of the Law ‘On Concessions’ 
modified in the law ‘On Public-Private Partnership’.  
       
14. Do you have your personal ideas (proposals) for the further improvement of PPP in 
Kazakhstan? 
Answer: I think it is necessary to provide the type of activity such as ‘Consultancy for 
concession projects and public-private partnership projects’ to legal entities under 
municipal ownership. I suggest holding round tables/seminars/meetings by inviting all 
regional representatives and specialists in the field of PPP on a regular basis. Since we 
already faced difficulties in PPP projects, and we have practical experience, I believe that 
the new law with all its advantages requires a lot of additions: in terms of financial 
modelling, strategic forecasting and pricing, taking into account the specifics of industry 
and of a technological map of industry. 
  
15. Can you say that Kazakhstan is experiencing an effective system of PPP right now 
that benefits all concerned parties, and the general public in the first place? 
Answer: Yes, in the future it will bring great benefits to the economy of Kazakhstan. It is 
necessary to continue the work in this direction. 
 
16. When will the society in Kazakhstan be ready to experience an effective model of 
the development of PPP in the future? 











Appendix D – Transcript of the answers of an employee of ‘Astana Innovations’ 
JSC (Answers received in writing on July 15, 2016) 
1. What are the main objectives and functions of local executive bodies in the sphere 
of PPP policy?   
Answer: The main goal is to create a favourable investment climate for further successful 
implementation of the expected PPP projects. Currently, the administration of Astana city 
is focused on intensifying work on the introduction of the PPP mechanism. Road maps, 
plans to attract investments and to develop territories with the inclusion of indicators of 
PPP projects are being developed. The functions of the ‘akimat’ of Astana are to plan and 
implement investment projects under the PPP scheme. 
 
2. How many PPP projects are underway in your region? Do you intend to implement 
them on time and within budget?  
Answer: At the moment in the city of Astana about 5 projects are at the planning 
(development) stage and about 6 projects are at the stage of preparation for competition 
for the selection of private partners. Yes, when planning PPP projects, the limit of state 
obligations on PPP projects set by the Ministry of National Economy is taken into 
account.  
 
3. Do you analyse the weaknesses and strengths of PPP at the local level, and do you 
report the results of the analysis to the higher authorised government bodies for 
policymaking? 
Answer: Yes, we hold and submit information to the Ministry of National Economy. 
 
4. Are there any difficulties in cooperation of local authorities with other public 
institutions (local authorities of other regions), associations of private businesses, national 
(quasi) and non-commercial organisations?  
Answer: No, there are no difficulties. On the contrary, the akimat cooperates, for example, 
with the National Chamber of Entrepreneurs, PPP Centre and ‘Damu’ Foundation in order 
to improve the efficiency of planning PPP projects. 
 
5. Do you discuss or propose any suggestions on PPP policy to the Government of the 
Republic Kazakhstan or to the central authorised body?  
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Answer: Yes, we submit suggestions on how to improve the legislation in the field of 
PPP, in particular, on simplification of planning procedures for projects, including 
participation in the development of suggestions by PPP Centre on amending legislation 
to increase the attractiveness of projects. 
 
6. In October 2015 the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan ‘On Public-Private 
Partnership’ was adopted. How is the Law working now?    
Answer: Yes, we submit proposals for improving the legislation in the field of PPPs, in 
particular for simplifying project planning procedures, including in participating in the 
development of proposals for amending the legislation by the Kazakhstani PPP Centre in 
order to increase the attractiveness of projects.  
 
7. Why did the Government decide to employ the experience of that (those) specific 
country (countries) in public-private partnership (PPP)?  
Answer: I cannot comment on anything on behalf of the Government of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, but presumably, experience is taken into account in order to apply it in its 
territory, generally, successful experience.  
 
8. Do you discuss the draft laws with any associations of legal entities or other non-
government organisations that protect interests of the private sector at the local level? Are 
there any disagreements with the private sector on provisions of the draft laws? How do 
you usually solve this kind of problem?  
Answer: There is a special procedure for the approval of bills, which includes 
organisations representing business interests. 
 
9. What kind of political, economic, legal or other issues hinder the further 
enhancement of PPP in Kazakhstan? 
[No answer was provided].   
  
10. What measures should the Government of Kazakhstan undertake in the first place? 
Answer: In my opinion, at the moment, the Government is taking enough measures to 
develop PPP in the country, including the development of the Law ‘On Public-Private 




11. Do you consider that the proposed international experience of PPP will be 
effectively adapted for Kazakhstani practice of PPP within the existing issues such as the 
lack of  public consultation and to a certain extent the inaccessibility of information about 
PPP projects prior to their approval? 
Answer: Given the new Law, I think PPP in Kazakhstan has a future. So, for example, a 
legislator allows us to conduct a so-called competitive dialogue with business 
representatives in the framework of which, technical, financial, legal parameters of a 
future project are discussed when developing a PPP project. The issue of closed 
information is no longer discussed. And I hope that, using the opportunities that the new 
Law gives us, we can successfully implement PPP projects. 
 
12. Could you tell what basic measures or novelties have been implemented by the 
Law? 
Answer: This is exactly what I have just talking about. The possibility to apply dialogue 
with the private sector during the development stage of project. Implementation of a 
private financial initiative in the framework of which there is no need to conduct a tender 
(if there are no alternative proposals), and much more. 
 
13. Is the activity of the private sector (domestic and foreign companies) being 
observed in the realisation of PPP projects since the Law was enacted? 
Answer: Yes, of course. 
 
14. Do you have your personal ideas (proposals) for the further improvement of PPP in 
Kazakhstan? 
[No answer was provided].   
 
15. Can you say that Kazakhstan is experiencing an effective system of PPP right now 
that benefits all concerned parties, and the general public in the first place? 
Answer: I think it is too early to talk about this since all projects are now at the planning 
stage. 
 
16. When will the society in Kazakhstan be ready to experience an effective model of 
the development of PPP in the future? 
[No answer was provided].  
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Appendix E – Transcript of the interview with an expert of ‘Kazakhstan Public-Private 
Partnership Centre’ JSC (Interview date - July 19, 2016) 
 
1. What are the main objectives and functions of JSC ‘Kazakhstan Public-Private 
Partnership Centre’?     
Answer: The Centre was established in accordance with the Resolution of the 
Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated from July 17, 2008, No. 693 ‘On the 
Establishment of a Specialized Organisation on Concessions’. The only shareholder of 
the Centre is the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the person of the Ministry 
of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The Centre is the leading 
Kazakhstani analytical and expert centre for the development of public-private 
partnership. The activities of the Centre are focused on carrying out studies, examinations 
and evaluations of the implementation of investment projects in the sphere of PPP.  
 
2. As the Centre performs the overall monitoring over PPP projects in the country, 
what kind of organisational, technical and legal issues happen in the process of their 
realisation? Does the Centre participate in solving such types of problem?     
Answer: As the leading Kazakhstani analytical and expert centre for PPP development, 
the Centre participates in PPP project management processes starting from the initiation 
of projects up to their completion and monitoring of implementation. Since the concept 
of PPP in Kazakhstan is relatively new, various issues arise as projects are implemented. 
For example, in order to resolve organisational problems of projects, the Centre organises 
and participates in various meetings with representatives of public agencies and business 
structures on a regular basis and conducts various training events to promote the practice 
of applying the PPP mechanism. If technical or legal issues arise, the Centre takes the 
important participation in solving them, and for this purpose the project and 
methodological offices of the Centre are involved. The technical and legal issues are 
mostly the following: defining an institutional scheme for the implementation of projects; 
selection of the optimal financing structure; the type of PPP contract; the budget 




3. Does the Centre scrutinise the international experience of PPP on a periodic basis, 
and does it report the results of the analysis to the Government of the Republic 
Kazakhstan for policymaking?    
Answer: So as to solve the emerging issues on the implementation of projects, the analysts 
of the Centre conduct an in-depth analysis of the international experience of 
implementing similar projects based on the experience of leading countries in the field of 
PPPs (South Korea, Canada, France, Great Britain, etc.). Being an analytical and expert 
organisation of the Government, the Centre on a regular basis provides information to the 
authorised bodies. 
 
4. Are there any difficulties in cooperation of the Centre with other public institutions 
(central and local authorities), associations of private businesses, national (quasi) and 
non-commercial organisations?   
Answer: No, difficulties do not arise. The above organisations appeal to the Centre’s 
consultations in oral and written forms. 
 
5. In October 2015 the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan ‘On public-private 
partnership’ was adopted. How is the Law working now?    
Answer: After the adoption of the Law, PPP development in Kazakhstan received a 
significant impulse, the number of announced PPP projects at the republican and local 
levels has increased significantly. 
 
6. The Centre had also been participating actively in the development of the Law. 
Which countries’ experience have been used in the preparation of the Law?  
Answer: During elaborating the Law on PPP, the best practices in the field of PPP of the 
following countries were used: the UK, France, South Korea and Japan. 
 
7. Why had the Government decided to employ the experience of that (those) 
specific country (countries) in public-private partnership (PPP)?  
Answer: The practice of PPP is relatively new for Kazakhstan. So as to use the positive 
practices, and to avoid mistakes, the experience of certain countries which have 




8. What kind of political, economic, legal or other issues hinder the further 
enhancement of PPP in Kazakhstan?  
Answer: At the regional level, the decision-making process is facilitated by the decision 
of regional authorities. Therefore, as long as the alternative schemes for implementing 
investment projects are chosen, PPP will have a negative development dynamic. 
Likewise, the budget deficit is the impetus for the development of PPP, since this 
mechanism allows to reduce the current burden on the budget. And in case of positive 
economic situation in the country and in the world, PPP may lose its relevance. 
 
9. What measures should the Government of Kazakhstan undertake foremost?   
Answer: I think it is expedient to develop human resources potential in public agencies, 
in particular, to train specialists in the field of PPP. 
 
10. Do you consider that the proposed international experience of PPP will be 
effectively adapted for Kazakhstani practice of PPP within the existing issues, such as the 
lack of public consultation and to a certain extent the inaccessibility of information about 
PPP projects prior to their approval?   
Answer:       Currently, having adopted the PPP Law, the project implementation process 
has become more transparent. In the process of realisation of projects, potential private 
partners have the right to participate in a ‘competitive’ dialogue and offer their own 
visions for the implementation of projects. Moreover, investors can independently initiate 
the implementation of PPP projects. 
 
11. Could you tell what basic measures or novelties have been implemented by the 
Law? 
Answer: New types of contracts such as – the service contract, trust management, life 
cycle contract and others. The possibility of direct negotiations (private financial 
initiative), the application of the competitive dialogue and others. 
 
12. Is an activity of the private sector (domestic and foreign companies) being observed 
in the realisation of PPP projects since the Law was enacted?        
Answer: Since January 2016, over 200 foreign and domestic investors have appealed for 
consultations to the Centre. 
176 
 
13. Do you have your personal ideas (proposals) for the further improvement of PPP in 
Kazakhstan? 
Answer: I think it is necessary to train in maximum the public servants responsible for 
the implementation of PPP projects with all the aspects and nuances of this mechanism. 
It is also problematic to finance the preparation of project documentation, therefore the 
creation of the fund for financing the consultative support will give impetus for the 
development of PPP in Kazakhstan. 
 
14. Can you say that Kazakhstan is experiencing an effective system of PPP right now 
that benefits all concerned parties, and the general public in the first place?    
Answer: Kazakhstan has a strong methodological base, currently it is planned to 
implement about 200 PPP projects. The main beneficiaries of PPP projects will be the 
public, as PPP projects often taken place in the social sphere. 
 
15. When will the society in Kazakhstan be ready to experience an effective model of 
the development of PPP in the future?   
Answer: In 2017 current PPP projects are going to be put into operation, accordingly the 
















Appendix F – Transcript of the answers of a member of local government, 
Department of Education of the city of Astana (Answers received in writing on 
September 19, 2016) 
1. What are the main objectives and functions of local authorities in the sphere of PPP 
policy?   
Answer: It is stipulated in article 3 of the Law ‘On Public-Private Partnership’.  
 
2. How many PPP projects are underway in your region? Do you intend to implement 
them on time and within budget?  
Answer: Ten projects for the construction of kindergartens, and the implementation 
period is 2016-2022.  
 
3. Do you analyse the weaknesses and strengths of PPP at the local level, and do you 
report the results of the analysis to the higher authorised government bodies for 
policymaking? 
Answer: On October 31, 2015 the Law ‘On Public-Private Partnership’ was entered into 
force, and all previously problematic issues were settled in that bill. 
  
4. Are there any difficulties in cooperation of local authorities with other public 
institutions (local authorities of other regions), associations of private businesses, national 
(quasi) and non-commercial organisations?  
         Answer: No.   
 
5. Do you discuss or propose any suggestions on PPP policy to the Government of the 
Republic Kazakhstan or to the central authorised body?  
Answer: Given that this is a new direction, questions arise during the course of 
implementation on the results of which, relevant proposals will be certainly submitted to 
the government body responsible for developing the law on PPP.  
 
6. In October 2015 the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan ‘On Public-Private 
Partnership’ was adopted. How is the Law working now?    
Answer: All PPP projects are currently being implemented in accordance with the Law 




7. Why did the Government decide to employ the experience of that (those) specific 
country (countries) in public-private partnership (PPP)?  
The question is not to local executive bodies.  
 
8. Do you discuss the draft laws with any associations of legal entities or other non-
government organisations that protect interests of the private sector at the local level? Are 
there any disagreements with the private sector on provisions of the draft laws? How do 
you usually solve this kind of problems?  
Answer: With the Regional Chamber of Entrepreneurship.  
 
9. What kind of political, economic, legal or other issues hinder the further 
enhancement of PPP in Kazakhstan? 
Answer: There are none yet, at least we do not have such problems.  
 
10. What measures should the Government of Kazakhstan undertake in the first place? 
 [No answer was provided]. 
  
11. Do you consider that the proposed international experience of PPP will be 
effectively adapted for Kazakhstani practice of PPP within the existing issues, such as the 
lack of public consultation and to a certain extent the inaccessibility of information about 
PPP projects prior to their approval? 
Answer: All PPP projects are open, there is a procedure for coordinating projects, all 
information is available on the official websites of government agencies. 
 
12. Could you tell what basic measures or novelties have been implemented by the 
Law? 
Answer: Previously, there was only the law on concessions, now the concept of 
concession is included as a type of PPP. There are the following ways of implementing 
public-private partnerships:   
1) Public-private partnerships in terms of implementation are divided into 
institutional and contractual. 
2) Institutional public-private partnerships are implemented by a public-private 
partnership company in accordance with a public-private partnership agreement. 
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3) In other cases, public-private partnerships are carried out according to the 
method of public-private partnership. 
The contractual public-private partnerships are implemented through the conclusion of a 
public-private partnership contract, including the following types:  
1) concessions; 
2) trust management of state property; 
3) property hiring (leasing) of state property; 
4) leasing; 
5) contracts concluded for the development of technology, the manufacture of a 
prototype, pilot testing and small-scale production; 
6) life cycle contract; 
7) service contract; 
8) other agreements corresponding to the features of public-private partnership. 
When implementing certain types of contractual public-private partnerships which are 
not regulated by this Law, the provisions of the relevant laws of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan are applied, including the features provided for by the Law of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan ‘On Concession’.  
 
13. Is the activity of the private sector (domestic and foreign companies) being 
observed in the realisation of PPP projects since the Law was enacted? 
Answer: The activity occurs when projects are developed and when potential investors 
are searched for.   
 
14. Do you have your personal ideas (proposals) for the further improvement of PPP in 
Kazakhstan? 
Answer: There are none yet.  
 
15. Can you say that Kazakhstan is experiencing an effective system of PPP right now 
that benefits all concerned parties, and the general public in the first place? 
Answer: Yes.  
 
16. When will the society in Kazakhstan be ready to experience an effective model of 
the development of PPP in the future? 
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Answer: After the implementation of PPP projects, each project has its own 
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